











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
Essays on Equilibrium Unemployment Dynamics
Bradley James Speigner
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
The University of Edinburgh
2012
Contents
Declaration of Own Work 4
Acknowledgements 5
Overview 6




2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Firms and the Labour Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 Labour Market Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.1 Vacancy Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.2 Wage Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.3 Optimal Hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4 Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3 Solution and Calibration 27
4 Results 30
4.1 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2 Welfare Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3 Fiscal Stimulus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38




7.1 Solution Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.2 Description of the Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
II Monetary Policy and Job Creation in a New Keynesian Model 67
1 Introduction 67
1
2 Baseline Model 74
2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.2 Firm Structure and Job Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.3 Labour Force Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.4 Firm Optimisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.5 Recursive Representation of the Labour Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.6 Wage Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.7 Participation Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.8 Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3 Solution and Calibration 91
4 Baseline Results 94
5 Further Discussion 97
5.1 Comparison Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2 Nominal Rigidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.3 Eliminating Passive Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.4 Time-Inseparable Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6 Conclusion 109
7 References 111
8 Appendix I: Derivation of Equilibrium Wage 116
9 Appendix II: Accommodative Monetary Policy 117
III Equilibrium Matching and Age Discrimination Policy 138
1 Introduction 138
2 Model 145
2.1 Age-Specic Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
2.1.1 Recursive Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
2.1.2 Wage Determination and Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
2.1.3 Equilibrium Life Cycle Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
2.2 Random-Age Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3 Constrained E¢ ciency 155
4 Quantitative Analysis 162
4.1 Calibration and Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
2
4.2.1 Decentralised Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
4.2.2 Welfare Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5 Conclusion 173
6 References 173
7 Appendix: Wage Derivation 175
3
Declaration of Own Work
I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and is the result of my
own work under the guidance of my supervisors as stated in the acknowledgements.
References to published material are clearly indicated in the text. None of the work






I was very lucky to have two excellent supervisors whilst on the PhD programme
at Edinburgh, Professor Jose V. Rodriguez Mora and Dr. Richard Holt. Sevi and
Ric always took a keen interest in my research right from the start. Their openness
to discussion was probably the most rewarding part of my experience, as well as an
instrumental source of motivation. It goes without saying that I owe them both a huge
debt of gratitude. I would also like to thank Professor Ed Hopkins, who directs the
PhD programme in economics, for all the work he puts into making sure that the best
possible platform to succeed is available to each research student at Edinburgh. Full
nancial support from the Edinburgh School of Economics and the Scottish Economic
Society is also gratefully acknowledged.
Finally, but most importantly, I would like to thank my mother, Anna, for providing
me with yet another opportunity for achievement.
5
Overview
This thesis is a collection of three essays in which the behaviour of unemployment is
studied in di¤erent dynamic environments. Throughout, unemployment is understood
to be involuntary, arising due to the uncoordinated nature of trade in the labour mar-
ket as viewed from the perspective of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides equilibrium
matching model. It goes without saying that the fundamental motivation for pursuing
this line of research is provided by the untold consequences, both human and economic,
of otherwise capable people remaining involuntarily idle. An attempt, therefore, is made
to contribute to the understanding of how various aspects of macroeconomic policy can
inuence unemployment outcomes. The approach maintained throughout is to combine
general equilibrium modelling with simulation techniques in order to provide not only
qualitative inferences but also quantitative descriptions of equilibrium dynamics. The
dynamic environments considered cover both the business cycle (the rst two chapters)
and the life cycle (the third chapter).
In the rst chapter, Structural Tax Reform and the Cyclical Behaviour of the Labour
Market, we build a real business cycle model with frictional unemployment and distor-
tionary tax rates which are increasing in individual taxable labour income. The cyclical
aspects of tax reform that are addressed in this chapter are distinct from the station-
ary state distributional issues that have garnered most of the attention in the existing
literature on structural tax reform. Estimating the tax code parameters from federal
income tax return data for the U.S., we nd that a reduction in the progressivity of
the tax system is associated with a signicant increase in the volatility of hours per
worker. The intuition is simply that the greater the extent to which marginal tax rates
uctuate in response to shocks, the smaller the incentive to adjust working hours. But
in a frictional labour market in which it is costly for rms to issue vacancies, the behav-
iour of hours - i.e. intensive adjustment, or adjustment in the intensive margin - is a
determining factor of job creation - i.e. extensive adjustment. We then explain how the
dynamic behaviour of hours along the adjustment path to an aggregate productivity
shock generates o¤setting incentives for job creation, with the result that tax reform
has little impact on unemployment uctuations. The welfare cost of the business cycle
is also computed under di¤erent tax regimes. It is found that although business cycles
are more costly under a at tax, the overall welfare implications are quantitatively
negligible regardless of the tax system.
Having described the e¤ects of the tax system on equilibrium dynamics when per-
turbed by a productivity disturbance, we then consider business cycle adjustment to
an aggregate demand shock in the form of scal stimulus. In light of recent scal devel-
opments in the U.S. and Europe, the ability of expansionary scal policy to stimulate
output has gained renewed interest in the business cycle literature. We contribute to
the analysis by assessing whether the e¢ cacy of government expenditure in reducing
unemployment depends on the structure of the tax system. It is demonstrated that a
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less progressive tax policy increases the ability of expansionary scal policy to stimu-
late output due to a larger response in hours, but this comes at the cost of a smaller
unemployment multiplier. Tax reform therefore causes a compositional shift in labour
market adjustment in response to aggregate demand shocks, with relatively more ad-
justment occurring in the intensive margin and less adjustment in the extensive margin
the atter the tax schedule is. The reason why this compositional shift occurs for a
demand shock but not a supply shock is that the adjustment path of hours is qualita-
tively dependent on the type of disturbance. In particular, we describe how equilibrium
undershooting in hours occurs only in response to an aggregate productivity (supply)
shock, whereas the negative wealth e¤ects arising from increased government expendi-
ture exert sustained upward pressure on hours along the entire adjustment path, thus
providing a signicant incentive for rms to substitute away from job creation.
The second chapter, Monetary Policy and Job Creation in a New Keynesian Model,
is motivated by the work of Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and Krause and Lubik (2007).
These studies indicate that a typical monetary business cycle model with frictional un-
employment and endogenous job destruction tends to encounter di¢ culty in generating
a rise in job creation in response to expansionary monetary policy, rendering the model
inconsistent with the downward sloping Beveridge curve that appears in the data and
implying only a limited policy role for inationary job creation. Matching frictions in
the labour market congest the job creation process so that rms tend to skew adjust-
ment to shocks towards the job destruction margin. In recognition of the assertion
put forth but unpursued by Cooley and Quadrini (1999) that uctuations in the size
of the labour force may ease labour market congestion and therefore amplify cyclical
job creation, in Chapter II we extend a New Keynesian model with unemployment
to feature an endogenous labour market participation decision. However, a baseline
model with a standard degree of risk aversion tends to exhibit countercyclical labour
force participation, which is inconsistent with the data. In order to address this issue,
we propose the notion of labour market participation as a social consideration, which
we demonstrate to be capable of generating procyclical participation incentives. The
basic idea is that agents will tend not to exit the labour force during booms in order
to "keep up with the Joneses". We then nd that plausible uctuations in the size of
the labour force do not exert a quantitatively signicant e¤ect on job creation.
In light of this result, we search for alternative mechanisms which may overturn
the conclusion that inationary policy is incapable of incentivising job creation. The
approach taken involves switching focus to the characteristics of aggregate demand
dynamics along the adjustment path to a monetary shock. It is well known that stan-
dard New Keynesian models fail to deliver the gradual, hump-shaped adjustment path
to monetary policy shocks that is observed in the data. We argue that if aggregate
demand experiences a persistent increase in response to a monetary shock instead of
peaking on impact, the incentive for rms to create jobs becomes amplied. The intu-
ition is that, since the job creation decision is forward-looking due to the presence of
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matching frictions, aggregate demand must rise persistently even after the shock takes
place so that rms anticipate a further increase in aggregate demand in order for the
time consuming process of issuing a vacancy to be justied. To demonstrate this, it is
shown that, by altering the dynamics of aggregate demand, time-inseparability in the
utility function can signicantly improve the ability of expansionary monetary policy
to increase job creation, allowing the model to generate a downward sloping Beveridge
curve conditional on monetary shocks. In the appendix to Chapter II, we lend further
credence to this hypothesis by describing how the manner in which monetary policy it-
self is specied may give rise to hump-shaped adjustment dynamics and, consequently,
amplify inationary job creation.
Finally, in Chapter III on Equilibrium Matching and Age Discrimination Policy,
we abstract from business cycle issues and concentrate instead on the life cycle. Fed-
eral legislation prohibiting the discrimination of workers on the basis of age has been
in place in the United States since the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Yet empirical studies which aim to estimate the employment e¤ects of such legislation
have yielded inconclusive results. We approach the issue from a di¤erent perspective
by deriving quantitative predictions of equilibrium unemployment theory to investigate
how age anti-discrimination legislation impacts labour market performance. We do not
seek to measure the impact of a particular episode of legislative reform, but aim to
quantitatively explore the general equilibrium consequences of restricting the ability of
employers to hire on the basis of age. The main conclusion is that an equilibrium match-
ing model of the life cycle predicts a moderately positive e¤ect on the employment rate
of workers very close to retirement, but the overall impact of age discrimination policy
on the life cycle pattern of employment is quantitatively small. This occurs because in
a frictional matching equilibrium, the incentive to discriminate against workers closer
to retirement is o¤set by labour market congestion, preventing the demand for older
workers from falling excessively even when it is possible to discriminate on the basis
of age. If the demand for workers of a particular age were to fall sharply, the rate at
which a given vacancy is matched with a worker of that age cohort increases, allowing
rms to capitalise on quick vacancy transition rates stemming from weak competition
in hiring. The model thus suggests that the extent to which the e¤ect of a nite horizon
is o¤set by labour market congestion is quantitatively signicant, implying a modest
role for age discrimination policy in shaping the life cycle prole of employment.
Welfare issues are also addressed. In particular, we demonstrate that an age-
dependent ine¢ ciency arises in the labour market participation decision of nitely-lived
agents when rms are not able to discriminate in the hiring process on the basis of age.
The intuition is that older workers, for whom only a relatively short productive time
horizon remains, do not internalise the negative e¤ect that their participation decision
has on the age distribution of the aggregate pool of searchers. However, the size of this
externality is quantitatively negligible. It is emphasised that the analysis in Chapter III
concerns solely the macroeconomic implications of age discrimination policy as separate
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and distinct from the issue of fairness which naturally arises in this context. Although
the economic impact of age discrimination policy on employment is argued to be quite
small, this does not of course imply that such policy does not have signicant merit
with respect to its assurance of the basic tenet of equal opportunity for all.
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Chapter I
Structural Tax Reform and the Cyclical
Behaviour of the Labour Market
Abstract
In this chapter, we quantitatively examine the consequences of structural tax re-
form in a real business cycle model with frictional unemployment and distortionary tax
rates which are increasing in individual taxable labour income. The cyclical aspects
of tax reform that are addressed in this chapter are distinct from the stationary state
distributional issues that have garnered most of the attention in the existing literature
on structural tax reform. Calibrating the model to U.S. data, we nd that a reduction
in the progressivity of the tax system is associated with a signicant increase in the
volatility of hours per worker whereas the impact on unemployment volatility is quan-
titatively small. The welfare cost of the business cycle increases after tax reform, but
remains quantitatively negligible. We also assess the implications that the structure of
the tax system has for the ability of expansionary government spending to stimulate
economic activity. It is demonstrated that a less progressive tax policy increases the
ability of expansionary scal policy to stimulate output due to a larger response in
hours, but this comes at the cost of a smaller unemployment multiplier. In particular,
tax reform causes a compositional shift in labour market adjustment in response to
aggregate demand shocks, with relatively more adjustment occurring in the intensive
margin and less adjustment in the extensive margin the atter the tax schedule is.
1 Introduction
"How large are the costs of the federal income tax? They are larger than
the federal budget decit, larger than the Defense Department, larger than
Social Security, perhaps as large as the combined budgets of the fty states."
- Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka in The Flat Tax, 1995.
In a comprehensive critique of U.S. tax policy, Hall and Rabushka (1995) make
the case for a dramatic reform of the U.S. federal income tax system which would
shift the economy from a progressive to a at tax schedule. They argue that a at
tax would dramatically boost productivity by improving incentives to work and invest
while shifting massive amounts of resources away from activities which merely serve to
reduce tax liabilities to those that provide real economic functions. Their proposal is
to implement a system in which all personal taxable income above a certain threshold
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is taxed once, and only once, at a uniform rate, doing away with all of the complexities
of the current system.
Involvement in the redistribution of income is one of the dening roles of government
in modern democratic countries. Tax progressivity determines how the distribution of
the tax burden is shared and for this reason progressive tax systems are usually justied
by an appeal to fairness. Consequently, most of the attention in the literature focuses
on the distributional impact of structural tax reform, as well as e¢ ciency and long-run
growth issues associated with lowering or attening tax rates. Heer and Trede (2003)
demonstrate that a progressive tax system reduces labour supply and savings, thereby
reducing capital accumulation and income. But on the other hand, a at tax reduces
aggregate welfare in the long-run through an increase in inequality. By comparing
stationary states, they nd that the net welfare e¤ect of switching to a at tax is
positive. Other studies on tax reform which analyse this type of long-run equilibrium
trade-o¤ include Ventura (1999), Erosa and Koreshkova (2007) and Cassou and Lansing
(2003).1
In contrast to the literature on distribution and growth, the objective of this chapter
is to plausibly quantify the short-run cyclical implications of tax reform, particularly
with respect to central labour market variables. More specically, this chapter focuses
on the consequences of labour income taxation for the dynamics of unemployment
and average hours worked per employee in a real business cycle (RBC) model that is
extended to allow for two additional features; matching frictions in the labour market
and a graduated labour income tax schedule in which the rate of tax rises endogenously
with increases in the taxpayers own wage income. The key parameters of the tax rate
function that determine the structure of the tax system are not calibrated arbitrarily,
but are estimated using actual U.S. data over the post-war sample period. The central
tax policy experiment is then represented as a shift from the empirically estimated U.S.
tax schedule to a at tax programme. We then consider how this change to the tax
structure inuences macroeconomic adjustment in response to both supply and demand
shocks.
Tax reform inuences equilibrium dynamics in our model primarily through be-
havioural changes in average hours per worker. We nd that progressive taxation
signicantly reduces the incentive to work longer hours in response to positive pro-
ductivity shocks by generating a steeper rise in the tax-adjusted marginal disutility
of labour. Agents are more willing to increase labour supply during booms when it
does not result in a commensurate increase in the marginal tax rate. Consequently, the
volatility of average hours per worker relative to output increases by 27% for a baseline
1Recent evidence for OECD countries, however, indicates that government cash transfers, the other
lever of redistribution policy, are substantially more e¤ective at reducing household income inequality
than progressive taxation is (OECD, 2008). The OECD (2008) report also suggests that tax progressiv-
ity is negatively related to tax revenue (Tables 4.2 and 4.5 of the report), so neither can progressive tax
systems be justied on the merit of the potential to support more generous cash transfer programmes.
That the redistributive achievement of welfare state arrangements is largely determined by public cash
transfers weakens the argument for tax progressivity as an implement of social protection.
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calibration after the adoption of a at tax. In the context of a frictional labour market,
the greater the extent to which workers are willing to increase hours in response to
a shock, the smaller the incentive for rms to engage in the costly matching process
involved in creating new jobs. However, along the adjustment path to a productivity
shock, hours initially rise above steady state on impact and then subsequently under-
shoot long-run equilibrium as employment and consumption gradually rise. Flat tax
reform exacerbates both the initial rise and the subsequent fall in hours. Given that
the job creation decision is forward-looking due to the presence of matching frictions,
on balance the impact of tax reform on uctuations in unemployment is quantitatively
small. Under an alternative calibration in which the bargaining power of the worker is
small, attening the gradient of the tax schedule is associated with a moderate increase
in unemployment volatility.
Under which tax policy is the representative household better o¤? The logic of
Lucas (1987, 2003) is followed and the welfare gain from macroeconomic stabilisation
is computed as the percentage of steady state consumption that a representative house-
hold would be willing to pay in order to have business cycle risk entirely eliminated.
In this manner we can then determine under which tax policy business cycles are more
costly. The welfare cost of business cycles, regardless of the tax system, is found to
be quantitatively small, corroborating Lucas (1987, 2003). In the baseline model, the
representative household subject to a progressive tax would be willing to give up only
a mere 0.05% of steady state consumption in order to entirely eliminate business cycle
uctuations. Because tax reform exacerbates business cycle volatility, the welfare cost
under a at tax policy is higher, approximately 0.2% of steady state consumption. De-
spite increasing by an order of magnitude, welfare costs of cyclical uctuations are still
negligibly small.
We then extend the baseline framework by introducing government expenditure to
assess how the structure of the tax system inuences the e¢ cacy of scal intervention.
Government expenditure shocks that absorb output and exert a negative wealth e¤ect
on the household, as in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), are found to elicit a sus-
tained increase in working hours which is amplied under a at tax for much the same
reason as for a productivity shock. However, in contrast to the dynamics induced by a
productivity shock, it is demonstrated that larger uctuations in hours are accompa-
nied by smaller uctuations in unemployment following a scal policy-induced shock to
aggregate demand. This is because the negative wealth e¤ect of government spending
prevents hours from undershooting the steady state along the adjustment path, so that
hours under a at tax tend to be persistently higher. In response to this, rms expand
the supply of vacancies to a lesser extent in order to meet the increase in aggregate de-
mand. Structural tax reform - from a progressive to a proportional system - is therefore
associated with a compositional shift in the way the labour market adjusts to aggre-
gate demand disturbances, with relatively more adjustment occurring in the intensive
margin (i.e. average hours per worker) and less adjustment in the extensive margin
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(i.e. employment). We therefore nd that the ability of expansionary scal policy to
reduce unemployment is weakened by a atter tax schedule due to the crowding out
e¤ect on job creation of more exible working hours. The peak drop in unemployment
resulting from an increase in government expenditure normalised to 1% of GDP falls
from 0.32 percentage points under a progressive tax to 0.20 percentage points under a
at tax. Despite the smaller fall in unemployment, the output multiplier of scal policy
increases from 1.08 to 1.22 on impact for a baseline calibration due to the amplied
response in hours.
Before proceeding to develop the model, we briey review how this study ts in
with the related literature. The relationship between taxation and work behaviour has
received enormous interest in the labour economics literature, and is far too voluminous
to comprehensively review here (see Meghir and Phillips 2008 for a detailed survey).
The key issue regarding our study is the willingness of agents to intertemporally substi-
tute labour across periods in response to changes in the incentive to do so. Indeed, this
is the central component in the propagation mechanism of tax reform in our model.
But, as is well known, microeconomic evidence has not been supportive of large labour
supply elasticities (Ball 1990 and Altonji 1986). However, Aaronson and French (2002)
demonstrate that labour supply elasticities do tend to be biased downward in models
which abstract from joint wage-hours determination and progressive taxation. Fur-
thermore, authors who have studied specic tax reform episodes have found signicant
e¤ects of reductions in progressivity on gains in taxable income (Feldstein 1995, Auten
and Carroll 1999). In light of the literature arguing that net wage rates do not ap-
preciably inuence labour supply behaviour (e.g. Pencavel 1986 and Triest 1990), it is
unclear whether such increases in taxable income are due to labour supply adjustments
or other factors such as a reduction in tax avoidance and less of an emphasis on untaxed
compensation. In this chapter, we try to contribute to the analysis through a di¤erent
perspective, using a calibrated RBC model as a laboratory in which to quantitatively
assess the transmission of exogenous shocks conditional on the tax code, whereas the
previously mentioned studies abstract from business cycle issues. Our work can thus be
viewed as a complementary attempt to quantify the inuence of progressive taxation on
labour supply, providing an RBC-based interpretation of the mechanisms underlying
tax reform.
This chapters approach to studying the business cycle implications of labour tax
policy di¤ers from models based on the seminal contributions of Braun (1994) and
McGrattan (1994), in which tax rates are approximated using stochastic exogenous
processes. The objective of these studies was to demonstrate that tax disturbances,
along with other stochastic scal variables, are important driving forces of U.S. eco-
nomic cycles, and they abstracted from issues related to tax progressivity and unem-
ployment. The specication of the tax system in this chapter is such that tax rates rise
endogenously with the individuals own level of taxable income and is based on Cas-
sou and Lansing (2003), who study the growth implications of the Hall and Rabushka
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(1995) plan. The functional form is general enough to allow for regressive, proportional
and progressive systems and is therefore suitable for capturing structural tax reform.
There are no shocks to the tax rate itself.
Recent work on scal policy in the context of frictional labour markets by Arseneau
and Chugh (2008) examines optimal tax policy over the business cycle, nding that
the optimal tax rate is typically quite volatile. The authors, however, do not discuss
tax progressivity or the consequences of structural tax reform for shock propagation,
which is our main focus. Relatively little attention has been devoted in the literature
to the subject of progressive taxation in cyclical matching equilibria, with most of the
focus being on stationary state analysis. Previous work in this area includes Pissarides
(1998) and Sinko (2005) who demonstrate that an increase in tax progression reduces
stationary state unemployment if wages are determined through bargaining. Tax pro-
gressivity is modelled by assuming that workers receive a lump-sum transfer from the
government (a tax-subsidy that does not vary with income) and are subsequently taxed
on their total labour income including the subsidy. The receipt of this subsidy raises
the workers surplus value of the match so that Nash bargaining requires the worker to
e¤ectively transfer part of the subsidy to the employer by accepting a lower wage pay-
ment. This downward pressure on the wage raises the steady state supply of vacancies
and equilibrium unemployment is lower the more progressive the tax system is.
Regarding business cycles, traditional Keynesian theory postulates that progressive
income taxation automatically stabilises macroeconomic uctuations. Guo and Lansing
(1998) demonstrate that in real business cycle models with an indeterminate steady
state, such as in Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994), the presence
of su¢ ciently progressive taxation can eradicate multiple equilibria by "taxing away"
the higher returns associated with exogenous uctuations in beliefs or "animal spirits".
Progressive taxation has thus been shown to induce stability from the perspective of
eliminating sunspot uctuations. This interpretation of economic volatility di¤ers to the
one employed here in that we concentrate solely on rational expectations equilibria that
are stable around a unique steady state. Fluctuations are then driven by a standard,
exogenous real aggregate productivity shock.
This chapter builds on, and relates more closely to, Vanhala (2006) and Zanetti
(2011) who study the role of labour taxation in shaping the response of frictional
labour markets to shocks. Both studies introduce a graduated tax schedule using the
tax-subsidy approach outlined previously and nd that tax progressivity reduces the
sensitivity of output and employment to aggregate shocks. The reason for this is that
the wage rate becomes more sensitive to uctuations in productivity, thereby absorbing
most of the e¤ect of the shock and leaving little incentive for rms to adjust the supply
of jobs (Shimer 2005). But why is tax progressivity, in the form of a tax-subsidy
which does not vary over time, associated with greater cyclicality in the wage rate?
Recall that the steady state wage is decreasing in the tax-subsidy. All else equal, the
lower the steady state wage, the greater will be the impact of a given productivity
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shock on the logarithmic deviation of the wage from its steady state value.2 The
dynamic implications for wage behaviour thus essentially stem from this di¤erence in
the calibration of the model. In this respect the studies by Vanhala (2006) and Zanetti
(2011) reinforce the point made by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), who demonstrate
that the cyclical behaviour of the canonical equilibrium matching model is sensitive to
the calibration procedure. In particular, they show that if the workers value of leisure
is large enough, the model will generate realistic unemployment uctuations. However,
increasing the workers value of leisure in the Nash wage equation is observationally
equivalent to decreasing the value of the tax-subsidy (i.e. reducing tax progressivity).
Both parameter adjustments lead to the same increase in the elasticity of the wage
with respect to productivity and therefore have similar repercussions for unemployment
dynamics.
There are a number of di¤erences between this chapters analysis and Vanhala
(2006) and Zanetti (2011). First and foremost is the nature of the tax function. Al-
though the concept of a tax-subsidy has the virtue of simplicity, it is somewhat ab-
stract and therefore di¢ cult to calibrate. Neither author calibrates the degree of tax
progressivity based on any evidence and so the studies are restricted to making only
qualitative inferences about the dynamic implications of the tax structure. In contrast,
using U.S. tax return data we estimate the gradient of the wage income tax schedule
and benchmark it against other estimates in the literature. This makes it possible to
obtain a more quantitatively reliable prediction about the business cycle e¤ects of tax
reform. More fundamentally, holding marginal tax rates constant as in the tax-subsidy
approach a priori rules out certain aspects of the joint dynamics of wage rates and
taxation that could theoretically lead to an inverse relationship between tax progres-
sivity and wage volatility. We discuss how time variation in tax rates in our model can
cause either larger or smaller uctuations in the wage depending on the calibration.
Aside from improved consistency with the fact that actual progressive tax systems are
characterised by incremental tax brackets as households face marginal rates that de-
pend on their level of income, our approach therefore possesses the desirable theoretical
trait of accommodating a broader potential set of outcomes. This stands in contrast
to the tax-subsidy mechanism which necessitates a positive relationship between tax
progressivity and wage volatility. Our simulation exercises then indicate that the e¤ect
of tax movements on wage uctuations is quantitatively small. Consequently, in the
absence of variable hours, which do not feature in Vanhala (2006) or Zanetti (2011),
we nd no evidence of signicant business cyclical implications of tax reform.3
2 It is straightforward to explain this intuition in symbols. Let wt be the time t Nash equilibrium
wage,  the tax-subsidy and At a productivity shock. Assume that the wage depends only on the
productivity shock and the tax subsidy, which is constant, and that  does not multiply At. Using
a circumex to denote logarithmic deviations from steady state values, the latter being denoted by
removing t subscripts, the log-linearised wage equation is expressed as bwt = @w=@Aw=A bAt. Then, the
steady state elasticity, @w=@A
w=A
, is decreasing in w which in turn is decreasing in  .
3The importance of wage uctuations in determining unemployment volatility is stressed by Shimer
(2005).
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Although the Vanhala and Zanetti studies examine various aspects of labour market
policy, they ignore spending by the federal government. The business cycle implica-
tions of scal stimulus have gained renewed interest in the literature given recent scal
developments in the U.S. and Europe. Examples include Monacelli et al. (2010) and
Bruckner and Pappa (2010). The current study contributes to this related literature
in a novel way by illustrating how the gradient of the labour income tax schedule
determines the ability of the government to expand output and reduce unemployment
through public expenditure. Furthermore, and crucially, our inclusion of variable work-
ing hours demonstrates how tax reform gives rise to a compositional shift in labour
market adjustment to demand shocks, while Moncelli et al. (2010) and Bruckner and
Pappa (2010) consider only extensive labour market adjustment. In the absence of
intensive adjustment we do not nd signicant e¤ects of government expenditure at
the cyclical frequency.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section builds the model.
Section 3 describes the calibration procedure and solution algorithm. Baseline results
and extensions are reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and discusses prospects
for further research.
2 Model
This section extends the baseline real business cycle framework in two main ways. First,
unemployment is introduced through matching frictions in the labour market, as rst
implemented in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium by Merz (1995) and Andolfatto
(1996). These authors integrated the matching model of unemployment as described by
Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (2000) with the real business cycle
approach to studying macroeconomic uctuations advanced by Kydland and Prescott
(1982). The exibility of both the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides and RBC paradigms
allowed their combination to be especially attractive for purposes of tractability. Al-
though it is common to abstract from variation in the hours each employee works in
such models, we introduce variable hours in the spirit of Trigari (2009) and Holt (2008).
The second important feature of the current setup is the specication of the tax
policy. To begin with, taxation on business income is abstracted from, so that the only
form of income that is subject to taxation in the model is labour income. This is unlike
the model developed by Cassou and Lansing (2003) who stipulate a much more detailed
representation of the U.S. tax structure, including features such as the double taxation
of business income, investment tax credits and standard deductions. In this chapter,
these features are abstracted from in order to keep the model as simple as possible and
maintain focus on labour market dynamics. This assumption should not bear much
inuence on the analysis given this chapters emphasis on labour market dynamics
as opposed to capital accumulation. Furthermore, as noted by Hall and Rabushka
(1995), despite oppressively high marginal tax rates on business income through the
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combination of corporate and income taxes (as a consequence of the double taxation
built into the U.S. tax system), the actual amount of tax that is paid on business income
is in general, as the authors described it, "remarkably small".
Aside from these two additional features, the rest of the theoretical model is de-
scribed by what is now widely accepted as standard RBC-matching theory. Distor-
tionary taxation breaks the correspondence between competitive equilibrium and the
social optimum, and so instead of assuming the existence of a social planner, the decen-
tralised equilibrium is solved for. We proceed rst with the households optimisation
problem.
2.1 Households
Time is discrete. Random matching in the labour market generates employment risk
which would make individual consumption dependent on each agents entire labour
market history. In order to avoid issues relating to heterogeneity and inequality, the
institutional structure of the household follows the seminal contributions of Merz (1995)
and Andolfatto (1996). There is a single representative household with a continuum of
members dened over the unit interval who pool their income in order to insure away
employment risk. The household chooses consumption at each date t, ct, in order to











where 0 <  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and Ht is the sum of disutilities
of work of all household members.  is a discount factor and Et is the conditional ex-
pectations operator. Unemployed agents search for jobs with constant intensity taking
aggregate labour market conditions as given, implying that employment is determined
according to the matching technology in a process to be described below. Hours are
determined not at the level of the representative household, but via decentralised Nash
bargaining of individual agents, as in Trigari (2009) and Holt (2008). Hence, the house-
holds optimisation problem does not feature a leisure trade-o¤. The measure of the
households members currently in employment is given by nt. Labour force participa-
tion is abstracted from so that unemployment is ut = 1  nt, where the labour force is
normalised to unity.
Optimisation is subject to a budget constraint given by
ct + it = nt
Z 1
0
(1   i;t)wi;thi;tdi+ rtkt + Ut + Tt +Dt (2)
where it denotes private investment, individual hours worked are indexed by hi;t and the
wage rate per hour is wi;t.  i;t is the tax rate paid on the ith individuals gross labour
income, wi;thi;t. As will be demonstrated subsequently, in the absence of idiosyncratic
17
heterogeneity each individual will receive the same wage and work the same number of
hours so that each individuals taxable income is the same. In anticipation of this, (2)
can be simplied to
ct + it = nt (1   t)wtht + rtkt + Ut + Tt +Dt:
The return on capital is rt, kt represents the private capital stock and Ut is unem-
ployment income (specied below). Tt and Dt are, respectively, a lump-sum transfer
from the government and dividend income that the household receives as the diversied
owner of rms. The tax rate is endogenously determined and time dependent, given by
the nonlinear function






where steady state values are denoted by removing time subscripts. This functional











As in Chen and Guo (2010), we restrict 0   t; mt  1. Then, if  > 0, the marginal
tax rate is increasing in taxable labour income. In this case the tax system is said to
be progressive. When  is negative, it is regressive. When  = 0, the marginal tax rate
is constant and independent of Lt and this is referred to as a at, or proportional, tax.
In what follows we will focus attention on the dynamic implications of moving from
a progressive tax system,  > 0, to a proportional system,  = 0. The parameter 
determines the steady state value of the tax such that
 = 1  
whereas  determines the slope of the tax schedule. The tax schedule in (3) does
not feature any stochastic elements, and uctuations in  t arise solely as a result of
endogenous movements in the level of personal taxable income. This specication of
tax policy di¤ers fundamentally from various studies which approximate tax behaviour
by tting autoregressive processes to actual tax data, and then using the resulting
stochastic equations as forcing variables to drive the business cycle.4 In contrast, there
is no uncertainty in our tax specication so that the business cycle repercussions of tax
policy in this model derive from the interaction of  t with other endogenous variables.
The other constraint on household optimisation is a standard capital accumulation
equation, given by
kt+1 = (1  ) kt + it: (4)
In modelling scal policy, government investment and therefore public capital ac-
4For studies on stochastic cal policy, see Finn (1998), McGrattan (1994) and Braun (1994) who
build on the seminal work of Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
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cumulation is abstracted from. Therefore, all investment and capital accumulation in
the model is undertaken by the private sector, so that kt and it are private (household)




t+1 (rt+1 + 1  ) (5)
which simply states that the net e¤ect of marginal intertemporal variations in consump-
tion on lifetime utility is zero at an optimum. In particular, since capital income is not
subject to taxation in the current model, taxes do not distort the savings decision.
2.2 Firms and the Labour Market
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the output market is competitive and
comprised of a large number of small rms with each rm posting a single job. In this
setup, the terms "match", "job" and "rm" can be used interchangeably, with either
being dened as a worker-rm pair. The methodology of Heer and Maussner (2009) is
followed, in which capital and labour are both inputs into the production technology.
In contrast to the latter authors, we abstract from endogenous job destruction. Firms
rent capital services from households, the assumed owners of the capital stock. The
individual rm production technology is constant returns to scale and is subject to







where At is an aggregate productivity shock common to all matches, and   0 de-
notes the elasticity of match output with respect to capital. Matches are destroyed
exogenously at the rate . Capital is rented from a common market so that the rental
cost is identical across rms, implying that the capital-output ratio is equalised across
all jobs. Furthermore, in the absence of idiosyncratic heterogeneity, equilibrium hours
worked will also be the same across all matches. Individual hours are therefore equal
to average hours per worker, ht. The quantity of capital employed in each match is
then the same, given by ki;t = kt=nt, where an omission of the i subscript denotes an
aggregate value (kt is aggregate capital).
Unemployment arises in the model as a consequence of costly, uncoordinated search
in the labour market. The measure of successful matches in period t is given by an
aggregate matching function which randomly pairs job seekers with vacancies. Denote
the aggregate measure of measure of vacancies vt. The aggregate matching function
M (vt; ut) is increasing in both of its arguments, concave and homogenous of degree 1.












where it has been implicitly noted that the homogeneity assumption permits a repre-
sentation of the probability of lling a vacancy solely as a function of t. Similarly, the





and the two matching probabilities are related by p (t) = tq (t). Congestion in the
labour market implies that q0 (t) < 0 and p0 (t) > 0 for t > 0. Following Pissarides
(2000), the matching technology is assumed to have the Cobb-Douglas form, which
implies constant matching elasticities,





where 0 < m and 0    1 are constants.
The recursive representation of the labour market is dened in terms of the Bellman
equations which characterise the asset values of occupied jobs, vacancies, employed
workers and unemployed agents. A rms value of an occupied job, Jt, and a vacancy,











+ Ett+1 [(1  ) Jt+1 + Vt+1] (8)
and
Vt =  + q (t)Ett+1Jt+1 + (1  q (t))Ett+1Vt+1: (9)
The stochastic discount factor is dened as t+1 =  (ct=ct+1)
. Consider equation
(8) rst. Productive matches yield a ow prot to the rm equal to the di¤erence
between match output and the factor payments. The rms continuation value of the
match is given by the discounted term in (8). With probability 1   , a productive
match at time t will survive to the production stage of period t+ 1. With probability
, the match becomes vacant, or is destroyed, at the beginning of time t+1 (or the end
of time t). Equation (9) states that vacancy posting entails a ow cost   and with
probability q (t) results in a match that becomes productive, at the earliest, at time
t+ 1.5
The rm decides on the quantity of capital to rent in order to maximise Jt. The





5This time lag between matching and production is common in discrete time matching equilibria.
It facilitates dening employment as a predetermined state variable that is not subject to change in
the current period.
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where yit = yt=nt. The Bellman equations describing the asset values of an employed
agent, Wt, and an unemployed agent, Ut, are, respectively,
Wt = (1   t)wtht  
h1+'t
1 + '
ct + Ett+1 [(1  )Wt+1 + Ut+1] (11)
and
Ut = b1 + b2c

t + p (t)Ett+1Wt+1 + (1  p (t))Ett+1Ut+1: (12)
The ow value of being employed to the worker is given by net labour income
adjusted for the disutility of work, expressed in units of the consumption good. The





t , where '  0 governs the elasticity of labour supply. The
continuation value of the match to the employed worker is equal to a weighted average
of the conditional expected time t + 1 values of employment and unemployment. In
equation (12), b1 denotes the consumption value of government funded unemployment
benets obtained during job search, which are not subject to taxation. The term b2ct
represents the (exogenous) consumption value of a home-produced good, or leisure,
that the agent enjoys whilst not at work. If b2 < 0 it could be interpreted as a xed
cost of job search. With probability p (t) the unemployed agent at time t encounters
a match that will operate successfully in period t+ 1.
2.3 Labour Market Equilibrium
2.3.1 Vacancy Supply
The equilibrium supply of vacancies is determined by a free entry condition which
ensures that the asset value of posting a new vacancy is zero for all t. In symbols,
Vt = 0 8t




The left hand side of the above equation represents the ow cost of maintaining
a vacancy, , multiplied by the expected duration that a vacancy will go unmatched,
which is given by the reciprocal of the matching rate, q (t)
 1. In equilibrium, this
expected cost of creating a vacancy at time tmust be equal to the discounted conditional
expected value of a successfully operating job in the following period. To see how this
condition endogenously regulates the supply vacancies, suppose that there is a positive
aggregate productivity shock which raises the right hand side of (13). Recalling that
q0 (t) < 0, it follows that by increasing the supply of vacancies the expected cost of
posting a vacancy rises due to increasing congestion costs until equality is restored.
Thus, equation (13) postulates a positive relationship between the asset value of a job
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and the supply of vacancies.
This intuition governing vacancy supply can be translated into a dynamic context
by combining the equilibrium condition (13) with the Bellman equation (8), iterated











h1 t+1   wt+1ht+1   rt+1
kt+1
nt+1





The intuition underlying the above expression is similar to that outlined for equation
(13), except that the t + 1 asset value of an occupied job has been replaced with the
models endogenous variables. This asset value is thus equal to the conditional expected
value of prots at time t + 1, plus the equilibrium continuation value conditional on
survival as captured by the term (1  )=q (t+1). The benet of not having to search
for additional labour once a match has been formed gives rise to local monopoly rents
over which the rm and the worker bargain to determine the wage payment.
2.3.2 Wage Determination
Costly search frictions give rise to a joint surplus value of maintaining current matches.
Dene this surplus as
St = (Wt   Ut) + (Jt   Vt) : (15)
St is shared via the wage according to the Nash product
wt = argmax (Wt   Ut) (Jt   Vt)1 
where  and 1    are the bargaining power of the worker and the rm, respectively.
There are no contractual impediments to wage setting so that wages are fully exi-
ble and re-contracted every period as new information becomes available. From the
Bellman equations (11) and (8) it then follows that
@Wt
@wt




The presence of the tax slope parameter  in the expression for @Wt=@wt implies
that agents internalise the structure of the tax schedule during wage negotiation. In
particular, workers explicitly recognise that bidding up the wage results in a higher
marginal tax rate if  is positive. The more graduated the tax schedule, the smaller
the net return to the worker of an incremental rise in the wage rate. Hence the derivative
@Wt=@wt is decreasing in . This behaviour arises in our model because the tax rate is
endogenously determined, and is absent from the models of Vanhala (2006) and Zanetti
(2011) in which the tax rate is assumed to be constant.
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The rst-order condition for wages is
Wt   Ut =

1   (1  ) (1   t) Jt: (16)
The worker receives a fraction of the rms surplus, which is decreasing in the
degree of progressivity as well as the current tax rate. Note that although the tax
rate inuences the division of the surplus, this does not imply that a rise in  t lowers
the wage. Furthermore, the joint surplus of the match is decreasing in  t, since for
every unit wage increment conceded by the rm, the worker receives the fraction 1  t.
Therefore, the higher the tax rate, the smaller the surplus to be bargained over. This
does not imply that the wage rate necessarily falls, since the impact of the tax rate on
the workers outside option needs to be accounted for.
Substituting the respective Bellman equations into the rst order condition (16)



















(1  ) (1  )

24b1 + b2ct + h1+'t1+' ct
(1  ) (1   t)
  (1  ) (1  p (t))

1  





Equation (17) is similar in nature to the standard expression derived in Pissarides
(2000), except for the presence of the endogenous progressive tax policy. In particular,
the equilibrium wage rate is a weighted average of the contribution of the worker to
the match and the workers outside option, where the weights are given by the bar-
gaining power of the worker and the rm, respectively. The entire right hand side
of (17) is scaled down by the factor (1  ) = (1  ) which is decreasing in . This
reects the joint incentive facing the worker and the rm to keep wages low in order to
avoid high tax burdens that drain the joint match surplus under progressive tax poli-
cies. Note, however, that (1  ) = (1  ) is inversely proportional to the workers
bargaining weight and is equal to 1 when  = 1.6 Flat tax reform that sets  = 0 and
(1  ) = (1  ) = 1 therefore tends to increase the elasticity of the wage with respect
to improvements in working conditions and thus has the potential to exacerbate wage
uctuations in response to shocks.
The tax system has another e¤ect on the wage through the workers outside op-
tion, which is contained in the second square brackets in (17). The outside option
is comprised of two elements. The rst is the (untaxed) ow value of unemployment
consumption including the opportunity cost of labour, adjusted for the tax rate. Note
6When  = 1, it is not the joint surplus which is maximised, but the workers surplus. Since the
latter is always increasing in the wage and the marginal tax rate never exceeds unity, tax progressivity
no longer incentivises wage moderation.
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that the tax distortion is amplied by the factor (1  ) 1  1 in recognition of the
progressivity of the tax schedule. The second element is the surplus value to the worker
of continuing the current match into future periods, which is the term that enters neg-
atively in the second brackets in (17). The rents to the worker of being in the current
match are decreasing in the availability of other jobs captured by p (t). If it were
certain that the agent would nd another job outside of the current match - that is, if
p (t) = 1 - then the surplus value to the worker from continuing the current match into
the future period is zero. Similarly if  = 1. The continuation value also depends on the
time path of taxation. The lower future tax rates are relative to the current period, the
greater the continuation value of the match is to the worker. The continuation value
enters with a negative sign because the higher the continuation value to the worker of
the current match, the greater the desire of the agent to remain in current employment
and therefore the lower the wage needed to provide the incentive to do so.
The e¤ect that an increase in  t has on the wage therefore depends on the sign
of the second brackets in (17). Higher  t increases the relative consumption value of
unemployment, which positively a¤ects the wage rate. Note that this e¤ect is increasing
in  since the tax distortion is amplied by (1  ) 1; the more progressive the tax
system, the greater the extent to which wt is bid up given the improvement in the
untaxed consumption value of unemployment, since workers anticipate that the increase
in wt precipitates a further increase in  t if the tax schedule is graduated. Conversely,
higher current tax rates relative to future tax rates act to reduce the current wage
because the surplus value to the worker of continuing the match into the (lower-tax)
future becomes greater, prompting the worker to accept a decline in the current wage.
The direction of the dependence of wt on  t is therefore uncertain. It is possible in
principle for an increase in wt which raises  t, say due to a positive productivity shock,
to either be reinforced by an increase in the tax rate or o¤set by it. If the latter,
then coupled with the wage moderation e¤ect of progressivity captured by the factor
(1  ) = (1  ), the wage would tend to become more volatile after tax reform as 
is set to zero and uctuations in  t are eliminated. On the other hand, if wt depended
positively on  t, setting  to zero would contribute to wage stability by eliminating
uctuations in the tax rate, but this dynamic e¤ect would have to be o¤set against the
increase in (1  ) = (1  ) which reduces incentives for wage moderation. Note that
if the wage depends positively on the tax rate, a tax-wage multiplier arises due to the
positive dependence of the tax rate on the wage from (3).
On the whole, therefore, the impact of tax reform on wage dynamics is ambiguous.
Wage dynamics, however, are key to determining unemployment dynamics. In accor-
dance with the analysis of Shimer (2005), the more stable the wage path, the greater
the extent to which shocks lter through to unemployment.7 The extent to which wages
become more or less volatile then determines the quantitative e¤ect of this channel of
7The crux of the argument is that if wages respond very elastically to an increase in productivity,
the prots from issuing a vacancy decline for rms and so job creation rises by less.
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tax policy on unemployment dynamics. The other important channel of tax policy is
the behaviour of hours, which we describe next.
2.3.3 Optimal Hours
Hours are determined through decentralised Nash bargaining at the level of the indi-
vidual match. In the absence of individual heterogeneity, equilibrium hours worked are
the same for all workers. Hours are set so as to maximise the Nash product
ht = argmax [Wt   Ut] [Jt   Vt]1  :
From Bellman equations (8) and (11), it follows that
@Wt
@ht









The rst-order condition for hours is
0 =  (Wt   Ut) 1 ((1  ) (1   t)wt   h't ct )










Making use of the rst-order condition for wages (16) in the above expression,











The above equilibrium condition stipulates that hours are negotiated such that
the tax-adjusted marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is
equal to the marginal product of labour. Since higher tax rates lower the net re-
turn from working, the consumption value of the disutility of work is amplied by
the factor((1  ) (1   t)) 1, which is increasing in the degree of tax progressivity.
Progressivity amplies the tax distortion on hours, just as for wages. For ';  > 0,
equation (18) implicitly denes a negative relationship between ht and the tax rate as
well as . In this sense, progressive taxes disincentivise work e¤ort.
To gain some intuition for the implications of progressivity in the tax system for
the dynamic behaviour of hours, consider the repercussions of a positive productivity
shock in (18). As the match becomes more productive, agents respond by increasing
the number of hours worked. Taxable income increases causing  t to rise. The extent to
which  t rises for a given increase in hours depends on . The more progressive the tax
system, the larger the increase in the multiplier ((1  ) (1   t)) 1. This attenuates
the incentive to work longer hours during a boom, and ht increases by less. Had the
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tax system been proportional, the tax rate is constant at  with  = 0 and there would
be no increase in the tax rate to o¤set the willingness to work more. All else constant,
we would expect progressive labour taxation to weaken the procyclicality of average
hours. This intuition plays a central role in the quantitative analysis to follow.
2.4 Aggregation
This section states the aggregate consistency conditions that are necessary in equilib-
rium to close the model. Since output in each match is the same, aggregate output is
dened as




Matches are destroyed at the end of every period, after production takes place. The
aggregate employment rate at the start of period t+ 1 is then equal to the fraction of
employed workers that survived period t plus the measure of new matches,
nt+1 = (1  )nt +Mt (20)
where Mt = q (t) vt = p (t)ut.
Unemployment income is given by
Ut = b1ut
which the household can spend on consumption or investment. The government is
assumed to operate a balanced budget
b1ut + Tt = nt twtht
where Tt is the lump-sum transfer payment (or tax if b1ut >  tntwtht) to households
that features in the latters budget constraint (2). Combining the governments budget
constraint with the households and noting that the aggregate dividend paid to the
household through its diversied ownership of rms is equal to aggregate prots, the
aggregate resource constraint is
ct + it = yt   vt: (21)
Given that all agents work the average number of hours ht, for each agent i we have










It is assumed that the aggregate productivity shock is lognormally distributed and
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follows an exogenous stochastic process given by
lnAt = PA lnAt 1 + A;t




and 0  PA  1.
3 Solution and Calibration
The aggregate system of equations of the model is log-linearized around a stationary
state equilibrium. The resulting linear, rational expectations model is solved using
the method of undetermined coe¢ cients, as described in Uhlig (1997). Attention is
restricted to local cyclical behaviour around a known steady state. The appendix
outlines that the solution takes the form of (stable) equilibrium laws of motion that
are linear in the logarithmic deviations of the models variables from their stationary
state values. Articial time series are then computed from this set of equations by
iteration of the equilibrium laws of motion. 200 random samples of 300 periods each
are obtained and, to reduce dependence on initial conditions, the rst observations of
each sample are discarded to match the corresponding sample period of U.S. quarterly
data. We consider a sample period spanning quarterly data from 1965:1 to 2005:4. The
appendix to this chapter contains a description of the data we use. All data, simulated
and actual, are logged and detrended using an HP lter with smoothing parameter
1600. The models cyclical properties are then computed under di¤erent tax regimes.
Our calibration strategy for the labour income tax schedule follows the general
methodology of Cassou and Lansing (2003) and Chen and Guo (2010). Specically, we
use non-linear least squares regressions to estimate the tax code parameters  and 
from (3). The di¤erence to the previous authors is that we only consider taxation on
wage income, whereas they allow for a richer tax specication that includes business
income. To be able to estimate the parameters, data on average tax rates and an
empirical counterpart to the inverse ratio of taxable labour income to its mean level
are needed. Marginal federal tax rates on wage income are computed using the TAXSIM
model which is available at the website of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
The empirical counterpart to the taxable income ratio whwtht is obtained from average
salary and wage data reported on W-2 Forms, available at the website of the Internal
Revenue Service. A more detailed description of the data is contained in the appendix.
In order to account for changes to the federal income tax law that have occurred
during the sample period in question, we estimate regressions for the tax years 1965,
1975, 1985, 1995 and 2005. The results are reported in Table 1. The results indicate
that there has been a certain degree of variation in both the level and slope of the
estimated labour tax function. There have been at least two notable tax reforms during
our sample period, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (TRA-69) and the Tax Reform Act of
1986 (TRA-86). TRA-69 appears to have resulted in a lower level parameter (higher
27
average tax), which decreases from 0.89 in 1965 to 0.80 in 1975 and 1985. The slope
of the schedule increased slightly from 0.14 to 0.15, but then fell back to 0.14 over the
same period. In contrast, TRA-86 appears to have resulted in both a slight decrease
in average taxes and a notable decrease in progressivity, with the slope parameter
falling from 0.14 to 0.10 after 1985. Comparing our results to those of Chen and Guo
(2010), their nding of a tendency for progressivity in total income tax to decrease over
time in post-war U.S. data still holds when isolating wage taxes. Their estimates are
slightly di¤erent to ours, but not excessively so. They estimate the slope parameter
for the period 1966 to 1986 to be about 0.17, falling to about 0.06 from 1987 to 2005.
This suggests that the reduction in the progressivity of business income tax has been
somewhat sharper than for wage income. They also nd little variation in the level
parameter, which is roughly constant at 0.8 according to their estimates. Our results
suggest that the variation in the average level of wage taxes has been more noticeable.
Nevertheless, the di¤erence to Chen and Guos estimates is not drastic.8
The use of an average measure of tax progressivity is most convenient for our pur-
poses of analysing business cycle moments over a long horizon. We therefore set  = 0:84
and  = 0:13, the averages of our estimates in Table 1. This gives a steady state tax
rate of  = 0:16. Our main focus is on tax progressivity, keeping  xed across policy
experiments. The hypothetical tax reform experiment that we concentrate on involves
a reduction in the parameter  from its initial baseline value of 0.13 to zero, thereby
entirely eliminating tax progressivity.9 All other parameters are unchanged, including
the variance of the productivity shock. In this manner, we attempt to approximate
what the U.S. business cycle moments may have looked like had labour tax not been
progressive, holding all other factors constant.
As emphasised by Merz (1995) and Trigari (2009), there is no consensus regarding
the convexity parameter ' for the disutility of hours. This parameter governs the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labour e¤ort, dened as its reciprocal. Micro
estimates of ' 1 range from close to zero to 0.5 (Trigari 2009), whereas representative
agent macro studies assume much larger values of up to 4 (Christiano and Eichenbaum
1992). The RBC literature also contains examples in which utility is linear in hours,
which can be theoretically justied by an appeal to labour indivisibilities (Hansen 1985).
Our strategy is to set ' = 0:2, which lies at the upper end of the values considered in
the literature, in order to replicate realistic hours variation. The model with ' = 0:2 is
referred to as the baseline. We also set ' = 100 to essentially shut down hours variation
8As Hall and Rabushka (1995) note, the lions share of adjusted gross income goes to wages and
salaries, with the latter typically comprising about 70-80% of total adjusted gross income, whereas
business income is about 3-5%. These numbers are stable over time. For instance, in 2008 total gross
adjusted income was $5.7 trillion, of which wages and salaries were $3.8 trillion and net business income
was $0.19 trillion. See http://www.irs.gov for data.
9Some analyses of at tax reform choose to concentrate on a revenue-neutral change in order to
avoid issues related to the optimal size of government in an economy. See, for example, Cassou and
Lansing (2003). These concerns are more applicable to long-term growth studies, where changes in the
tax parameters can lead to large di¤erences in the size of government over time. Our business cycle
focus renders the issue less of a concern, since we consider small shocks around a steady state.
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in order to examine the role of intensive adjustment in the transmission process.
Aside from the calibration of the tax schedule and disutility of work, our assumed
parameter values are largely standard in the RBC-matching literature. Assumed base-
line parameter values are summarised in Table 2. Given the use of quarterly data, the
discount factor is set to  = 0:99. As in Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1995) and Holt
(2008), amongst others, we assume log utility such that  = 1. Following Prescott
(1986), the quarterly depreciation rate on capital is  = 0:025 and the elasticity of
output with respect to capital is  = 0:36. Steady state values for aggregate output,
capital, hours and consumption are found by solving the system (18), (19), (10) and
(21).
Turning now to the labour market, it is standard to assume symmetric bargaining,
 = 0:5. We follow Andolfatto (1996) in setting the vacancy transition probability
to q () = 0:9, consistent with the evidence on average vacancy duration reported in
van Ours and Ridder (1992). The elasticity of the matching function with respect to
v is  = 0:6, as suggested by the empirical study by Blanchard and Diamond (1989).
The quarterly separation rate  = 0:05 and is obtained from data on labour market
transition probabilities used in Shimer (2007), made available at the authors personal
webpage.10 It is given by the sum of the employment-unemployment and employment-
inactivity transition probabilities. Given q () and , v is determined from the steady
state version of (20) once n is specied. We set n, the steady state employment-
population ratio, in order to target a realistic value for p (). The transition probability
p () is calibrated in order to match average unemployment duration, which is equal to
p () 1. The latter is calculated to be 1.17 quarters for the whole sample.11 We set n =
0:945 in order to target these averages. This results in a slightly larger unemployment-
population ratio than is found in the data for our sample (5.5% versus slightly less than
4%). Nevertheless, this calibration strategy has been adopted by other authors (Cole
and Rogerson 1999 and Krause and Lubik 2007) and is consistent with the notion
that measured unemployment understates the true intensity of search e¤ort because
non-participants are ignored.12
Given our focus on unemployment uctuations, the vacancy cost  is treated as a
free parameter that is adjusted in order to generate realistic unemployment volatility
in the baseline calibration. This requires  = 0:021 in the baseline model. Given
, the total ow value from unemployment, b1 + b2c, is then determined residually
from equation (14). We set b1 and b2 so as to ensure that the net replacement ratio,
10For additional details, please see Shimer (2007) and his webpage
http://sites.google.com/site/robertshimer/research/ows. The data from June 1967 and Decem-
ber 1975 were tabulated by Joe Ritter and made available by Hoyt Bleakley. Data are not available
for 1965-6.
11Data on average unemployment duration are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
www.bls.gov.
12We take up the issue of labour market participation in the next chapter. As we discuss, "un-
employment rates" as high as 11% are not unreasonable in the context of models which ignore the
participation decision.
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b1= ((1  )wh) = 0:4, the assumption in Shimer (2005). As for the shock process for
aggregate productivity, the persistence parameter is set to PA = 0:95 and the standard
deviation A = 0:00615 so that the model is consistent with the volatility of output for
the sample period in question.
4 Results
We rst present impulse response functions for  = 0:13 and  = 0 in order to determine
how large the di¤erences in adjustment paths are when a positive 1% productivity
shock hits the economy. Figure 1 plots the impulse dynamics of the two specications.
All variables respond positively to the productivity shock apart from unemployment.
The response of vacancies signicantly weakens in the period after impact due to the
sharp fall in unemployment, which increases market congestion and raises the expected
cost of lling a vacancy. As employment increases after the matching delay, hours
experience a notable decline from their peak response on impact. This indicates that
when consumption is sustained by relatively high employment, the household works
less hours opting instead to consume relatively more leisure. Intensive and extensive
adjustment therefore substitute for one another to a certain extent. After a few periods,
hours decline below steady state. This is partly due to the diminishing marginal utility
of consumption along the adjustment path, which magnies the consumption value of
the disutility of labour from (18). As the consumption path is more amplied under
a at tax regime, hours undershoot steady state equilibrium to a greater extent when
 = 0. Tax dynamics also contribute to greater equilibrium undershooting in the at
tax model. To see this, note that as the return from supplying labour falls, workers
reduce hours to a greater extent when there is no commensurate reduction in the tax
rate so that equality is maintained in (18).
Flat tax reform signicantly amplies the response of hours on impact, which rises
from 0.70% to 0.95%. Although increased impact amplication is not observed for
unemployment or vacancies, tax reform does increase the persistence of these variables
adjustment paths. The di¤erence in persistence is quite large. For example, at period
10 unemployment is 12.35% below steady state in the progressive tax specication
whereas it is 14.39% below in the at tax model. Forward-looking rms anticipate
greater equilibrium undershooting in ht along most of the adjustment path under a at
tax, and therefore choose to sustain the expansion in vacancy supply for a longer period,
driving a more persistent drop in unemployment. Opposing the e¤ect of equilibrium
undershooting is the notably larger increase in hours on impact when  = 0, which
crowds out vacancy creation to some extent in the initial periods as rms seek to
reduce their exposure to costly matching frictions when currently employed agents are
very willing to work longer hours. On balance, there is little change in the impact
response of vacancies conditional on the tax system and the divergence between the
two paths takes a few periods to widen as the e¤ect of equilibrium undershooting begins
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to dominate.
If this intuition were correct, we would expect to observe greater impact amplica-
tion and weaker persistence of labour market variables in the model with inelastic hours.
This is exactly what happens. Figure 2 plots impulse dynamics for ' = 100 keeping
the rest of the parameterisation the unchanged. Holding hours (approximately) con-
stant signicantly amplies the responses in vacancy supply, unemployment and market
tightness, thereby conrming that in the absence of intensive adjustment rms do rely
to a greater extent on extensive adjustment. The persistence of the labour market
adjustment path is also weaker when hours are inelastic regardless of , with vacancy
supply, unemployment and market tightness all decaying at a much faster rate. The
peak responses in output, consumption and investment are roughly the same as in the
baseline, although the impact responses are weaker since adjustment along the exten-
sive margin operates with a lag. Overall, output volatility increases slightly as the tax
schedule is attened, with the increase being more notable when hours are exible.
The impulse response functions for inelastic hours demonstrate the centrality of
variable hours to the tax reform transmission mechanism. Indeed, in Figure 2 in which
hours do not vary, the e¤ect of tax reform on impulse dynamics is very small. The wage
does display a lower adjustment path under a at tax despite slightly higher market
tightness and output, but the di¤erence is not quantitatively large. In the absence of
signicant changes to wage dynamics, the path of vacancy supply is not sensitive to tax
reform either. These results indicate that under inelastic hours, the opposing e¤ects
of taxation on wage dynamics explained previously in section 2.3.2 either largely o¤set
one another or are both quantitatively unimportant. On the other hand, the wage does
appear to be somewhat more sensitive to tax reform when hours are elastic. This is
partly due to the fact that as workers become more willing to increase hours they must
also accept smaller increases in wage rates per hour worked due to a compositional
shift in the rms wage bill. It also indicates that when hours uctuate the workers
outside option becomes more procyclical due to convex disutility of labour, and the
tax-wage multiplier described in section 2.3.2 becomes magnied with the result that
attening the tax schedule has a relatively larger stabilising e¤ect on the wage. This
in turn contributes to a larger e¤ect of tax reform on vacancy supply the more elastic
hours are.
Simulation-based business cycle statistics for the baseline and inelastic hours models
are presented in Table 3. We report mean simulation standard deviations with sample
standard deviations in parentheses for the baseline and inelastic hours models.13 The
corresponding statistics from actual U.S. data are also shown for comparison. For each
model economy, the relative volatilities of the economic variables of interest are reported
prior to the simulated removal of tax progressivity, and after tax reform keeping all
parameters apart from  unchanged. In particular, the variance of the shock process is
13Results for a wage posting model are also presented in Table 3. We discuss this extension subse-
quently.
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held constant post-reform. Recall that the baseline model is calibrated in an attempt to
give a realistic labour market performance assuming the degree of tax progressivity that
is present in the data. For the purposes of moment computations, the statistics reported
in the next section for the inelastic hours model are calculated based on the assumption
that the "true" model is one in which the elasticity of hours is very small. Therefore,
we re-calibrate  and A so that the inelastic hours model displays relative volatilities
of unemployment and output that are consistent with the data. This required only a
small change setting  = 0:05 and A = 0:0074.
Prior to the tax policy experiment, the models provide reasonable predictions re-
garding the second moment properties of the data. Despite realistic volatility in unem-
ployment and vacancies, however, the relative volatility of market tightness is slightly
understated, but nevertheless the correct order of magnitude. This is because the neg-
ative correlation between vacancies and unemployment is much stronger in the data,
and this holds across all specications. Consumption volatility is also understated. The
real business cycle-matching models of Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) also under-
state consumption uctuations, suggesting that either the logarithmic specication of
utility implies excessive consumption smoothing at the representative agent level, or
perhaps a richer demand-side of the model (e.g. the inclusion of monetary shocks and
sticky prices), which is lacking in the current framework, is potentially important for
the behaviour of consumption. Given our focus on the labour market, we do not dwell
on this issue. The relative volatility of the wage is also somewhat understated, and
hours are slightly less procyclical than in the data.
Consider now the di¤erences in the mean standard deviations when tax progressivity
is removed. Consistent with the previous impulse response analysis, in the baseline
model the main e¤ect of tax reform is an increase in the relative volatility of hours of
approximately 27% despite the concomitant increase in output volatility. In contrast,
we do not report a signicant change in the relative volatility of unemployment which,
if anything, declines slightly. Fluctuations in consumption and investment increase
in proportion to output, so that their relative volatility remains una¤ected by tax
reform. With hours variation suppressed, there is no quantitatively meaningful impact
on relative labour market volatility. Wage volatility in the absence of hours variation
is signicantly higher but completely unresponsive to at tax reform. In the absence of
intensive adjustment, unemployment volatility increases very slightly from 8.65 to 8.92
but the change is insignicant.
With regard to the correlations, hours become slightly more procyclical but it is
observed that the gradient of the vacancy-unemployment curve is not inuenced by tax
reform.14 In particular, persistence in vacancy creation tends to be weak regardless of
the tax structure, deteriorating signicantly after the rst period as indicated by the im-
pulse response functions reported previously. Consequently, the simulated data display
14The vacancy-unemployment correlation is known as the Beveridge curve, and its importance is
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
32
only moderately negative vacancy-unemployment correlations.15 The autocorrelation
of unemployment uctuations is also not impacted by the policy change.
To summarise, baseline results indicate that the only quantitatively signicant
repercussion of structural tax reform for labour market dynamics is an increase in
the relative volatility of hours. In adjusting to shocks, the economy displays a substi-
tution e¤ect between intensive and extensive adjustment, whereby households reduce
average hours as rms create more jobs, and vice versa. A larger observed increase
in hours during the initial periods of adjustment under a at tax partially crowds out
job creation, o¤setting the incentive for rms to expand vacancy supply due to subse-
quent equilibrium undershooting of hours. Our baseline simulations therefore do not
support the notion that at tax reform signicantly exacerbates cyclical unemployment
instability.
4.1 Robustness
In this section, we discuss the extent to which changes to the models central para-
meters inuence the baseline results. First, we note that our quantitative results are
insensitive to the level parameter of the tax function, . For instance, lowering  to
0.8 - the lower bound on the empirical estimates which gives the highest steady state
tax rate - and keeping all other parameters unchanged results in moment calculations
that are practically identical to those reported in Table 3. Performing the tax pol-
icy experiment, hours volatility again increases from 0.37 to 0.47 and unemployment
volatility declines insignicantly from 8.43 to 8.19. Results are comparably insensitive
to setting  = 0:9. Performing the tax experiment with  = 0:15 - the upper bound of
our estimates in Table 1 - results in quantitatively very similar results to the baseline as
well. Hours volatility increases from 0.36 to 0.46 and unemployment volatility remains
virtually unchanged from 8.64 to 8.42. Our baseline results are therefore representative
of empirically plausible variations in the tax code parameters.
In this chapter, we have theoretically established that the transmission mechanism
of tax policy reform operates through the Nash wage equation and the equilibrium
condition for optimal hours. However, our baseline results tended to display only a
weak quantitative e¤ect of tax reform on wage uctuations. Given that previously
mentioned work in the literature has found the wage channel to be key in determining
unemployment uctuations, we now consider whether the wage e¤ects of tax reform are
sensitive to the calibration strategy. In the baseline model, symmetric bargaining was
assumed, as is most common in the literature. However, the weight that is placed on the
15 In relation to this point, Fujita (2003) demonstrates that the introduction of additional vacancy cre-
ation costs, such as planning lags, facilitates the replication of highly negative vacancy-unemployment
correlations by making the response of vacancies to shocks more persistent. The latter author argues
that the free-entry condition on vacancy supply induces a sharp impact response but weak persistence.
Congestion externalities caused by falling unemployment in the period after the shock force vacancy
supply back towards the steady state relatively quickly as q (t) falls. Fujita (2003) refers to this as
the "echo e¤ect", a consequence of the simple zero prot restriction assumed in standard matching
equilibria.
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outside option component of wt - and therefore on tax movements - depends negatively
on  in (17). In order to determine if the cyclical implications of adjustments to 
depend on relative bargaining weights, consider a wage posting equilibrium in which
 = 0. For this calibration, maximum weight is placed on the workers outside option
in the equilibrium wage, allowing tax uctuations to have a potentially more important













Figure 3 plots impulse dynamics for  = 0 with all other parameters unchanged
relative to the baseline. Lowering  signicantly increases labour market volatility as
the wage becomes less sensitive to productivity shocks, causing the percentage devia-
tion in market tightness to be substantially magnied relative to the baseline. Once
household employment increases in the period after impact, equilibrium undershoot-
ing is now much sharper since the return to working is relatively unattractive when 
is small and employment (and therefore consumption) is much higher because of the
strong response in job creation by rms. It only takes one period for hours to fall below
steady state along the adjustment path. The cyclical repercussions of tax reform are
amplied, but not because of a substantial di¤erence in wage behaviour. Perhaps some-
what surprisingly, the wage follows almost the same path regardless of the structure of
the tax system despite the prominence of  t in (22), while unemployment nevertheless
responds more sensitively to tax reform than in the baseline. The tax reform transmis-
sion mechanism does not therefore rely on wage dynamics, but hours dynamics. The
strong incentive to reduce hours below steady state due to the robust expansion in va-
cancy supply exerts substantial downward pressure on the tax rate. In equilibrium, the
drop in hours is strong enough to cause the tax rate to fall below steady state under a
progressive tax system. This works to signicantly arrest the decline in hours through
the tax-labour income multiplier that is operative when  > 0. As a result, under a
at tax, substantially stronger undershooting of hours causes the economy to adjust
to the productivity shock to a signicantly greater extent through job creation. To
provide further support for this intuition, Figure 4 displays impulse dynamics for the
wage posting model with inelastic hours, keeping all remaining parameters the same
as in the baseline. In this case, the cyclical implications of tax reform are, as in the
baseline model, quantitatively small, illustrating the importance of hours adjustment in
determining the path of unemployment and job creation. Finally, we note from Figure
3 that although equilibrium undershooting of hours is more severe under a at tax, the
impact response is no longer as sensitive to tax reform as in the baseline model. This
indicates that tax reform in the wage posting model tends to exacerbate volatility only
in the downward direction given the reduced incentives for workers to extend average
hours on impact when their bargaining power is low. As the initial crowding out e¤ect
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of tax reform on vacancy supply is therefore smaller, the increase in vacancies on impact
under a at tax is larger relative to the baseline.
Business cycle statistics for the wage posting equilibrium are presented in the last
two columns of Table 3.16 In order to target realistic unemployment and output vari-
ability, we set  = 0:49 and A = 0:006. It is observed that reducing the workers
bargaining power amplies the e¤ects of tax reform on relative unemployment volatil-
ity, which increases by approximately 10% when  is lowered to zero and hours are
exible. The increase in hours volatility remains notable but is weakened relative to
the baseline. This is partly due to the increase in the parameter ' which lowers the
elasticity of labour supply and partly due to the fact that the impact response of hours
in Figure 3 is less sensitive to tax reform given the decreased incentives to work longer
hours when bargaining power is low. The results also indicate that wage volatility is
substantially reduced in the wage posting equilibrium to less than half the baseline
magnitude.
In summary, we therefore conclude that the e¤ect of tax policy reform on unemploy-
ment dynamics is sensitive to the weight placed on the workers outside option in the
equilibrium wage equation, but only when hours are exible. In a wage posting equilib-
rium in which the workers bargaining power is zero, cyclical job creation is amplied as
wages become less procyclical. This causes hours to rise for one period only on impact,
thereafter strongly dropping below steady state to increase the consumption of leisure.
The strong incentive to reduce hours, in conjunction with the endogenous relationship
between the tax rate and the labour supply, amplies the e¤ects of tax reform on the
labour market. Tax reform can thus result in a statistically meaningful increase in
unemployment volatility, but only if this extreme condition of wage bargaining is met.
Even then, however, the increase in relative unemployment volatility is not exceedingly
large at about 10%.
4.2 Welfare Analysis
It has been demonstrated that tax reform exacerbates the cyclical responses both of
hours worked and consumption in response to productivity shocks. Under which incen-
tive structure - the at or graduated tax programme - is the representative households
welfare higher? To obtain a measure of the welfare implications of policy reform, we
rst compute the utility di¤erence induced by the divergence in the adjustment paths
of the progressive and at tax economies following a positive productivity shock. We
then consider a second measure of the welfare e¤ects of policy reform that is based
on the compensating variation in steady state consumption required to make the rep-
resentative household ex ante indi¤erent between living in worlds with and without
business cycles. We can then determine to what extent the compensating variation in
consumption depends on the progressivity of the tax system.
16We only report statistics for the exible hours version since, as the impulse response analysis
indicated, the cyclical implications of tax reform are small under inelastic hours.
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Up until now, we have analysed linearised equilibrium dynamics in order to under-
stand the cyclical implications of structural tax reform on several endogenous variables
of interest. First-order approximations to the models equilibrium conditions are less
computationally burdensome and yield comparable numerical results to higher-order
solution methods regarding the second moment properties of the model as long as the
economy is perturbed only a small distance from the steady state.17 However, in order
to measure the e¤ect of di¤erent policy environments on welfare, the curvature of the
utility function must be preserved to capture risk aversion. Therefore, in this section
our results are derived from a second-order approximation to the policy function using
the method of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). The appendix outlines the solution
method. In practice, second-order accurate equilibrium dynamics are very similar to
the baseline results that were obtained from a log-linear approximation. In Figure 5 the
impulse responses are shown for the model solved using a second-order approximation
to the policy function. Comparing with Figure 1 reveals a negligible di¤erence.
Panel (a) of Figure 6 plots the path of utility after a 1% positive shock to produc-
tivity in the progressive and at tax economies. Note that the vertical axis measures
the level of utility, not logarithmic deviations from steady state. It can be seen that
welfare in the at tax economy is higher during all periods. When the shock hits,
the increased disutility from the spike in working hours initially outweighs the positive
e¤ect on utility of increased consumption. As hours fall below steady state and con-
sumption continues to rise over the adjustment path (recall Figure 5), utility rises above
the steady state level. Panel (b) plots the di¤erence between the two utility paths, rep-
resenting the excess utility in the at tax economy over the progressive tax economy.
As hours respond more sensitively in the at tax economy the initial drop in utility
is greater, and this causes an initial fall in the surplus utility of the at tax regime.
However, the utility gain from being subject to a at tax rises above steady state during
the adjustment period. Finally, panel (c) expresses the welfare gain in panel (b) as a
percentage of consumption in the progressive tax economy. This measure is computed
as the !t which solves
0 =























for each t and where a pro or flat superscript indexes the respective models. Panel
(c) therefore indicates that the welfare gain from removing tax progressivity along
the adjustment path to a productivity shock is approximately equivalent to raising
consumption in the progressive tax economy by just under 4% on average in each
quarter. In terms of the steady state, the welfare gain from setting  to zero from its
benchmark value is equivalent to an exogenous increase in steady state consumption of
17See Heer and Maussner (2009) for a comparison of di¤erent numerical procedures for solving real
business cycle models.
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3.84%. The steady state welfare implications are therefore fairly substantial: for net
family earnings of $50,000 a year, the welfare gain from tax reform is almost $2,000
each year. Lowering  increases steady state hours and therefore consumption, which
on balance yields a rise in welfare. We remark that the welfare loss of progressive
taxation occurs almost entirely due to the di¤erence in steady state hours that the
change in  induces. With the inelastic hours calibration, the welfare loss is roughly
equal to zero. The reason is that when ' = 100, h = 1:00 and c = 2:59 regardless of .
This is contrasted with the elastic hours calibration for which ' = 0:2. In this case, h
increases from 0:71 to 0.80 after tax reform and c increases from 1.85 to 2.08.
Next, based on the measure of welfare loss associated with business cycles proposed
by Lucas (1987), we calculate the proportional shift in steady state consumption that
would render the representative household indi¤erent between the expected stochastic
consumption and work paths that would result over the normal course of the business
cycle and the steady state allocation that would obtain in the absence of shocks. This
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The value of  is computed for both the at and progressive tax economies and
represents the proportion of steady state consumption that the representative household
is willing to forgo in order to completely eliminate business cycle uncertainty. Therefore,
business cycle uctuations in the at tax model would be more costly if the estimated
value of  is larger when  = 0. The algorithm for numerically estimating  involves
setting T to a large number - we choose 500 - and generating a large number of simulated
sample paths for the stochastic economy - we generate 200 samples - which are then
averaged in order to approximate the representative households expectation of utility
in the stochastic model. Given expected utility in the uctuating economy,  follows
straightforwardly from (23).
Table 4 summarises the welfare costs of business cycles under di¤erent tax policies
for di¤erent model parameterisations. Our quantitative evaluation of the welfare e¤ects
of business cycles suggests that, in accordance with Lucas (1987, 2003), the gains from
improved stabilisation policy are small. In the baseline model with progressive taxation,
business cycle uctuations result in a welfare loss equivalent to 0.05% of steady state
consumption. The exacerbation of the business cycle caused by at tax reform implies
that the welfare loss is about 0.2% of steady state consumption.18 In relative terms,
this represents a substantial increase, an order of magnitude larger than the welfare loss
under a progressive tax policy. But still at only a fraction of a percentage point of steady
state consumption, however, it would be an exaggeration to label a welfare loss of such
18Recall that moving from a progressive to a at tax increases steady state consumption. There-
fore, the welfare loss in absolute terms increases by a greater factor than the measure expressed as a
percentage of consumption.
37
magnitude considerable, especially given that it results from the complete elimination
of the business cycle. For comparison, Lucas (2003) estimates the welfare gain from
bringing an annual ination rate of 10% to zero to be a perpetual consumption ow of
one percent of income. The welfare losses are of a similar magnitude for the inelastic
hours and wage posting calibrations and are even less sensitive to tax policy, especially
the inelastic hours specication. The highest welfare cost we obtain is for the wage
posting equilibrium under a at tax programme at 0.25% of steady state consumption.
4.3 Fiscal Stimulus
In this section, we consider the implications of the structure of the tax system for the
propagation of government expenditure shocks. The study by Monacelli et al. (2010)
demonstrated that a standard neoclassical model with matching frictions encounters
di¢ culty in generating realistic e¤ects of government purchases on output and un-
employment. The latter authors assume that government purchases are intrinsically
useless and enter the aggregate resource constraint as a pure drain on resources. It
has been well known since at least Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) that useless gov-
ernment expenditure that is nanced by a balanced budget induces a negative wealth
e¤ect on the economy, prompting households to compensate by increasing their work
e¤ort. That Monacelli et al. (2010) obtain only weak scal multipliers suggests that
the presence of matching frictions in the labour market impedes transmission of scal
shocks. In recognition of this, we follow Chen and Guo (2010) by allowing for produc-
tive government purchases in order to obtain scal multipliers of a realistic order of
magnitude. For simplicity, we assume that government purchases, gt, reect a non-rival,






where  is the elasticity of output with respect to government spending. The govern-
ment does not invest in capital; all capital remains privately owned. The rst-order













The government is still assumed to operate a balanced budget in every period, so
that
gt + b1ut + Tt = nt twtht
which implies the aggregate resource constraint
yt = ct + it + gt + vt:
We do not allow gt to substitute for private consumption so that there is no direct
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e¤ect of government expenditure on the utility of the household. The scal transmission
mechanism in this model therefore operates through two distinct channels; a produc-
tivity channel (when  > 0) which causes gt to have supply-side repercussions much
like At, and an aggregate demand channel. Setting  = 0 removes the contribution
of government expenditure to the production of private output, so that gt would only
a¤ect the economy through changes in aggregate demand consistent with the resource
constraint.
The path of gt is determined by an exogenous stochastic process given by
log gt = Pg log gt 1 + g;t




and 0  Pg  1 governs the degree of persistence of the gov-
ernment expenditure shock. As in Monacelli et al. (2010), we consider the e¤ects of
a one-o¤ scal stimulus package that is dened as an temporary increase in gt that
is normalised to 1% of steady state output. We therefore abstract from a full set of
simulations-based business cycle moments in which stochastic government expenditure
is a forcing variable over the business cycle.19
The persistence parameter Pg is set to 0.9 based on the VAR estimates of Monacelli
et al (2010). As Sarte and Wenli (2004) point out, the range of values for  is large; from
0.03 (Eberts 1986) to 0.39 (Aschauer 1989). Our calibration strategy is to set  such
that the scal multipliers prior to tax reform match the VAR estimates of Monacelli et
al. (2010). We also make slight adjustments to  and A in order to ensure that realistic
unemployment and output uctuations are produced. Table 5 summarises the changes
to the calibration of the scal policy models, including the inelastic hours and wage
posting variants, that are used to compute the scal multipliers. The parameterisation
of  lies towards the lower range of the empirical estimates. The steady state value
of g = 0:20 to be consistent with the data over the sample period. The rest of the
parameters remain the same as in the previous calibrations.
To rst gain some intuition for the scal transmission mechanism, Figure 7 shows
the impulse responses to a positive government expenditure shock normalised to 1%
of steady state output in the baseline model. The gure depicts how scal stimulus
in the form of (non-wasteful) government purchases a¤ects the economy when the tax
system is progressive as opposed to proportional. The scal shock raises the marginal
productivity of labour and aggregate demand, thereby exerting a positive inuence on
hours worked and the supply of vacancies. The increase in hours is reinforced by the
negative wealth e¤ect that higher gt causes via the crowding-out e¤ect e¤ect on the
aggregate resource constraint, which is evidenced by the fall in private consumption.
There is consequently no equilibrium undershooting of hours. Note that the expansion
19This is because we nd the contribution to the business cycle of government shocks of the type
considered here to be small when 2g is estimated from the cyclical component of gt from actual data.
For the contribution of stochastic scal policy to U.S. business cycle moments, see Finn (1998) or
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
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in labour supply without a commensurate increase in labour demand puts downward
pressure on the wage, which falls below steady state under a at tax. Private investment
still increases and the overall e¤ect on output is expansionary. Tax progressivity is found
to decrease the e¤ect of scal stimulus on hours and increase the e¤ect on job creation
and unemployment, which stands partially in contrast to the impulse dynamics to a
productivity shock analysed previously.20 We now nd that tax reform has opposite
e¤ects on the dynamics of hours and unemployment, leading to a compositional shift
in the scal transmission mechanism.
What is causing this compositional shift in labour market dynamics? Recall that gt
is partially a demand shock and partially a supply shock. However, given that the cali-
brated value of  is close to zero, the aggregate demand e¤ect of gt is likely to dominate.
Interpreted as a demand shock, gt boosts ht through a negative wealth e¤ect arising
from a drain on the aggregate resource constraint. In this case, equilibrium undershoot-
ing of hours does not arise because the negative wealth e¤ect sustains a persistent rise
in hours above steady state along the adjustment path, exerting a uniformly negative
e¤ect on job creation. Under a at tax the response in ht is stronger, prompting rms
to bypass some of the costly matching process by expanding the supply of vacancies
to a lesser extent. Unemployment consequently drops by less than under a progressive
tax. It is in this manner that the structure of the tax system inuences labour market
adjustment to a scal policy (i.e. aggregate demand) shock. The compositional e¤ect
is quantitatively substantial: unemployment drops by 50% more initially when taxes
are at and job creation increases by a similar proportion.
To provide further evidence for this explanation of events, Figure 8 plots the impulse
responses for the baseline scal model with the only change being that  is reduced to 0
so that gt is a pure aggregate demand shock. As indicated by the substantial decline in
consumption and investment, the negative wealth e¤ect is now larger. Hours respond
more persistently, causing tax reform to have a larger e¤ect on the adjustment path.
Vacancy supply actually contracts in response to the scal injection when taxes are
at, leading to a rise in unemployment. The shock is still expansionary, however, as
output rises.
How central are hours to the impact that the tax structure has on the scal trans-
mission mechanism? Figure 9 plots the impulse responses for ' = 100 keeping all other
parameters unchanged. In the absence of variable hours, the structure of the tax sys-
tem does not have a signicant e¤ect on the transmission of the type of scal shocks
considered here. Without variable hours, output cannot rise signicantly on impact
and investment must therefore also fall for one period to accommodate the increase in
government expenditure until employment rises in the second period. This leads us to
conclude that variation in the intensive margin is central in order for the structure of
20Although we have made slight changes to the calibration for the scal model, the impulse re-
sponse functions for a productivity shock remain practically identical to those reported earlier with all
conclusions drawn remaining valid.
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the tax system to inuence the transmission of government expenditure shocks.
In Figure 10, impulse responses are reported for the wage posting equilibrium with
 = 0 keeping all other parameters the same as in the baseline scal model. As in the
baseline model, it is observed that tax reform is associated a larger increase in hours
worked and a smaller decline in unemployment in response to scal stimulus. However,
the divergence between the adjustment paths of the progressive and at tax economies
is smaller than in the baseline model. It can be seen that the tendency for hours to
undershoot the steady state is larger under wage posting, and relatively more so under
a at tax. The positive e¤ect that equilibrium undershooting has on vacancy creation
causes the compositional shift in scal adjustment to be somewhat weaker. Thus, the
incentive to curtail the expansion in vacancies in response to a scal shock because
of a larger increase in ht when  = 0 is attenuated in the wage posting equilibrium
compared with the baseline.
Consider next the output and unemployment multipliers of scal policy as dened by
Monacelli et al. (2010). The output multiplier is measured as the cumulative percentage
change in output divided by the cumulative percentage change government expenditure




gt. We report multipliers on impact and at one
and two year horizons. The unemployment multiplier is computed as the peak fall in
unemployment from the steady state expressed in percentage points. Recall that  is
calibrated to match the empirically observed one year output multiplier as measured by
Monacelli et al. (2010), which is 1.16 for the U.S. They nd an unemployment multiplier
of -0.64. Recall that in computing the multipliers for each separate version of the model
- baseline, inelastic hours and wage posting - we make the calibration adjustments listed
in Table 5 on the presumption that the model in question is the "true" representation
of the economy.21 Caution must therefore be exercised in comparing multipliers across
specications.
Table 6 reports the scal multipliers for the baseline, inelastic hours and wage post-
ing calibrations. The output multiplier at one year in the baseline model increases
from 1.16 to 1.26 after tax reform, an increase of just under 9%. A similar proportional
increase is observed for the two year output multiplier. The increase in the impact
output multiplier is about 13%, entirely attributable to the stronger response in hours.
The unemployment multiplier, on the other hand, falls by about 30%, from -0.32 to
-0.20, when  = 0. Tax reform does not have a quantitatively meaningful impact on
scal policy when ' = 100, as anticipated from the impulse response functions. The
impact output multiplier is substantially smaller in the inelastic hours model at just
0.72 compared to 1.08 under a progressive tax, and 0.72 compared to 1.22 under a
at tax. On the other hand, given the increased reliance on extensive adjustment, the
unemployment multiplier is signicantly larger in the inelastic hours model at -0.80,
21The multipliers, apart from the baseline, therefore do not correspond to the impulse response
gures. In these gures only one parameter - ' or  - was altered at a time in order to isolate the
individual e¤ects of such changes to facilitate intuition.
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more than double the baseline value of -0.32. Under a progressive tax system the two
year output multiplier is larger in the inelastic hours model since extensive adjustment
imparts sluggishness in the adjustment process, but eventually yields a larger cumula-
tive response. Hours variation thus "attens" the time prole of the output multiplier,
increasing the impact response but weakening the long-term multiplier. Under a at
tax, however, the output multipliers are always larger in the baseline model. The re-
lationship between tax reform and scal multipliers in the wage posting equilibrium is
similar to the baseline but somewhat weaker.
In sum, a at tax programme increases the ability of expansionary scal policy
to stimulate output, with the improvement occurring to a somewhat greater extent
towards the initial period of impact. This suggests that a at tax programme can pos-
sibly hasten the e¤ects of scal stimulus by encouraging variation in hours which serves
to amplify the output multiplier on impact. There is a trade-o¤ however, since when
hours are variable, at tax reform decreases the ability of expansionary scal policy
to reduce unemployment. This is because rmswillingness to expand vacancy supply
in response to an aggregate demand shock is inversely related to workerswillingness
to work longer hours in existing matches, thereby driving a "compositional e¤ect" of
tax reform. The model thus displays a tendency for output multipliers to be posi-
tively related to the elasticity of the labour supply, while unemployment multipliers
are decreasing in the elasticity of the labour supply. These results reveal that tax re-
form has qualitatively di¤erent implications for the e¤ects of demand as opposed to
supply shocks, since we previously demonstrated that productivity shocks tended to
moderately amplify unemployment volatility.
Finally, given the centrality of hours in the scal transmission mechanism we have
highlighted, it is natural to ask what the VAR evidence indicates about the impact
of government expenditure on average hours per employee. The evidence is mixed.
On the one hand, Monacelli et al. (2010) nd that the e¤ect is small, with hours not
responding signicantly to government shocks. On the other, Li and Yuan (2000) nd
that government expenditure induces a positive response in hours worked per employee
that is statistically signicant for several periods after the shock. The di¤erence appears
to stem from the e¤ect that the respective authors measure on employment, which is
positive in Monacelli et al. (2010) and negative in Li and Yuan (2000). Unfortunately,
hours per worker is a variable not often included in empirical investigations of scal
multipliers, so it is di¢ cult to gather su¢ cient evidence to make a reliable conclusion
based on atheoretical VAR estimations.22
4.4 What Actually Happens in the Data after a Structural Tax Break?
In recognition of the observation by Chen and Guo (2010) that the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 happened to coincide with the onset of an extended moderation in U.S. busi-
22Other empirical investigations of scal multipliers include Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Auer-
bach and Gorodnichenko (2010).
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ness cycle volatility, we briey remark that at rst this may seem at odds with our
models prediction of increased output volatility. Table 7 provides a breakdown of the
business cycle statistics we consider pre- and post- 1986. Improved economic stability
in the U.S. since the 1980s is well documented phenomenon, colloquially dubbed the
"Great Moderation" (see Stock and Watson 2002 for a discussion). The standard devi-
ation of the cyclical component of output falls dramatically from 1.43% to 1.07% after
TRA-86. Our model, by contrast, tends to predict a negative association between tax
progressivity and output volatility, due to the e¤ect on the behaviour of hours varia-
tion. Although the relative volatility of hours in the data across sub-samples rises, the
change is weaker than what is implied by the model. The data also display a decrease in
the relative volatility of unemployment despite the large drop in output volatility. The
relative volatility of the wage rate in the data, however, goes in the opposite direction,
increasing from 0.42 to 1.11 relative to output over the two sample periods.
Of course, the environment is controlled in our tax policy experiments - the only
change to the structure of the economy is to the slope of the tax schedule. In the
actual data, there are likely to have been several important changes that would need
to be controlled for in isolating the business cycle impact of the 1986 tax reform. Our
objective in this chapter is not to undertake a formal empirical investigation of the
relationship between the Great Moderation and tax reform. We do note, however, that
there are several hypotheses attempting to account for the decline in business cycle
volatility in more recent decades, ranging from "good luck" (Stock and Watson 2002)
to better stabilisation policy (Clarida et al 2000). Champagne and Kurman (2010)
argue that the rise in wage volatility coincides with other structural labour market
changes that are likely to have rendered wages more sensitive to cyclical labour market
conditions. Examples include a smaller tendency towards private sector unionisation
(Farber and Western 2001) and a shift towards performance-pay contracts (Lemieux et
al. 2008). As Shimer (2005) emphasises, wage exibility damps unemployment and job
creation volatility in frictional matching models of the sort considered in this chapter.
As shocks are increasingly absorbed by wage adjustments, output volatility falls.
We have abstracted from potential shifts in the macroeconomic environment, fo-
cusing solely on the real business cycle implications of a structural tax policy shift,
keeping all else constant. It is therefore conceivable, for instance, that a tax policy
shift in conjunction with an increase in the exibility of wages would render the latter
more volatile in the post-tax reform model. Exacerbated wage movements would then
be anticipated to reduce the volatility of hours worked, to an extent o¤setting the e¤ects
of the tax reform. However, we emphasise that the purpose of the current study is not
to provide an explanation for the modern improvement in macroeconomic stability, but
to elucidate the business cycle consequences of at tax reform in an isolated fashion.
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5 Conclusion
This chapter has developed a real business cycle model that is capable of quantify-
ing the extent to which structural tax reform inuences the propagation of exogenous
shocks in general equilibrium. The principal channel through which tax reform operates
is on the behaviour of hours, which tend to become more volatile the less progressive
tax policy is. The adjustment path of hours is found to be qualitatively di¤erent de-
pending on the type of shock considered. In a frictional labour market, however, the
path of hours has implications for job creation and unemployment. We found that the
dynamic behaviour of hours along the adjustment path to an aggregate productivity
shock generates o¤setting incentives for job creation, with the result that tax reform has
little impact on unemployment uctuations. On the other hand, we argued that tax re-
form causes a compositional shift in labour market adjustment to an aggregate demand
shock. This implied that scal stimulus is more e¤ective at reducing unemployment
but less e¤ective at expanding output under a progressive tax system in which hours
are less responsive to shocks. For an extreme parameterisation in which government
spending is entirely wasteful, we found that government shocks can actually lead to an
increase in unemployment. This result relates to the empirical nding of Bruckner and
Pappa (2010) for OECD countries that an increase in government expenditure often
results in an increase in unemployment. Whereas Bruckner and Pappa (2010) provided
a theoretical explanation based on increased labour market participation which causes
unemployment to rise due to congestion, our model provides an alternative explanation
suggesting that rising unemployment in response to government expenditure may be
partially due to rms avoiding frictional hiring costs when employees are willing to
work longer hours. In this chapter we have therefore established a relationship between
the size of scal multipliers and the slope of the labour income tax schedule. The
model therefore delivers a testable hypothesis in this regard, laying the groundwork for
an empirical investigation into the dependence of scal stimulus on the degree of tax
progressivity.
We abstracted from the potential impact of tax reform on the search intensity of job
seekers, which was assumed to be constant. However, relaxing this assumption could
introduce new dynamic implications of tax reform, especially for job creation. There
are several ways to model variations in job search intensity, one of which is the labour
force participation decision. Meghir and Phillips (2008) remark that the participation
decision can be especially sensitive to tax incentives for certain demographics, such
as women and low education men. On-the-job search is another way of introducing
endogenous variations in search intensity. Evidence that progressive tax schedules
decrease the probability of moving to a higher paying job is documented by Gentry
and Hubbard (2003). In recognition of the empirical support available to motivate
extending the model along these lines, we regard this area as protable for future
research. Furthermore, we also abstracted from endogenous job destruction. Extending
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the model to include this feature would allow for an assessment of how tax policy
inuences separation dynamics.
We also found that the welfare e¤ects of tax reform are quantitatively small, in line
with Lucas (1987) who argued that the welfare loss to the representative household
of having to live through business cycles is negligibly small. Given that this chapters
analysis is based on a similar representative agent framework, it is not surprising that
the welfare consequences of tax reform at the business cycle frequency are on the order
of Lucas(1987) ndings. Subsequent work, for example by Krusell et al. (2009), has
found that the costs of macroeconomic volatility are substantially greater when agent
heterogeneity is taken into account. These authors build on the idea that although the
welfare of the ctitious "average" household may not vary substantially with aggregate
volatility, the welfare e¤ects of cycles on certain sub-categories of agents, like the poor
or unemployed, may be substantial. It seems likely that such considerations would have
to be incorporated into the current framework in order to conduct a meaningful welfare
analysis. For example, the impact of tax reform on labour supply is likely to vary with
observable household characteristics such as wealth.
These ideas are left to future research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Solution Methods
Log-Linear Approximation The model of this chapter is a system of non-linear
dynamic discrete time stochastic equations for which standard solution techniques are
available. In order to solve for the models dynamics, a linear approximation of the
models equilibrium and aggregate consistency conditions is obtained. The resulting
log-linearised system of equations can be cast in the canonical form of Uhlig (1997) in
which equations containing expectational elements are separated from those that do
not,
0 = Axt +Bxt 1 +Cht +Dzt
0 = Et [Fxt+1 +Gxt +Hxt 1 + Jht+1 +Kht + Lzt+1 +Mzt]
where xt,ht and zt denote vectors of endogenous state variables, endogenous jump
variables and exogenous state variables, respectively, and are multiplied by conformable
coe¢ cient matrices. The exogenous states are the stochastic processes of the model,
written in vector notation as





A system of recursive laws of motion is sought of the form
xt = Pxt 1 +Qzt
ht = Rxt 1 + Szt
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which constitutes the equilibrium of the model. Uhlig (1997) describes the matrix
algebra involved in obtaining the above solution using the method of undetermined
coe¢ cients once the models parameters have been calibrated. Once this solution has
been obtained, the models dynamic properties can be analysed by generating articial
time series data by repeatedly iterating on the equilibrium laws of motion. The stability
condition for a unique equilibrium is that the number of stable eigenvalues of the
coe¢ cient matrix P is exactly equal to the number of endogenous state variables. In
our model we have two endogenous state variables, capital and employment, and for
all of our calibrations there are exactly two stable eigenvalues, ensuring uniqueness of
equilibrium. In practice, we modify the MATLAB routines of Uhlig (1997) in order to
run the numerical solutions that were used in this chapter.
NOTE: all models in this dissertation that are solved in this manner satisfy the
stability condition such that indeterminate equilibria do not arise. The MATLAB
routines used to run the solution algorithms are available upon request.
Second-Order Approximation For the purposes of welfare computations it is nec-
essary to preserve the curvature of the utility function during simulations. The al-
gorithm we use to take a second-order approximation to the policy function is by
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). Expressing the model in the canonical form
0 = Etf (yt+1; yt; xt+1; xt) (24)
where xt is a vector of pre-determined variables at time t and yt is a vector of controls.
The exogenous forcing (vector) process is a subset of xt assumed to follow
zt+1 = zt + t+1
where the error term t+1 is independently and identically distributed with zero mean
and  is a scale parameter and  is a vector of coe¢ cients. The solution to the model
is given by a set of policy functions mapping current states into current controls and
future states
yt = g (xt; )
xt+1 = h (xt; ) + et+1
where the elements of e are zero for endogenous states. Dropping time subscripts and
letting primes denote t+ 1 values, substituting the policy functions into (24) denes




h (x; ) + e0;  ; g (x; ) ; h (x; ) + e0; x
= 0
Hence all derivatives of any order of F are equal to zero. The solution at second-
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order accuracy takes the form
byt = gxbxt + 1
2
bxtgxxbx0t   12g2bx0t+1 = hxbxt + 12bxthxxbx0t   12h2
where a carat denotes logarithmic deviation from steady state. The coe¢ cient matrices
on the second-order terms gxx and hxx are found by twice di¤erentiating F with respect
to x and  and evaluating the result at the steady state (x; 0). Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004) demonstrate that the resulting system is linear in the unknowns gxx and hxx.
The coe¢ cient matrices g and h are the solution to the linear system of equations
F (x; 0) = 0.
The MATLAB routines provided by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) employ the
symbolic di¤erentiation function in order to solve for the second-order approximation
described above, taking as inputs the equilibrium conditions of the model.
7.2 Description of the Data
Here we provide a description of the data used in this chapter as well as the procedure
for obtaining the estimates of the labour income tax function. The data used to compute
the business cycle moments of the U.S. economy in Tables 3 and 7 are all available at
the websites of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov) and the Bureau of
Labour Statistics (www.bls.gov). The table below summarises the data sources. We
use employment and hours data in the non-farm business sector because time series
on total hours worked by private sector employees is a relatively new addition to the
Current Employment Statistics programme of the BLS and is only available from 2006.
The non-farm business sector excludes the economic activities of government and farms,
and according to the BLS glossary accounted for 77% of GDP in 2000.
Variable Denition
Consumption Personal Consumption of Non-Durable Goods and Services, BEA.
Investment Non-Residential Investment + Consumption of Durables, BEA.
Gov. Spending Federal + State and Local Consumption Expenditures, BEA.
Employment Total Employment in the Non-Farm Business Sector (Index), BLS.
Hours Average Hours per Worker in the Non-Farm Business Sector, BLS.
Unemployment Unemployment Level (16 and over)
 Civilian Non-Institutional Population (16 and over), BLS.
Wage Rate Compensation to Private Employees
 (GDP Deator  Hours per Worker  Employment), BEA.
Vacancies Help Wanted Ads Index as constructed by the Conference Board
and made available by the OECD.
We now provide the details regarding the computation of the tax rates that were
52
used in the estimation of the labour tax schedule. The NBER provide an online
tool, TAXSIM, for computing tax liabilities for a given tax year. This is available
at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/. The model makes use of stratied random samples
of actual U.S. tax returns in order to estimate tax liabilities. We follow the example
set by Cassou and Lansing (2003) and compute the tax schedule for married taxpayers
who le jointly. It is assumed that the primary taxpayer earns 70% of the couples
taxable income. This gure is consistent with the data provided in Table 1 of IRS
Statistics of Income Bulletin, Fall 2003.23 We estimate tax schedules for the years
1965, 1975, 1985, 1995 and 2005 for individuals earning between 0.1 and 20 times the
average wage for the given year. The average wage in a given year is taken to be the
empirical counterpart to the term wh in the tax function (3). Unfortunately, the IRS
does not publish historical data sets for tax returns by ling status. Average wages
for joint lers are therefore obtained from the latter Table 1 for the years 1969, 1979,
1989 and 1999. These are based on Form W-2, in which employers report the wages
and salaries of employees for a given tax year. Average wages are observed to follow
a virtually linear time trend, and so linear interpolation and extrapolation are used to
obtain the corresponding estimates for the years we consider. Uploading this data to
TAXSIM provides estimates of the federal marginal tax on wage income. Average tax
rates - the ratio of total taxes paid to total taxable income - are then computed from
the marginal rates.
23This table is available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/99inw2wm.pdf.
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Table 1: Estimated U.S. Labour Income Tax Schedule
Year
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Estimated Level, b 0.89 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.86
(Standard Error) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Estimated Slope, b 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.10
(Standard Error) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.86 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
Note: Nonlinear least squares estimates of the wage tax function using TAXSIM. For a
detailed description see the appendix.
Table 2: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Value Parameter Value
 0.99 h 0.71
 1  0.021
 0.025 b1 0.57
 0.36 b2 -0.10
 0.13 n 0.945
m 0.88 k 25.58
' 0.2 i 0.64
 0.6 c 1.85
 0.05 y 2.49
A 0.00615  0.5
v 0.05 q () 0.9














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: The Welfare Cost of Business Cycles and Tax Reform
Model Welfare Cost of Business Cycles,  
 = 0:13  = 0
Baseline 0.0005 0.0019
Inelastic Hours 0.0012 0.0015
Wage Posting 0.0019 0.0025
Note:  is expressed as a fraction of steady state consumption.
Table 5: Calibration for the Model with Government Spending
Parameter Model
Baseline Inelastic Hours Wage Posting
 0.027 0.033 0.6
' 0.14 100 0.21
A 0.0067 0.0075 0.00635
 0.088 0.1425 0.0915
g 0.20 0.20 0.20
Pg 0.90 0.90 0.90
Note: Remaining parameters same as in baseline.
Table 6: Fiscal Multipliers
Progressive Tax Flat Tax
Impact 1 Year 2 Year Impact 1 Year 2 Year
Output Multipliers
Baseline 1.08 1.16 1.17 1.22 1.26 1.27
Inelastic Hours 0.72 1.16 1.26 0.72 1.15 1.25
Wage Posting 1.09 1.16 1.17 1.19 1.24 1.25
Unemployment Multipliers
Baseline -0.32 -0.20
Inelastic Hours -0.80 -0.79
Wage Posting -0.25 -0.23
Note: The output multiplier is the cumulative change in output divided by the cumulative
change in government spending. The unemployment multiplier is the peak reduction in
unemployment measured in percentage points.
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Table 7: The Great Moderation
U.S. Data









Hours per Worker 0.35 0.40
Note: Standard deviations expressed relative to output. HP lter applied to all time series.
See the appendix for data sources.


































































































































































































































Note: Impulses computed for ' = 100. All other parameters are the same as in the baseline
calibration.
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Note: Impulses computed for  = 0. All other parameters are the same as in the baseline
calibration.
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a Positive 1% Aggregate Productivity Shock with











































































































Note: Impulses computed for  = 0 and ' = 100. All other parameters are the same as in the
baseline calibration.
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Note: Computed using a second-order approximation to the policy function. All parameters
are the same as in the baseline calibration that was used to obtain the linearised dynamics in
Figure 1.
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Figure 6: Utility Adjustment Paths after a Positive 1% Aggregate Productivity Shock












Panel (a): Utility in Levels











Panel (b): Surplus Utility under Flat Tax
















Panel (c): Equivalent Consumption Gain of Surplus Utility
Progressive Tax
Flat Tax
Note: Computed using a second-order approximation to the policy function. Panel (c) shows
the utility gain from a at tax expressed as a percentage of steady state consumption in the
progressive tax model.
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Note: Size of shock normalised to one percent of GDP.
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Note: Size of shock normalised to one percent of GDP. Impulses computed for  = 0. All
other parameters are the same as in the baseline scal calibration.
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Note: Size of shock normalised to one percent of GDP. Impulses computed for ' = 100. All
other parameters are the same as in the baseline scal calibration.
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Note: Size of shock normalised to one percent of GDP. Impulses computed for  = 0. All
other parameters are the same as in the baseline scal calibration.
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Chapter II
Monetary Policy and Job Creation in a
New Keynesian Model
Abstract
Recent research has indicated that New Keynesian models with frictional unem-
ployment tend to encounter di¢ culty in generating a rise in job creation in response
to expansionary monetary policy, rendering the model inconsistent with the downward
sloping Beveridge curve that appears in the data. Matching frictions in the labour mar-
ket congest the job creation process so that rms tend to skew adjustment to shocks
towards the job destruction margin. In recognition of the assertion put forth but un-
pursued by Cooley and Quadrini (1999) that uctuations in the size of the labour force
may ease labour market congestion and therefore amplify cyclical job creation, in this
chapter we extend a New Keynesian model with unemployment to feature an endoge-
nous labour market participation decision. A baseline model with a standard degree
of risk aversion tends to exhibit countercyclical labour force participation, which is
inconsistent with the data. In order to address this issue, we propose the notion of
labour market participation as a social consideration, which we demonstrate to be ca-
pable of generating procyclical participation incentives. We then nd that plausible
uctuations in the size of the labour force do not exert a quantitatively signicant
e¤ect on job creation. It is then argued that, by altering the dynamics of aggregate
demand, time-inseparability in the utility function can signicantly improve the ability
of expansionary monetary policy to increase job creation, allowing the model to gen-
erate a downward sloping Beveridge curve conditional on monetary shocks. However,
time-inseparability comes at the cost of inducing a counterfactually upward sloping
Beveridge curve conditional on productivity shocks.
1 Introduction
Flows of working-age individuals into and out of the labour force are exceedingly large.
For instance, the number of working-age people moving from employment to non-
participation exceeds the ow from employment to unemployment even if the tails of
the age distribution are ignored (Garibaldi and Wasmer, 2002). This raises a number of
questions about macroeconomic behaviour. What is the relationship between variations
in the size of the labour force and the joint dynamics of ination and output? Are
movements in labour market participation potentially important for monetary policy?
To what extent do labour market ows to and from inactivity a¤ect wage determination
and job creation?
67
This chapter attempts to address these questions in light of analyses by Cooley and
Quadrini (1999) and more recently by Krause and Lubik (2007) that have highlighted
the di¢ culties encountered by New Keynesian models with frictional unemployment
and endogenous job destruction in generating a meaningful boom in job creation in
response to monetary stimulus. Macroeconomic adjustment to monetary policy shocks
in this class of models tends to occur largely through variations in the rate at which jobs
are destroyed, rather than the rate at which they are created. The reason is that costly
matching frictions in the labour market make it di¢ cult to hire new workers, a di¢ culty
which is exacerbated during a boom when unemployment is low. Destruction rates that
decline during an upswing cause the unemployment pool to get smaller. In the presence
of matching frictions, labour market congestion from low unemployment lengthens the
expected duration before a vacancy is lled and also puts upward pressure on wages
because of an improvement in the job nding prospects of employees outside of their
current matches. Endogenising both the destruction and creation decisions of rms at
the cyclical frequency in a frictional environment thus implies that a reduction in the
destruction rate has the unintended consequence of reducing incentives for job creation
due to a concurrent rise in labour market congestion. In a standard New Keynesian
model with matching frictions, the supply of vacancies typically decreases in response
to expansionary monetary policy, moving in parallel with unemployment. However, as
Krause and Lubik (2007) and Fujita (2003) note, a positive and persistent reaction of
vacancies to shocks is pivotal in generating the observed negative correlation between
job creation and job destruction over the cycle as well as the highly negative correlation
between vacancies and unemployment, the latter being known as the Beveridge curve.
From a model building perspective, predicting a realistically sloped Beveridge curve is
crucial for the ability of the model to generate realistic transition rates (determined by
the cyclical behaviour of labour market tightness) and therefore job ows.1
Mechanisms are therefore sought which are capable of arresting the fall in the prof-
itability of issuing vacancies as labour market tightness, and hence congestion, rises
during a boom. Movements in labour market participation tend to be moderately pro-
cyclical, uctuating about a third as much as output, and highly correlated with the
vacancy-unemployment ratio, which serves as a proxy for the potential benets of job
search. Figure 1 illustrates the cyclical behaviour of labour market participation and
market tightness for U.S. data. As Cooley and Quadrini (1999) speculate, through the
amplication of procyclical variation in the pool of available job searchers, endogenous
labour market participation may potentially mitigate the rise in labour market con-
gestion that o¤sets incentives to expand vacancy supply during booms. The authors,
however, do not pursue this avenue. A priori, it is di¢ cult to judge the importance
of uctuations in the labour force for job creation in a frictional labour market. On
1The Beveridge curve is also important for policy. For example, outward shifts may indicate a rise
in structural, as opposed to cyclical, unemployment. See Blanchard and Diamond (1989) for a seminal
contribution.
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Figure 1: Cyclical Components of Labour Market Tightness and the Labour Force for
U.S. Data






















Labour Force Tightness (Secondary Scale)
Notes: Data for the labour force and unemployment are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
website. Time series data on vacancies are compiled by the Conference Board and made
available online at the OECDs statistics portal. Data are HP ltered with smoothing
parameter 1600.
the one hand, uctuations in the labour force are relatively mild.2 Indeed, the vast
majority of business cycle studies of unemployment abstract from the participation
margin presumably on these grounds (see Andolfatto 1996 and Merz 1995 for two sem-
inal studies). But on the other hand, the current literature suggests that job creation
is perhaps highly sensitive to the presence of labour market congestion arising from
matching frictions, indicating that even small reductions in congestion may have an
appreciable e¤ect.
The resolution of this issue necessitates a quantitative approach. For this purpose,
we extend the New Keynesian model of Krause and Lubik (2007) by introducing an
explicit labour market participation decision, thus allowing for compositional changes
in the measure of agents who are not currently in employment. In particular, we ask
whether endogenous participation can overturn the result of Krause and Lubik (2007)
that an acceleration in monetary growth causes a contraction in vacancy supply. Our
main result is that endogenous participation movements are found to be quantitatively
irrelevant for amplifying cyclical job creation. Despite empirically plausible variation
2Although Figure 1 illustrates that uctuations in the labour force are an order of magnitude smaller
than uctuations in tightness, the latter tend to be very large, an order of magnitude larger than output
movements.
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in the size of the labour force, the extended model remains incapable of producing
a Beveridge curve. Prior to arriving at that conclusion, it is found that a baseline
model with risk averse agents exhibits a tendency for labour force participation to be
countercyclical, which is inconsistent with the data. The reason is that as the marginal
utility of market consumption declines during a boom, agents have less of an incentive to
remain active in the labour market. We nd that this result holds despite a conventional
degree of curvature in the utility function. In order to address this issue we propose the
notion of labour market participation as a social consideration, which we demonstrate
to be capable of generating procyclical participation incentives. We formalise this
idea by introducing an aggregate consumption externality in the form of comparison
utility preferences which feature an interdependence of utility across households. The
particular specication which we adopt is based on Gali (1994) which exhibits the
"keeping up with the Joneses" property, or the notion that individual households will
wish to consume relatively more when aggregate consumption (which we take to be
the external reference) is higher. Procyclicality of the labour force in our model with
comparison utility is then generated by the social consideration of wanting to consume
more when average consumption is relatively high. In this sense, participation in the
labour market can be thought of as more of a social institution and less of a free
choice, with the social aspects of labour force participation providing an incentive to
"stay in the market". Consumption externalities are key to replicating realistic labour
force uctuations, allowing us to reach the conclusion that, for empirically plausible
magnitudes, endogenous participation movements are not a primary driver of cyclical
job creation.
We must therefore dig a little deeper into the fundamental mechanics of the model
in order to nd other processes besides participation ows which could potentially give
rise to a positive relationship between expansionary monetary policy and vacancy sup-
ply. In addition to an aggregate consumption externality, which is also referred to
as external habit formation, we also consider internal habit formation. Internal con-
sumption habits, which cause utility to be time-inseparable, shape aggregate demand
dynamics over the business cycle, in particular rendering the response to monetary
growth shocks much more persistent.3 As a result of this increase in persistence, we
nd that time-inseparability of the utility function is capable of reversing the conclu-
sion reached by Krause and Lubik (2007) that vacancy supply contracts in response
to monetary stimulus. The intuition for this result is as follows. Without internal
consumption habits, the peak response in aggregate demand to a monetary shock oc-
curs on impact, after which output falls monotonically back towards the steady state.
However, in the presence of a frictional matching process in the labour market, vacancy
supply is forward-looking. The forward-looking nature of job creation in this class of
models implies that the incentives for job creation that arise in response to a monetary
expansion are weak when the impact on aggregate demand tends to be front-loaded.
3Both Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and Krause and Lubik (2007) assume time-separable utility.
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By introducing internal habit formation, the response in aggregate demand to a mone-
tary expansion is hump-shaped, so that rms anticipate a further increase in aggregate
demand even after the period in which the shock takes place. Our analysis demon-
strates that sluggish adjustment in aggregate demand is quantitatively important for
generating an expansion in vacancy supply in response to monetary stimulus.
Before proceeding with the formal model, we note that this chapter is related to
various strands of literature on monetary policy, job ows, endogenous labour force
participation, home production and consumption externalities. In relation to job ows,
recent work by Silva and Toledo (2009) indicates that introducing post-match labour
turnover costs helps to encourage job creation by making termination more costly,
allowing for a more realistically sloped Beveridge curve. Holt (2008) nds that en-
dogenous hours variation is conducive to breaking the synchronisation of job ows and
obtaining a negative vacancy-unemployment correlation. Our approach takes a di¤er-
ent perspective, assessing the incentives for job creation that arise from uctuations
in labour market participation and sluggish consumption adjustment to shocks. These
two mechanisms are examined independently of one another for ease of exposition as
well as for reasons that will become clear subsequently.
Regarding endogenous participation, the motivation for modelling the activities in
which non-participants engage as pertaining to a distinct "home sector", rather than
just a subset of time use in the market sector, is based on empirical grounds. The
home sector is large, whether measured by the time allocated to home production,
the value of inputs or the value of output. Empirical estimates of the value of home
production range between 20 to 50 percent of GNP in industrialised countries (Eisner
1988 and Bonke 1992). Time use surveys indicate that people spend 28 percent of
their discretionary time working in the home sector, which is comparable to 33 percent
in the formal market (Hill 1985). Purchases of consumer durables and residential
investment exceed purchases of producer durables and nonresidential investment in
the U.S. (Greenwood and Hercowitz 1991). Moreover, there appears to be a large
degree of substitutability between market and non-market activities, with employed
individuals devoting relatively little time to home production, and the amount of time
devoted to market activities being positively correlated with wages (see Benhabib et
al. 1991 and Rios-Rull 1990). In light of this evidence, the home sector is modelled as
a distinct entity, and it is assumed that only agents who are not employed engage in
the production of a home good. An alternative interpretation of activity in the home
sector would be a broad denition of "leisure". In what follows, these two terms are
used interchangeably.
The study by Krause and Lubik (2007) is very closely related to a small but rapidly
expanding literature of New Keynesian studies which concentrate on the interaction
between monetary policy and frictional unemployment. These include Walsh (2005),
Heer and Maussner (2009) and Trigari (2009), amongst others. These studies nd that,
relative to a New Keynesian model with a Walrasian labour market, matching frictions
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lower the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output. In a Walrasian labour mar-
ket in which unemployment is non-existent and all labour input variation occurs along
the intensive margin, unless an implausibly high labour supply elasticity is assumed
the model will tend to generate excessive ination volatility. Allowing for matching
frictions permits rms to adjust the labour input along the extensive margin as well,
which, given the long term nature of employment contracts in such a setting, alleviates
the rise in marginal costs due to the expected payo¤ from continuing the match into
the following periods (see Trigari 2009). On the other hand, Walsh (2005) nds that
policy inertia itself is the primary driver behind the output e¤ects of monetary policy
shocks. All of these studies normalise the labour force to a constant. Furthermore, our
model di¤ers by featuring rms that jointly make both pricing and ring decisions, as in
Krause and Lubik (2007) and Thomas (2008), whereas this decision is separated in the
other New Keynesian studies mentioned. We argue that the connection between pricing
and separation decisions has quantitatively signicant implications for the (in)ability
of the model to jointly capture the volatilities of ination and job destruction.
Recent work by Gali (2010) relates more closely to the current study in that, al-
though he does not focus on the implications, he allows for variations in the labour force
in a New Keynesian model with sticky prices. There are nevertheless several di¤erences
between our study and his. First, we explicitly allow for not only an endogenous partic-
ipation decision, but also an endogenous job destruction decision, whereas Gali (2010)
assumes a xed destruction rate and refrains from discussing the dynamics of job ows
over the cycle. Second is the mechanism through which frictions are introduced in the
labour market. Instead of costly vacancy posting, Gali (2010) assumes that rms pay
a real hiring cost in order to expand their workforce, although, as he points out, this
is closely related in a reduced-form sense to the assumption of an aggregate match-
ing function. The consequence of adopting the hiring costs of Gali (2010) however is
that vacancies are omitted from his model, preventing an assessment of the ability of
the model to reproduce a Beveridge curve, a key empirical regularity which has been a
pressing issue for matching models with endogenous job destruction (Cole and Rogerson
1999).
Another di¤erence between our models is the manner in which the participation
decision is introduced. Gali (2010) species a utility cost to the representative house-
hold of having an additional agent enter the labour force. We follow Haefke and Reiter
(2006) in assuming that agents are subject to idiosyncratic variation in their valua-
tion of leisure, thus allowing for participation ows. Heterogeneity in the valuation of
non-participation is what permits movements into and out of the labour force in our
model. Conceptually, the two approaches are not drastically di¤erent, but do appear
to require di¤erent calibration strategies which may a¤ect the results. Gali (2010) cal-
ibrates the households disutility of unemployment so as to generate realistic labour
force uctuations. Given his specication of the participation decision, Gali (2010) is
forced to depart from the standard assumption of symmetric Nash bargaining. Instead
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he assumes that the relative bargaining power of the rm is close to zero in order to
generate realistic unemployment uctuations. In the limit in which it is zero, the wage
is independent of the workers outside option. The workers outside option, however,
undergoes a substantial change upon the introduction of a participation choice, and to
rule it out of the wage equation is to a priori discard a channel of potential impor-
tance in light of the well known connection between wage dynamics and job creation
emphasised by Shimer (2005). In contrast, we follow the approach of Haefke and Reiter
(2006) in calibrating the standard deviation of idiosyncratic home productivity shocks
so as to generate realistic unemployment movements, which allows us to match the
data without imposing a restriction on relative bargaining powers.
Another study by Campolmi and Gnocchi (2011) also incorporates endogenous
labour force participation into a New Keynesian model, but, similarly to Gali (2010),
they do not also endogenise job destruction. Instead, they show that endogenous par-
ticipation reduces the extent to which switching from a exible to a strict ination
targeting regime exacerbates unemployment volatility. We also note that our work re-
lates to other studies of variable participation over the business cycle which abstract
from monetary disturbances and nominal rigidity. Apart from Haefke and Reiter (2006),
such studies include Veracierto (2008) and Tripier (2003). The latter two studies nd
that procyclical participation incentives tend to imply that unemployment counterfac-
tually rises during productivity booms when the incentive to enter the workforce is high
but matching frictions impede the transition to employment. Haefke and Reiter (2006)
note that calibrating the density of workers who are close to the participation margin is
key to generating countercyclical unemployment uctuations. Although the manner in
which we introduce endogenous participation closely corresponds to Haefke and Reiter
(2006), we nd that the negative correlation of unemployment with output is not sensi-
tive to our calibration strategy. This suggests that our incorporation of endogenous job
destruction promotes countercyclical unemployment despite procyclical participation
incentives. To see this, note that endogenous job destruction has opposing e¤ects on
the incentive to participate. All else equal, a reduction in the destruction rate in re-
sponse to a positive shock reduces the unemployment pool, raising the chances that an
individual agent nds a job and thus encourages participation. Conversely, the ability
of rms to adjust along the separation margin reduces the extent to which new jobs
need to be created in order to expand employment, which detracts from the incentive
to enter the labour market during an upswing. On balance, our nding that unemploy-
ment is robustly countercyclical suggests that the latter e¤ect outweighs the former.
Moreover, unlike the previously mentioned studies, we also allow for direct transitions
from non-participation to employment, as appears in the data, in the form of "passive
search". We nd this channel to be quantitatively important for generating strongly
countercyclical unemployment.
Another major di¤erence between our model and that of Haefke and Reiter (2006)
is that we consider consumers who are risk averse while they assume risk neutrality.
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Interpreting non-participation as a productive use of time presents complications with
risk averse workers as they will have to be paid increasingly more to remain in employ-
ment during a boom. As mentioned previously, we address this issue by re-interpreting
participation in the labour force as a social activity which allows the household to ad-
just its level of market consumption relative to an external reference stock. Individual
concern over aggregate consumption is referred to as "comparison utility" in Carroll
et al. (1997). Preferences of this type that exhibit outward-looking, interdependent
utility have a long tradition in economics, dating back to Veblen (1899) and Duesen-
berry (1949). In the recent literature, such preferences have been applied in a variety
of elds: Carroll et al. (1997), Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) and Liu and Turnovsky
(2005) in endogenous growth; Abel (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Gali
(1994) in asset pricing; Dupor and Liu (2003) show that consumption externalities
can cause equilibrium overconsumption; and Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) analyse the
implications for optimal tax policy. To our knowledge, the application to the social
aspects of cyclical labour force participation is novel.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 derives a baseline New
Keynesian model that features endogenous labour market participation. Section 3
details the calibration and solution procedures. Simulation-based moment calculations
and impulse response functions are reported in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the
comparison utility extension as well as the e¤ects of nominal rigidity, passive search
and time-inseparability. Section 6 concludes.
2 Baseline Model
The model that is developed in this section incorporates endogenous labour force move-
ments into a New Keynesian business cycle framework, relaxing the assumption that
employment and unemployment are collectively exhaustive states. Frictions in the
labour market are based on the mathematical framework commonly referred to as the
Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides matching model.4 Idiosyncrasy in the value of home
productivity is what enables participation uctuations, as in Haefke and Reiter (2006).
Conditional on this value, non-employed agents, i.e. those not in productive employ-
ment, decide whether to enter the labour market as unemployed and formally search
for a job, or stay out of the labour force to fully devote their time to the production of
a home good, which can also be thought of as leisure. In what follows these two terms
for the activities of non-participants are used interchangeably. Both pricing and hiring
decisions are made within the same rm in a monopolistically competitive environment,
drawing heavily on the structure of Krause and Lubik (2007). Hiring is subject to an
aggregate random matching technology which permits ows from both unemployment
and non-participation directly to employment. Pricing decisions are subject to convex
nominal adjustment costs.
4Seminal contributions include Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (2000).
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We begin by describing the households optimisation problem.
2.1 Households
Time is discrete. It is assumed that the institutional structure of households is such
that each pools all of the income of a unit measure of individual members so that
all employment risk is eliminated.5 Consumption is therefore the same for all family
members and the jth households preferences are dened over a composite consumption
bundle, cj;t. Real money balances, mj;t=pt, where pt is the aggregate price level and
mj;t is the jth households nominal money balances, enter into the utility function.
Households make consumption decisions in order to maximise the innite sum of














where  > 0 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, Et is the expectational operator
conditional on information available at time t and  is a discount factor. The labour
market participation decision is not chosen at the level the household, but is instead
determined through decentralised individual participation decisions which are discussed
in detail subsequently. This is analogous to the assumption made by Trigari (2009)
and Holt (2008) that the quantity of household hours is chosen through decentralised
optimisation behaviour of agents subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks and not
at the level of the household.

















where Wj;t and Uj;t are labour and unemployment income, respectively, and are speci-
ed below. rt 1 is the return on nominal bonds purchased at t 1, Bj;t 1. (gt   1)mt 1=pt
is a lump-sum transfer from the monetary authority to the household in period t, where
gt is the gross growth rate of the aggregate money supply. j;t represents dividends that
the household receives from diversied ownership stakes in rms and Tj;t is a lump-sum
scal transfer (or tax if less than zero). The rst-order conditions associated with the
5Dropping this assumption would entail tracking the labour market histories of each individual
family member, greatly complicating the analysis. Authors such as Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996)
pioneered this method of modelling general equilibrium business cycles with search frictions, which has
proven to be the most popular framework in the literature.
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households optimisation programme are
@ct : c
 
t   t = 0













where t is the Lagrangian multiplier on the budget constraint. In equilibrium all
households are identical and so j subscripts are eliminated, so that quantities now refer

















which are the usual optimality conditions associated with a standard New Keynesian
model. Equation (3) is a standard Euler condition governing the optimal path of
consumption, and equation (4) is the intratemporal optimality condition that sets the
marginal rate of substitution between money and consumption equal to the opportunity
cost of holding money.
2.2 Firm Structure and Job Flows
The structure of rms closely follows Krause and Lubik (2007). A large number of rms
produce di¤erentiated goods by employing labour as the sole input to a stochastic
production technology. Each individual rm is large, with a continuum of jobs, or
matches, dened over the unit interval available within each rm. Each successful
match (job) produces a measure of output Ataij;t at time t, where At is an aggregate
technology shock common to all matches within all rms, and aij;t is the match-specic
productivity of job i at rm j at time t. Variables without an ij subscript denote
aggregate values. It is assumed that the individual agents valuation of leisure or home
productivity does not inuence the productivity of that agents employment.
All uncertainty, both aggregate and idiosyncratic, is revealed at the beginning of
each period. Match specic productivity is drawn before production commences within
the period, and only matches which draw a high enough value for aij;t follow through to
the production stage, implying that di¤erent levels of output are produced in di¤erent
matches. Matches that do not draw a high enough value of the idiosyncratic shock
are terminated prior to production. Should this be the case, the job is then destroyed
yielding a zero value to the rm, and the worker, upon job termination, decides whether
to actively search for another job or to exit the labour market. This decision will be
made explicit once a recursive structure for the labour market has been constructed.
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An endogenously determined critical value, denoted by aj;t for rm j, denes the
level of individual match productivity that renders the value of the match to the rm
equal to zero. The ith match for which aij;t  aj;t is terminated with probability
one. Idiosyncratic match productivities are drawn from a general time-invariant distri-
bution, G (a) ; with positive support and density G0 (a). The endogenous destruction




. The endogenous destruction rate is time de-
pendent because changes in the aggregate state of the economy will a¤ect the value
of all matches regardless of the individual circumstances in each match. In order to
maintain consistency with the related literature, following den Haan et al. (2000) it is
assumed that there is also a source of exogenous labour turnover, denoted by x. A
fraction x of the rms matches exogenously terminate before idiosyncratic productiv-
ities are known in each period. Exogenous labour turnover is intended to capture job
terminations that arise from worker quits or other actions which are not related to the
fundamental productivity of the job. The total separation rate for rm j at time t is
then given by
j;t = 





Having described job separation dynamics, consider next the process by which new
jobs are created. The measure of new matches in each period is determined by an
aggregate random matching technology that has as its inputs the aggregate measure of
vacancies issued by rms, vt =
R 1
0 vj;tdj, and the aggregate measure of job searchers,
st. The aggregate measure of new matches at time t is given by
Mt =M (vt; st)
whereM is increasing in both arguments and homogenous of degree one. Dene labour
market tightness as t = vt=st, the ratio of vacancies to searchers. Random matching








where the constant returns to scale restriction on the matching technology permits a
representation of transition probabilities with tightness as the sole input argument.
2.3 Labour Force Participation
Idiosyncratic home productivity hi;t is drawn from a general time-invariant distribution,
F (h), with positive support and density F 0 (h). In order to avoid wage heterogeneity
with respect to hi;t in addition to ai;t, which complicates the model substantially, it
is assumed that only non-employed agents (both unemployed and out-of-the-labour
force) re-draw the idiosyncratic home productivity parameter within the period. This
assumption follows Haefke and Reiter (2006). We are e¤ectively assuming that all
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successfully matched individuals concentrate fully on market sector production and
devote zero e¤ort to production in the home sector. One rationale for suppressing
home productivity to zero during full-time employment is the presence of a binding
time constraint. In this manner, as will be demonstrated formally when an explicit
wage equation is derived below, it is the likelihood that the agent will quit into non-
participation upon job termination that determines the outside option of the worker
and hence wages, rather than the particular realisation of hi;t. Given independent and
identical distribution of idiosyncratic shocks, the likelihood of entering unemployment
versus non-participation upon job separation is the same for all employees. Outside
options of negotiating agents are therefore homogenous within the rm and the only
source of wage heterogeneity is aij;t.
Should the match in which a particular agent is employed terminate, the agent
then draws a value of hi;t, which determines that agents subsequent actions. Let ht
represent the critical minimum bound on home productivity that is necessary for the
agent to remain outside of the formal labour market. ht will also be referred to as the
"participation constraint". Because the expected value of job search is homogenous
across agents, ht is also common to all agents. If hi;t  ht, non-employed agents,
including those red at the start of the period, enter the pool of non-participants.
If hi;t < ht, the agents individual value of home productivity is not high enough to
induce non-participation, in which case the agent enters unemployment, the latter being
dened formally as the measure of agents actively seeking employment.
Employment is dened as the measure of matches which are productive during the
current period,
et = (1  t)nt
where nt =
R 1
0 nj;tdj is the aggregate measure of matches at the beginning of the period
before shocks are drawn and t is the aggregate separation rate. The timing structure
of each discrete period is such that the matching phase occurs after the dissolution of
unproductive matches (see Walsh 2005 or Trigari 2009). The unemployment pool is
then dened as
ut = (1  et)F (ht)
and the measure of non-participants is
lt = (1  et) (1  F (ht)) :
The labour force is thus LFt = et + ut. It is assumed that non-participants search
passively for job opportunities at a constant intensity of 0    1. This approach
has been followed by others, for example Pries and Rogerson (2009), and is simply
reective of the assumed weaker interest that non-participants have in working in the
formal market but nonetheless permits transitions from non-participation directly to
78
employment.6 Given our adoption of discrete time,  can be thought of as the fraction
of each period during which a non-participant actively searches for employment. The
search intensity of unemployed agents is normalised to unity. The aggregate measure
of searching agents, in terms of e¢ ciency units, is given by
st = ut + lt:
Setting  = 0 corresponds to the case in which agents must enter employment
strictly via unemployment and  = 1 to the case in which unemployed and non-
participating agents search with the same (full) intensity. Let p (t) = Mt=st be the
probability that a randomly chosen searcher from the pool st is matched with a va-
cancy at time t. That is, for each e¢ ciency unit of search of an unmatched agent, the
aggregate matching technology transfers agents from the pool of e¤ective searchers to
employment at the rate p (t). Hence, the transition probability for an unemployed
worker who searches with unit intensity is simply
pU (t) = p (t) :
A non-participant searching with intensity  faces a lower probability of transition,
pN (t) = p (t) :
The parameter  is set to ensure that pN (t)  pU (t) for all t.
2.4 Firm Optimisation
The optimisation problem of the rm involves choosing prices, vacancies and the sep-
aration threshold in order to maximise the consumption value of an innite stream
of discounted real prots. The aggregate price level is denoted by pt while individual
prices have a j subscript, pj;t. The gross ination rate at time t is t = pt=pt 1. Output






















where  > 0 is the ow cost of maintaining an available vacancy. ej;t ewj;t represents
rm js wage bill, with ewj;t giving the conditional expectation Et wij;tjaij;t  aj;t.
Wages are not homogenous within the rm but depend positively on the individual
matchs draw of idiosyncratic productivity. Note that only matches which draw a
value of idiosyncratic productivity in excess of the lower bound follow through to the
6Proponents of the "time aggregation bias" viewpoint suggest that some minimal e¤ort is always re-
quired to successfully enter employment. Survey data that is obtained at discrete intervals cannot there-
fore capture infra-monthly transition, and so such instances appear as non-participation-employment
ows. See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
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production stage, allowing the worker to be remunerated. The costs of price adjustment
are captured in (6) by the quadratic term, with  > 0 governing the severity of price
adjustment costs. These are costs associated with relative nominal price changes that
deviate from the steady state rate of ination, , and are assumed to be proportional
to the level of aggregate output, yt.
Firm optimisation is subject to a constraint on the law of motion of employment






nj;t + q (j;t) vj;t: (7)
As is typical of discrete time matching equilibria, it is assumed that vacancies














where, in anticipation of its subsequent functional form, 1 represents the upper limit
of the support of G.
The nal constraint on rm optimisation is an equation relating individual rm-level
prices to the aggregate price index. This is derived as follows. It is assumed that the
continuum of intermediate goods is collected and bundled by a nal goods rm, or by a
group of nal goods rms, that behaves competitively. The nal goods sector maximises
the prots received from bundling the measure of intermediate outputs together subject






















































j;t   pj;t = 0









Substituting the above result into the bundler function gives a nal goods pricing











The above equation maps the optimal individual rm-level prices into an aggregate
price index. Using the demand for intermediate rm js output (9) to eliminate yj;t
from the rms objective function (6) and maximising subject to the constraints (7)
and (8) gives the following rst-order necessary conditions:
















@vt : 0 =  + nt q (t) (12)








ewj;t   nt (1  x)G0 (at)nt (13)




where yt and 
n
t are the time t Lagrangian multipliers on the output and employ-
ment constraints, respectively, and the stochastic discount factor is dened as t+1 =
t+1
 1
t . By symmetry, each rm j with a continuum of jobs is identical, and so the j
subscripts are dropped from the representative rms rst-order conditions. Note that
yt represents the contribution to the rms real revenue stream of marginally relaxing
the output constraint, and for a prot maximising rm is equal to real marginal cost.7
nt is the shadow value of employment, or the contribution of the marginal worker to
the rms stream of revenue averaged across all idiosyncratic productivities that exceed








yt+1At+1eat+1   ewt+1 + q (t+1)

(15)
where eat = Et ai;tjai;t  at+1 is the conditional expectation of idiosyncratic match
productivity. Equation (15) is the optimality condition which governs job creation. The
expected cost of issuing a vacancy in period t is equal to the expected discounted benet
of employing an additional productive worker in period t+1. The latter is represented
by the di¤erence between expected productivity and the expected wage, adjusting for
7Had the rms problem been formulated as a cost minimization programme, the output multiplier
would represent the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of output. For a prot maximising
rm as set out above, the two approaches are identical. It is standard in the literature to refer to the
multiplier as the marginal cost. See Krause and Lubik (2007).
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search costs forgone at t + 1 (captured by =q (t+1)) due to the employment of an
agent matched at time t. The entire right hand side of the expression is discounted by
the term 1  t+1, as it represents the probability that time t matches actually become
productive at time t+ 1.
Congestion externalities in the frictional labour market imply that q0 (t) < 0, so
that a persistent increase in aggregate productivity which increases the right hand side
of (15) prompts an increase in vacancy supply, causing =q (t) to rise until equality
is restored. In a model in which participation is held constant, the available pool of
agents to be potentially matched with vacancies is directly inversely proportional to
the employment rate. Employing one more agent reduces the search pool by one, and
this makes congestion a potential problem for rms wishing to create jobs. As a result,
in response to an improvement in aggregate conditions, congestion externalities quickly
drive up the expected duration of vacancies and put upward pressure on wages through
an increase in tightness. Allowing for endogenous participation has the potential to
mitigate these congestion e¤ects by allowing the measure of job seekers to uctuate in
response to the availability of vacancies. Note also that vacancy supply is a forward-
looking function of the path of the future wage bill. All else constant, a lower trajectory
for the real wage translates into a higher path for the supply of vacancies over the cycle.
Consider next the optimality condition that governs job separations. Replacing
the shadow value of employment in rst-order condition (13) with equation (12), the
following job destruction condition obtains,




where wt (at) is the equilibrium wage evaluated at the critical threshold. Job destruction
occurs at the level of idiosyncratic match productivity for which the net value added of
the worker, adjusted for the search costs that the rm forgoes by retaining the marginal
employee, is equal to (or below) zero. Recall that job destruction occurs before the
matching phase of each period of discrete time. This explains why the relevant search
costs that are saved in the current period by retaining the marginal worker are the
time t, not the time t+1, search costs. Hiring is subject to costly and time consuming
matching frictions, and so current period marginal costs therefore reect the costs of
raising production in the current period via a reduction in at. Rearranging (16) yields










Separation rates will tend to be low when; aggregate productivity is high, real mar-
ginal costs are high, the wage rate of the marginal worker is low and search costs forgone
are high. By determining the dynamic behaviour of the outside option of the worker,
the participation decision potentially a¤ects wage dynamics and hence movements in
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the separation rate and marginal costs. For instance, if the option to participate ex-
acerbated wage uctuations in response to aggregate productivity shocks, uctuations
in at would tend to be smaller. Furthermore, by determining st, participation ows
also potentially have a direct e¤ect on t in the above expression. Ultimately, whether
tightness becomes more or less volatile under endogenous participation also depends
on the response in vacancy supply. But, for instance, if procyclical labour force par-
ticipation had a large positive impact on job creation so that uctuations in t were
amplied, the direct e¤ect in the above expression would be to make the term =q (t)
more volatile, reinforcing the e¤ect on at of shocks to At.
The optimality condition for prices, equation (14), produces a linearised ination
equation that is observationally equivalent to specications that are based on the famil-
iar Calvo (1983) model of nominal adjustment. Using a circumex to denote logarithmic
deviations around a zero ination stationary state, the linearised version of (14) is
bt = Etbt+1 +    1

byt : (17)
The above expression is a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve based on quadratic
price adjustment costs. It is similar to equations derived from Calvo contracts in that
ination is a forward-looking function of its expected future value as well as current
marginal costs. The stickier prices are, the smaller the coe¢ cient on current marginal
cost is, and the greater the reliance of current ination on future market conditions.
The coe¢ cient on real marginal cost is also positively dependent on the degree of
competition in the monopolistic product market. When price elasticity of demand is
high, a given price increase will result in a large reduction in real marginal costs by
reducing demand for the rms output. Therefore, equation (17) states that rms will
be more willing to undertake costly price adjustment as a countermeasure to a spike in
real marginal costs precisely when a price increase has a large negative e¤ect on real
marginal costs, thereby justifying the penalty of costly nominal adjustment.8
It now becomes evident from equations (16) and (17) that the behaviour of real
marginal costs provides a link between separation and ination dynamics. The Phillips
curve implies that when current ination is below expected future ination, bt  
Etbt+1 < 0, the shadow value of output will be relatively low, byt < 0, indicating
that the marginal value of a match to the rm is below normal. From equation (16)
we then know that, all else equal, the separation threshold will be relatively high. The
intuition is straightforward: when a given match is worth less to the rm in terms of its
contribution to real revenue, job destruction will tend to be high. This relationship will
be returned to later. Of course, in general equilibrium the relationship is endogenous:
8The representative rm does not worry about losing market share due to price increases in this
model because there is no relative price dispersion - all rms adjust each period. This is in contrast to
Calvo contracts, in which pricing is costless but staggered and rms dislike relative price dispersion.
Under Calvo contracts the positive dependence of the slope of the Phillips curve on the price elasticity
of demand does not arise.
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real marginal costs also increase as rms lower the separation threshold to raise pro-
duction, since average idiosyncratic productivity falls as more relatively unproductive
workers are retained.
In the next section we specify a recursive structure of the labour market in order
to solve for the equilibrium wage and participation constraint.
2.5 Recursive Representation of the Labour Market
Let Ni;t; Ut;Wi;t; Vt and Ji;t be the time t value functions of a non-participant, an
unemployed agent, an employed agent, an available vacancy and an occupied job, re-
spectively. Notice that the values Ni;t, Wi;t and Ji;t are specic to the ith individual,
whereas the values of unemployment and job vacancies are independent of any idio-
syncratic disturbances and therefore homogenous across the population. The Bellman







































Individual production of the home good (or equivalently leisure) is determined by
the function z (hi;t), for which z0 (hi;t)  0. The individual home production function
is divided by the shadow value of real income from equation (2) in order to convert
it to a measure that is comparable to the units in which wages and unemployment




, the agent who is not
participating at time t is successfully matched at t+1, representing a direct transition
from non-participation to employment and yielding a capital gain equal to the condi-
tional expected value of the di¤erence between employment and non-employment. The
expected value of non-employment at time t+ 1, which is the workers outside option,









Ex ante, the agent whose job match is unsuccessful does not know whether he will
end up in employment or non-participation, as this depends on the draw of hi;t+1 which





agent would draw a value of idiosyncratic home productivity next period that exceeds
the critical threshold to induce non-participation, and that agent would choose to opt
9All household members are assumed to consume a constant fraction of household consumption, so
marginal utilities are equalised across agents.
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the agent would draw a relatively low value of home productivity, so that the
agent would elect to search for a job rather than remain outside of the labour force at




= 1 for all t, the model collapses to the exogenous participation
model in which the outside option is always unemployment. Going back to the Bellman
equation (18), if the non-participant is not matched at time t, then the agent simply
obtains the continuation value of being non-employed at t+ 1 conditional on the draw
of hi;t+1.
The value of unemployment is




































which is qualitatively similar to (18), apart from the di¤erence in the transition prob-
ability, pU (t), and the variable bi;t  0. The latter represents the ow value of being
unemployed in terms of current consumption. Following Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005)
it can be assumed that the consumption value bi;t is a combination of unemployment
benets and home production such that
bi;t = b+ #
z (hi;t)
t
where the parameter 0  #  1 represents the fraction of home production that the ith
unemployed individual engages in. The constant b is interpreted as government funded
unemployment insurance and enters the Bellman equation as a current consumption
value. An employed worker is characterised by the following recursive asset equation,























where wi;t (ai;t; ht), written to emphasise dependence on the participation constraint
as well as the idiosyncratic match productivity shock, is the equilibrium wage paid to
workers employed in successful matches, i.e. matches that produce output in period t.
In what follows, the wage is simply written as wi;t in order to ease notation and the
dependence on ht taken to be implicit. The time t+ 1 continuation value is similar to
that in (18) or (19), but is weighted by the probability of job destruction, t+1.

































The term ytAtai;t   wi;t represents the net contribution of the ith match to the
rms revenue.10 The vacancy Bellman equation is standard. Free entry on the supply
of vacancies ensures that the equilibrium asset value of a vacancy is driven down to
zero, so that
Vt = 0 8t:














which is simply a restatement of the requirement that the supply of vacancies adjusts
such that the anticipated costs of search by the rm (the left hand side) equal the
expected discounted value of an occupied job in the following period. Inserting (23)
into (21) and evaluating the result at the critical value at reproduces the job destruction
condition (16), thereby ensuring Ji;t (at) = 0 holds for all i; t.
2.6 Wage Determination
Matching frictions in the labour market create local monopoly rents for successful











[Ji;t   Vt]1  (24)
where  is the bargaining strength of the worker and 1    is the bargaining strength
of the rm. The term inside the rst square brackets represents the workers surplus
value of being employed over non-employed. Analogously, the term inside the second
square brackets represents the surplus value to the rm of an occupied job over a
10Recall that yt represents the contribution of a unit of output to the rms revenue stream. Atai;t
represents contribution to output of a match with idiosyncratic productivity equal to ai;t. Therefore,
the term ytAtai;t captures the individual matchs contribution to the rms revenue in the current
period.
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vacant position. Expression (24) makes it clear that only ht, and not the particular
value hi;t, inuences the outcome of wage negotiations. Maximising the objective (24)
with respect to wi;t, the following rst-order condition is obtained for equilibrium wages










1  Ji;t 8t: (25)
The above Nash sharing rule states that the workers share of the joint surplus is
equal to a constant fraction of the rms share. The di¤erence to the standard result in
our model is the modication to the workers outside option, which is now a weighted
average of unemployment and non-participation. Replacing the value functions in the
(25) with their respective recursive representations using equations (18)-(21) results in
an equilibrium wage equation of the form
wi;t = 
y




















where ez (ht) = R1ht z (h) dF (h) = (1  F (ht)) is the conditional average value of home
production. Since (26) is somewhat non-standard, details of the derivation are provided
in an appendix at the end of this chapter.
The wage in (26) takes the form of a convex combination of the matchs contribution
to the rms revenue, which is simply ytAtai;t, and the workers outside option, which
is the term inside the square brackets. The weight placed on the former is equal to
the workers bargaining power and the weight placed on the latter is equal to the
rms bargaining power. Should wage negotiations fail, then with probability F (ht)
the workers time t outside option would be continued job search, i.e. entry into the
unemployment pool.  Ut represents the asset value of being unemployed conditional
on Nash bargaining. In addition to the ow consumption value b + #ez (ht) 1t ,  Ut
incorporates the expected capital gain, conditional on Nash bargaining, that is realised
if the worker becomes matched. The capital gain is increasing in t because as tightness
rises the probability of an unemployed worker nding a job increases, as does the
expected cost of opening a vacancy. Tighter labour markets are associated with larger
expected capital gains from job search, which raise the value of the workers outside
option, resulting in an increase in wages.
Analogously,  Nt represents the value of non-participation, conditional on Nash bar-
gaining over wages, and likewise is the sum of two parts. The rst is the conditional
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expected value of non-market production and the second captures the anticipated cap-
ital gain of passive job search. If non-participants are not permitted to search for jobs,
then  = pN (t) = 0 and the anticipated capital gain from being out of the labour
force is zero. Note that the expected capital gains from active and passive search are
di¤erent only to the extent that pU (t) di¤ers from pN (t).
Consider how endogenous participation has the potential to inuence the cyclical
behaviour of the real wage over the business cycle. The inuence of labour market
participation on the real wage operates through a transformation of the workers outside
option. The participation choice means that the fall back value of the employee is
a weighted average value of unemployment and non-participation conditional on the
likelihood of entering each should employment be terminated. Accordingly, a smaller
weight than if F (ht) = 1 is placed on the value of unemployment. This diminishes
the reliance of the outside option on the value of unemployment, and therefore market
tightness, because the value of non-participation is only weakly directly related to
market tightness. Accordingly, wages may not be bid up as much when an increase in
vacancy supply causes tightness to rise.
There are also opposing e¤ects which may contribute to greater wage instability over
the cycle. Procyclical variation in ht implies that during a boom more weight is placed
on  Ut and less on  
N
t as ht rises, thereby causing a dynamic compositional shift in the
outside option of the worker which may exacerbate wage movements. Furthermore, as
ht rises, the conditional average ez (ht) also rises and is reinforced by a fall in the shadow
value t during a boom. This potentially results in stronger procyclical uctuations in
the wage rate in the presence of the participation option.
Finally, it is worth highlighting how our wage equation di¤ers from that of Hae-
fke and Reiter (2006). These authors work with a continuous time model in which
idiosyncratic home productivity shocks follow a Poisson arrival rate. This introduces
a perverse incentive for non-participants with low h to seek employment in order to
force a re-draw. They thus nd it convenient to concentrate on a restricted version
of their model in which this incentive is eliminated, but consequently so too is any
e¤ect of the participation threshold on the wage. We do not encounter this problem in
the current setup because we use a discrete time structure in which non-participants
re-draw idiosyncratic shocks every period. Our wage equation therefore provides a sim-
ple and tractable way of integrating an explicit participation decision into the cyclical
behaviour of wages whilst maintaining homogeneity.
2.7 Participation Constraint
Now that we have solved for the equilibrium wage, the returns to labour market search
are explicitly dened and we can now derive an expression for the participation thresh-
old, ht. Recall that optimal participation decisions are made in a decentralised manner
by individual household members according to their own idiosyncratic valuation of re-
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maining outside of the labour force in each period. These decisions are made on the
basis of what the non-participants expected value of future matches is, which is con-
ditional on the solution to the Nash bargaining problem. The participation constraint
is formally dened as the value of idiosyncratic home productivity that makes a non-
employed agent indi¤erent between unemployment and non-participation. In symbols,
the critical value of idiosyncratic home productivity must satisfy
Ut = Nt (ht) :
Substituting the recursive equations for non-participation and unemployment, (18)
and (19), into the above condition and making use of the Nash bargaining restriction











This expression is intuitive. It states that the critical value of home productivity
is equal to the ow benet of being unemployed plus the di¤erence in the anticipated
capital gains associated with being unemployed versus out of the labour force. The
right hand side of the above expression is multiplied by the factor (1  #) 1, which
for #; z0 > 0 raises the participation constraint since unemployed agents also devote
a fraction of their time to home production. If  = 1, then pU (t) = pN (t) and
agents would base their participation decisions solely on the consumption value of
being unemployed versus out of the labour force. Equation (27) establishes a positive
relationship between labour market participation and t. Higher market tightness is
associated with more favourable labour market prospects, such as higher wages and
quicker job nding rates. As a result, procyclical uctuations in tightness tend to make
labour market participation procyclical.
But what about the cyclical behaviour of the shadow value t, which depends
positively on the marginal utility of consumption? As the marginal utility of market
consumption falls during a boom, the relative value of home production increases, thus
exerting pressure on ht to fall. This opposes the positive inuence that procyclical
uctuations in market tightness have on the participation threshold. Which e¤ect will
dominate depends on the curvature of the utility function. For strongly risk averse
agents, whose marginal utility of consumption diminishes rapidly, uctuations in t
will be large. If  is large enough it becomes possible for countercyclical uctuations
in t to dominate participation behaviour, causing labour force movements to be coun-
tercyclical.
2.8 Aggregation
Aggregate quantities are denoted by the removal of j subscripts. The representative
rms quantities coincide with aggregate values, so that employment evolves according
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to
nt+1 = (1  t)nt + q (t) vt:
Aggregate income is given by the representative rms production function




















t + (1  F (ht))  Nt

:
Aggregate labour income owing to the representative household is thus given by
Wt = etwt
and the households unemployment income is
Ut = utb:
Two simple options for monetary policy are either the postulation of a Taylor-like
rule or an exogenous monetary growth rule. We adopt the latter as in Krause and
Lubik (2007), Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and others. Monetary policy enters as a
simple growth rule of the form
mt = gtmt 1: (28)
The stochastic process for monetary growth is given by
ln gt = 'g ln gt 1 + "
g
t






. In equilibrium, the representative household holds all
the money supply, mj;t = mt. In Appendix II we discuss the implications of a Taylor
rule.
The lump-sum tax, Tt, is used to nance gross government bond repayments and






Aggregate market productivity follows an exogenous autoregressive process
lnAt = 'A lnAt 1 + "
A
t






. Following den Haan et al (2000), who set the standard
for the ensuing literature, job ows are adjusted for exogenously terminated positions
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that are re-lled within the same period. In order to account for this, exogenous
separations are interpreted as being worker-initiated, implying that the rm endeavours
to re-post the vacancy for the position that was quit by the worker. Job creation is
therefore recorded as the measure of all newly created matches net of vacancies that
have been re-matched within the period,
jct =
q (t) (vt   xnt)
nt
(30)
where xnt represents the measure of jobs that were previously lled and are now
available for re-matching within the period. Similarly, in accounting for job destruction,
turnover associated with exogenously quit positions is netted out such that
jdt = t   xq (t) (31)
represents the relevant measure of job destruction in each period. This captures the
salient feature of the labour market that worker ows exceed job ows (see Davis et
al., 1996). Note that jct  jdt = nt+1=nt, or the percentage change in the measure of
jobs at the rm.
3 Solution and Calibration
The models equilibrium conditions are log-linearised around a zero ination stationary
state in which all real variables are constant. The resulting linear system of equations is
solved using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients, a standard procedure described
by Uhlig (1997).11 Linearised equilibrium dynamics are expressed as recursive laws
of motion from which time series of articial data are generated. Impulse response
functions are computed and the business cycle properties of the articial series are
then compared with corresponding statistics from actual U.S. data.12 We use quarterly
data for the period from 1970:4 to 2005:1. All simulated and actual data are passed
through a Hodrick-Prescott lter with smoothing parameter 1600 to isolate the cyclical
components of the time series.13
The parameter values used in the baseline calibration are summarised in Table 1.
Most of our parameterisation is standard. The discount factor  = 0:99, giving an
annual rate of interest of roughly four percent. Following Prescott (1986) and the
references therein, along with many other business cycle studies including the seminal
contributions to unemployment uctuations of Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995), we
11See the appendix in Chapter I for a description of the solution method.
12Data are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Buereau of Labor Statistics
websites. The series for job creation and destruction are computed by Davis et al. (2006). Vacancies
are obtained from the OECD statistics portal.
13Articial time series of length 300 are constructed and the rst observations are removed in order
to reduce dependence on initial conditions and to obtain series of length equal to the sample period.
200 samples of time series are obtained and the statistics reported are the sample averages.
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assume that  = 1 so that u (ct) is logarithmic. There is, however, some empirical
controversy regarding the degree of risk aversion. In particular, Hall (1988) nds that
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is much smaller than the logarithmic case -
see Neely et al. (2001) for a discussion. For our purposes, we note that even logarithmic
utility is su¢ cient to generate countercyclicality in the labour force.
It is assumed that the individual home production function is linear
z (hi;t) = hi;t
where   0 is a constant scale parameter. In our setup, we assume linearity of z for
convenience. As demonstrated subsequently, the elasticity of participation in our model
is determined by the idiosyncratic variance of individual home productivity, implying
that the curvature of z can be abstracted from for simulation purposes.
Following Cooley and Quadrini (1999), the value of the vacancy transition proba-
bility is set to q () = 0:7, informed by the calculations of den Haan et al (2000). The
matching function takes the standard form, Mt =Mvt s
1 
t , whereM is a normalising
constant. The elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies is set to 0:6
in accordance with the empirical estimates provided by Blanchard and Diamond (1989).
Symmetric bargaining is assumed such that  = 0:5. Steady state employment e = 0:59
to match the average value over our sample period. We also nd that u = 0:04. These
numbers express employment and unemployment relative to the total non-institutional
civilian population, not the labour force. The steady state value F (h) is calibrated in
order to match steady state unemployment, which implies F (h) = 0:1. It is assumed
that F is lognormal with mean zero. In the absence of empirical data for dispersion
in idiosyncratic home productivity, we calibrate the variance of this distribution such
that the model is consistent with realistically volatile unemployment uctuations. In
the baseline model this requires h = 0:15. Pries and Rogerson (2009) use data on
gross job ows to calculate the arrival rate of job o¤ers to non-participants. They
nd that the arrival rate of o¤ers to non-participants is 20 percent that of unemployed
individuals. In light of this, the search intensity of non-participants is set to  = 0:2.
Steady state vacancies are determined from the stationary version of the employ-




once  has been calibrated. We set  in order to yield a job nding probability of
pU () = 0:6, which gives an average unemployment duration of 1.67 quarters as re-
ported by Cole and Rogerson (1999). This requires  = 0:104, which is close to the
value of 0.1 from den Haan et al. (2000), which sets the standard for related studies.
We then nd that v = 0:1. We can now compute M = 0:66. Following den Haan et
al. (2000), the exogenous separation rate is x = 0:68. This implies an endogenous
destruction rate G (a) equal to 0:034 from equation (5). The stationary separation
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threshold is then given by the inverse of the distribution function. It is assumed that
idiosyncratic match productivity shocks are drawn from a lognormal distribution with
mean zero and standard deviation a which is calibrated to match the observed relative
volatility of job destruction. This is standard practice in the related literature (see, for
example, Walsh, 2005, or den Haan et al., 2000). A priori, it is di¢ cult to tell how a
will a¤ect the volatility of the destruction rate, t. By reducing (increasing) a, the
elasticity of G increases (decreases) which encourages rms to make smaller (larger)
adjustments to at. The net e¤ect then depends on whether the change to the elasticity
dominates the inuence on the dynamics of at. In our simulation exercises we nd that
reducing a tends to reduce the volatility of job destruction, and so we accordingly set
a = 0:2 as a baseline.




implying that marginal costs are equal to the inverse of the mark up. Following Krause
and Lubik (2007) and the majority of the literature,  = 11 giving a mark up of 10%
in the steady state. As previously noted, the linearised ination equation derived from
quadratic nominal adjustment costs is observationally equivalent to the Calvo pricing
counterpart. The imposed severity of price stickiness varies widely even in the recent
literature. In our baseline calibration we follow Christiano et al. (2005) and Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) by assuming a moderate degree of price stickiness. These authors
demonstrate that an average price duration of 2-3 quarters is consistent with observed
ination dynamics. This entails setting  = 20 to be consistent with an average Calvo
duration of 2 quarters. We explore the consequences of adjusting this parameter in
depth in a later section. The reason a moderate degree of price stickiness is chosen
is that, as discussed subsequently, the model - even without endogenous participation
- implies a trade-o¤ between matching ination volatility on the one hand and job
destruction volatility on the other. Given our primary focus on labour market dynamics,
we select a low degree of price stickiness to be able to replicate realistic job destruction
uctuations.
The vacancy ow cost, the ow value from unemployment and the constant  are
found by solving equations (15), (16) and (27) simultaneously. Given our interpretation
of b as unemployment insurance, we rst x this parameter so as to yield a replacement
ratio of approximately 40% as in Shimer (2005). This necessitates b = 0:37. We then
nd that  = 0:1, # = 0:66 and  = 1:47. This implies that unemployed agents spend
2/3 of their time in home production.
It remains to set the parameters for the aggregate shock processes. Other monetary
business cycle studies in the literature that specify monetary policy in the manner
that we have, such as Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and Krause and Lubik (2007), set
monetary persistence to 'g = 0:49 and volatility g = 0:009, based on the estimates in
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Cooley and Hansen (1989). For our sample period, we regress the growth rate of M1
on its lagged value to obtain 'g = 0:41 and g = 0:0086. For aggregate productivity
we follow the standard practice of assuming highly persistent shocks with 'A = 0:95
and choose the magnitude of A such that the volatility of real GDP in the model is
similar to that in the data. For the baseline we set A = 0:014.
For comparative purposes a constant participation version of the model is obtained
by setting F (ht) = F (h) = 1 for all t. Comparison of the two models is slightly
problematic, however, because the interpretation of unemployment di¤ers depending
on whether or not agents are allowed to exit the labour force. In models with constant
participation, u is often interpreted as a statement of "non-employment" rather than
unemployment. Therefore, an unemployment rate of 0.04 in the constant participation
version may understate the true extent of search e¤ort in the economy since in the
endogenous participation version we allowed for passive search even when out of the
labour force. In recognition of this, most studies of cyclical unemployment assume
u > 0:04 (e.g. Andolfatto 1996 assumes that u = 1   e, or 43% in his model). In
what follows we assume that unemployment in the constant participation version is
equal to the measure of e¤ective searchers in the endogenous participation version after
taking passive search into account. Given our baseline parameterisation this implies an
unemployment ratio of 0.114, which is remarkably close to the value of 0.12 assumed
in Krause and Lubik (2007). When abstracting from labour force participation, it is
assumed that each unemployed agent consumes a xed amount of home production, so
that the parameter bt is now dened as
bt = b1 + b2c

t
where b1 is government funded unemployment compensation and b2ct is the value of
home production in terms of the market good. b1 is calibrated to be consistent with a
replacement ratio of 40%. For the constant participation case, we also set A = 0:01 and
a = 0:075 in order to target realistic output and job destruction volatility, respectively.
All other parameters remain unchanged relative to the endogenous participation model.
4 Baseline Results
In this section, we discuss impulse response functions followed by simulation-based
moment calculations. In order to establish a benchmark and better understand the
business cycle consequences of explicitly introducing labour force participation, it is
instructive to briey consider a standard model with exogenous participation rst.
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of the model with constant participation to a
positive 1% monetary growth shock. Basically, the main results found in Krause and
Lubik (2007) are reproduced. Monetary policy as modelled in this framework acts as
an aggregate demand shock. Firms meet the increase in aggregate demand partially
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by raising production and partially by raising prices. Given the option to adjust along
the destruction margin, rms in this model nd it protable to increase employment
through a fall in the separation rate that is large enough to accommodate a reduction in
vacancy supply, circumventing the costly hiring process that arises from matching fric-
tions. It is precisely in this manner that the model of Krause and Lubik (2007) implies
a very limited role of monetary policy for job creation. By lowering unemployment, a
decrease in the job destruction rate increases average vacancy duration and thus makes
it relatively less protable for rms to create jobs. Although market tightness increases
following the shock, it is due to a smaller percentage reduction in vacancies relative
to the reduction in unemployment, which falls despite weakened job creation. Lower
vacancy transition rates increase the value of current matches to the rm due to the
di¢ culty of nding a replacement worker. Workersoutside options are thus boosted,
causing wages to rise which in turn contributes to higher marginal costs and pushes up
ination.
Figure 3 reports the impulses of the constant participation model to a 1% positive
aggregate productivity shock. A technology shock of this sort acts as a supply-side
shock, raising output and lowering ination. Unlike an increase in the growth rate
of money, the technology variable At enters directly into the right hand side of the
job creation condition (15). In contrast to a positive demand shock, increased output
across all matches leads rms to expand the supply of vacancies. The impact on job
creation is positive, but does not persist. Notably, the job destruction rate also rises
on impact, such that employment initially falls below steady state and then recovers
as vacancies become matched with workers.
What causes job destruction to increase in response to a positive technology shock?
In the empirical literature, the way employment responds to technology shocks is a
source of debate (Christiano 2006 and Gali 1999). Standard real business cycle theory
without labour market frictions postulates a positive relationship. A simultaneous rise
in both job creation and destruction, on the other hand, is consistent with the Schum-
peterian view of "creative destruction". Booms are characterised as periods in which
obsolete productive units are replaced by ones that embody the latest technology. In
our model, however, we have not specied any impediments to technology adoption
so that aggregate productivity shocks a¤ect all currently operating matches simultane-
ously and equally. Rather, given that we study a monetary equilibrium with nominal
rigidity, the tendency for job destruction to rise in our model is attributable to the
reasons discussed in Gali (1999). In a sticky-price equilibrium in which monetary pol-
icy is insu¢ ciently accommodating, a positive technology shock which increases output
creates a short-run aggregate demand constraint since prices do not fall by enough to
allow the private sector to absorb such a large increase in supply. The extent to which
rms shed workers then depends on their ability to adjust their prices in response to the
shock.14 In our baseline calibration, despite the fact that we have assumed only mild
14 Instantaneous adjustment can occur only through the destruction margin, and therefore it is the
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nominal adjustment costs, job destruction rises to such an extent that unemployment
increases on impact. It is demonstrated in a subsequent section that in an approxi-
mately exible price equilibrium job destruction does indeed fall on impact in response
to a productivity improvement. In section 5.2 below we also discuss in more detail how
a more accommodating monetary policy stance can prevent a surge in the destruction
rate.
Now that the fundamental mechanics of the simpler model have been quantitatively
assessed, let us next analyse the dynamic implications of introducing endogenous labour
force participation. Figure 4 contains the impulse responses to a monetary shock iden-
tical to the one considered previously. We nd that introducing variation in the size of
the labour force does not contribute to the ability of the model to generate an increase
in job creation in response to a monetary policy shock. The endogenous participation
model is therefore found not to be capable of reversing the negative response of va-
cancy supply to a monetary shock that was highlighted by Krause and Lubik (2007).
Indeed, the drop in vacancies is about the same as in the constant participation model.
This indicates that the job creation incentives generated by the relief of labour market
congestion from endogenous participation ows do not appear to be strong in the base-
line model. Quite the contrary, the e¤ect on the participation constraint is negative,
reecting the tendency to substitute away from formal labour market activity as the
marginal utility of market consumption diminishes. The behaviour of the workers out-
side option is roughly similar in both models, indicating that the modication induced
by the participation decision is quantitatively small.15
Figure 5 contains the impulse responses to an aggregate productivity shock in the
endogenous participation model. Once again a drop in ht is observed, despite a rise in
market tightness, indicating that the fall in the shadow value of relaxing the households
budget constraint dominates the relatively high returns from labour market search. The
rest of the impulse dynamics are broadly similar to the constant participation model.
The main di¤erence is that the decline in ht drives a drop in unemployment despite
the spike in job destruction, whereas unemployment initially increases in the constant
participation model. Labour force exit then causes employment to remain below steady
state for much of the adjustment path, consistent with the evidence in Gali (1999).
Business cycle statistics computed from numerical simulations are reported in Table
2 for both specications of the model. The results in general corroborate the intuition
developed in the impulse response analysis. Ination volatility is overstated in both
models for the degree of nominal rigidity assumed in the baseline calibration. We assess
the implications of varying the degree of price stickiness in a subsequent section. In the
endogenous participation model, uctuations in the labour force are somewhat too large
destruction rate which rises, not the job creation rate which falls.
15Despite roughly similar responses in the workers outside option, the wage rises by more in the
endogenous participation model. This is due to the calibration of a, which is di¤erent in the two






determines both the average wage payment and output.
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despite realistic unemployment movements and excessively stable employment. The
reason for this is that employment responds negatively to aggregate productivity shocks,
generating the incorrect prediction that the labour force uctuates countercyclically.
As was clear from the impulse response analysis, endogenous labour force partici-
pation does not rectify the weak vacancy creation mechanism in the standard model
with the result that the relative volatility of vacancies in both models is unrealistically
low. Because of this, and despite highly countercyclical unemployment, the relative
volatility of market tightness cannot match the data. Job ows are positively cor-
related in both model specications. The model with endogenous participation does
indeed predict a negatively sloped Beveridge curve conditional on technology shocks,
whereas the constant participation model is incapable of matching this statistical fact
conditional on either shock. This should not be seen as a desirable result, however,
since it arises due to an excessive outward ow of agents from the labour market that
brings unemployment down in response to a technology shock but which also causes
the labour force to behave countercyclically.
The results of the foregoing analysis can be summarised as follows. Computed
business cycle statistics and impulse responses for the baseline calibration suggest that
endogenous participation is quantitatively unimportant for the ability of the monetary
authority to stimulate cyclical job creation through inationary policy, as can be con-
cluded from the joint failure of both models to generate a realistically sloped Beveridge
curve. However, our baseline model predicts that the introduction of a participation
decision modies the outside option of the worker in such a way that causes the labour
force to be countercyclical. In order to fairly assess the relationship between labour
force uctuations and cyclical job creation, the model must generate movements in the
labour force that are procyclical and of a realistic magnitude that is consistent with the
data. We therefore cannot conclude at this stage that the congestion e¤ects of labour
market participation on the matching process suggested by Cooley and Quadrini (1999)
are independently insu¢ cient to generate a robust increase in vacancies in response to
a monetary shock. In the next section we show how comparison utility preferences ad-
dress the issue of countercyclical movements in the labour force. We also then discuss




In the baseline endogenous participation model, we found that the introduction of an
explicit home good or leisure to be valued induces agents to substitute away from
market activity during a boom. As is well known from standard real business cycle
theory, the response of labour e¤ort to exogenous shocks depends on the interaction
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between substitution and income e¤ects. Wen (2001) demonstrates that a standard real
business cycle model can be rendered consistent with the empirical regularity discussed
in Gali (1999) - that a positive technology shock causes a fall in employment - without
invoking nominal rigidities. To achieve this, the income e¤ect of the technology shock
must dominate the substitution e¤ect. In particular, if the shadow value of real income
declines su¢ ciently relative to the increase in the real wage, the income e¤ect will tend
to dominate and labour e¤ort falls in response to positive productivity disturbances.
We apply this intuition to our current framework with a frictional labour market
and endogenous participation. Recall that the shadow value of real income in our model
is given by the Lagrange multiplier on the households budget constraint and represents
the marginal utility of consumption. Our baseline results suggest that the decline in
the shadow value of real income is su¢ ciently strong to induce agents to substitute
away from market activity during a boom, giving rise to a countercyclical employment
rate that is inconsistent with the data. We therefore pose the following question: what
economic forces potentially exist that could provide a stronger incentive for agents to
remain active in the formal labour market?
Our suggested answer to this question is based on the literature concerning the e¤ect
that aggregate consumption externalities have on individual consumption choices, as
outlined in the Introduction. Specically, we now alter the preferences of the household
by assuming that each household cares not only about its own level of consumption,
but also considers an external reference point, or benchmark, when evaluating its own
welfare. In our example, following Gali (1994), we take the reference stock to be the
current average level of consumption. The hypothesis is that if the reference stock of
consumption to which the household compares itself has a positive inuence on the
households marginal utility of consumption, the shift away from market activity that
was observed in response to positive shocks in the baseline model should be weakened.
This captures the idea that each individual household will want to consume relatively
more when average consumption is high, a feature often referred to as "keeping up with
the Joneses" (Gali 1994).16
As in Gali (1994) the specic functional form is assumed to be




t ;  > 0;  < 1
where ct is the individual households own level of consumption and Ct represents
average consumption in the economy. The function u, although unconventional, satises
16 It may also seem that internal habit formation as in Fuhrer (2000) could also provide an incentive
not to exit the labour market during a boom when consumption is high. However, as noted by Wen
(2001), the presence of lagged consumption in utility introduces a multiplier which magnies the de-
crease in marginal utility for a given increase in consumption. In the context of our model, this would
exacerbate the countercyclical tendency of the labour force.
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the following standard properties for all positive (ct; Ct) pairs:
u1 (ct; Ct) > 0; u11 (ct; Ct)  0
 u11 (ct; Ct) ct=u1 (ct; Ct) = :
In addition, it also follows that the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to
average consumption is constant and given by . For  > 0, the e¤ect of average
consumption on the households marginal utility of its own consumption is positive. In
this sense, higher average consumption encourages individual households to consume
more, thus "keeping up with the Joneses". As Gali (1994) notes, when  < 0 average
consumption lowers the marginal utility of the households individual consumption,
perhaps owing to public good characteristics of the single consumption good. Here
we restrict attention to situations in which  is positive. Bounding  < 1 from above
ensures diminishing marginal utility and the existence of a symmetric equilibrium.
The particular manner in which Ct enters the utility function implies that household
utility increases given an increase in aggregate consumption. In the terminology of
Dupor and Liu (2003) this quality is referred to as "admiration". Senik (2008) describes
it as "ambition". Personal experience, on the other hand, as well as the evidence
discussed in Easterlin (1995), suggests that concerns regarding relative income status
prevent an increase in the income of all from raising the happiness of all, implying
that "jealousy" rather than admiration or ambition characterises preferences. A simple
thought experiment about what the personal welfare e¤ects would be from observing
an increase in the income of ones peers while ones own remains the same reveals the
intuition behind theories of negative consumption interdependence.
How, then, can the positive consumption externality that we have assumed be
justied? In contrast to emotions of relative impoverishment, the analysis of Caplin
and Leahy (2001) suggests that the "anticipatory feelings" associated with observing
reference consumption rising can induce a welfare enhancing expectational benet to the
individual whose income has not yet risen. The idea is that there is informational value
in learning of a rise in othersincome, since it may imply that ones own income may
rise thereafter. Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) refer to this behaviour as the "tunnel
e¤ect", giving an example of how one may experience gratication upon observing an
adjacent lane of tra¢ c start to move during a tra¢ c jam, since it probably indicates
that ones own lane will also start to move soon.17
The question then becomes which e¤ect is the empirically dominant one; jealousy
or what we could alternatively refer to as ambition, anticipation or admiration? Put
di¤erently, on average do people prefer living in a society in which the average level of
consumption is high or low? This issue is addressed in Senik (2008) who argues that
the dominance of one e¤ect over the other depends on the degree of social mobility
and uncertainty in a nation. Using subjective data, the authors main nding is that
17See Senik (2005) for a detailed survey of the literature on the welfare e¤ects of income distribution.
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the e¤ect of reference income on well-being is negative in Western Europe but positive
in Eastern Europe and the United States, noting that mobility tends to be higher in
the latter areas. We interpret these ndings as justication for including a positive
aggregate consumption externality in the households utility function, especially since
we make use of U.S. data in our calibration and computation of business cycle statistics.
We now return to the households modied optimisation problem. Households take
aggregate consumption as xed when deciding on consumption paths. Accordingly, the







In a symmetric equilibrium in which all households are identical, it must be the
case that household consumption is equal to the average, such that ct = Ct. From
the above equation, it is then immediately apparent that the model with consumption
externalities behaves identically to the baseline model with an appropriately adjusted
degree of risk aversion, an equivalence result noted by Gali (1994). The shadow value




For positive , it follows that the rate at which the marginal utility of consumption
diminishes during a boom is slower. This weakens the incentive observed in the baseline
model for agents to exit the labour force as consumption rises. The intuition is based
on social considerations: individuals interpret periods of high average consumption as
a good time to participate in the labour force. This is consistent with the "tunnel
e¤ect" view explained previously, in that periods of high average consumption may
be indicative of better job prospects. Relative to the baseline model this weakens the
consumption smoothing motive of the household.
We now quantitatively assess the implications of reference consumption for business
cycle dynamics. The issue becomes how to calibrate the parameter , which determines
the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to average consumption. The study by
Gali (1994) does not include a quantitative assessment and so cannot be used as a
benchmark for calibration purposes. A commonly cited study for (lagged) internal
habit formation is Fuhrer (2000), who nds that the exponent on a multiplicative habit
stock in utility is high at 0.8. Other studies such as Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004),
Carroll et al. (1997) and Koyuncu and Turnovsky (2009) allow for a more general
specication of reference consumption by including a distributed lag which includes
both current and past individual and aggregate consumption. Our utility specication
can be thought of as a special case of their models in which the external reference
stock adjusts immediately in each period. These authors follow Carroll et al. (1997) in
setting the exponent on the reference stock to 0.5 as a baseline and then considering
Fuhrers estimate as a strong habit case. In light of standard practice, then, it does
not appear to be unreasonable to calibrate the exponent on our reference stock, , to
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a values as high as 0.5 or 0.8, bearing in mind the restriction that  < 1.
Our specic strategy is to calibrate  such that the model predicts a realistically
volatile labour force that uctuates procyclically. In this manner, we allow for a realistic
e¤ect of labour force variation on labour market congestion. A few additional para-
meters will also need adjustment. We re-adjust the standard deviations of aggregate
productivity, idiosyncratic match productivity and idiosyncratic home productivity to
target realistic values for output, job destruction and unemployment volatility as in
the baseline procedure. We nd that setting  = 0:615; A = 0:0065; a = 0:2 and
h = 0:06 achieves our objectives.18
For brevity we only report results pertaining to the model with endogenous par-
ticipation.19 Figures 6 and 7 give the impulse responses to a monetary growth and
technology shock, respectively. The impact of comparison utility on the impulse dy-
namics in response to a monetary shock is not large. This is due to the fact that
the e¤ect of monetary policy has a relatively small impact on consumption and mar-
ket tightness, the two factors that determine the participation decision of agents (see
equation 27). The only di¤erence is that output rises slightly more due to a sharper
fall in job destruction in order to accommodate the increased demand for output given
the modication to preferences. In particular, for realistic labour force uctuations,
monetary growth remains incapable of generating a job creation boom, causing only a
very weak reaction in market tightness which is insu¢ cient to attract increased market
participation (the participation constraint still falls).
The responses to a technology shock display more of a change relative to the baseline
version. In particular, the participation constraint now initially rises rather than falls,
causing unemployment to rise on impact despite a simultaneous fall in the destruction
rate and rise in job creation.20 In theory, higher unemployment eases labour market
congestion and should present rms with a greater incentive to expand the supply of
vacancies. Vacancy supply and job creation do respond by more than in the baseline
endogenous participation model, but the additional increases are somewhat small con-
sidering the surge in unemployment. In particular, the impact response of job creation
in the comparison utility model is only slightly higher than in the baseline constant
participation model in Figure 3. Therefore, the fall in job destruction in the compar-
ison utility model is not so much due to a substantial shift in the rms willingness
to create jobs as it is the result of the positive impact on aggregate demand of less
rapidly diminishing marginal utility. Accordingly, employment rises above steady state
throughout the adjustment path to the shock.
Business cycle statistics for the comparison utility model are reported in Table
18Note that had we assumed a higher  in the baseline, we would simply have to raise the intensity
of the consumption spillover to generate the same results.
19We do not nd that there are quantitatively important implications of introducing comparison util-
ity in the standard model with constant participation. This is because the main e¤ect that we consider
operates through the participation decision which is obviously absent from the standard framework.
20The rise in unemployment in response to a positive technology shock is consistent with the empirical
VAR evidence documented by Canova et al. (2007) and Gali (2010).
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3. The main result is that the model now correctly predicts a realistically volatile,
procyclical labour force whereas the baseline version with standard utility predicted
a negative correlation with output and market tightness. The countercyclicality of
unemployment is weakened due to the increased tendency for workers to enter the labour
market in response to productivity improvements, causing the vacancy-unemployment
correlation to become strongly positive. Given that job ows now covary negatively
conditional on technology shocks, employment is more volatile than in the baseline
endogenous participation model and is realistically procyclical.21 We also note that
the relative volatility of the wage is reduced compared to the baseline due to the
amplication of output arising from the increased tendency to raise consumption in
response to shocks.
Before proceeding, we briey recognise the fact that just as we have found that
e¤ectively altering the curvature of the utility function with respect to consumption
has implications for labour market dynamics, it may also be reasonably suggested
that altering the curvature of the utility of home production may have comparable
e¤ects. Although this is certainly the case when the participation decision is modelled
at the household level as in Veracierto (2008) or Tripier (2003), in our model in which
the participation choice is decentralised, the elasticity of the participation decision is
determined by the variance of the idiosyncratic home productivity shock. In e¤ect,
therefore, the curvature of the function z is made redundant. To illustrate this point,
assume that
z (hi;t) = 
h1 2i;t
1  2
; 2  0:
As an example we adopt the value 2 = 0:8 used in the baseline calibration of
Merz (1995), who notes that this parameterisation falls within the wide range of values
consistent with the empirical micro and macro evidence. Simulating the model with this
modication keeping all other parameters unchanged increases unemployment volatility
to 16 times that of output. However, once h is controlled for in order to replicate
empirically observed unemployment volatility (which requires setting h = 0:75 to
yield a standard deviation of unemployment of 6.85 relative to 1.60% for output), the
models dynamics are virtually indistinguishable from the baseline model with linear
leisure.
5.2 Nominal Rigidity
It is possible to reduce ination volatility by increasing the stickiness parameter .
However, in the current model with endogenous job destruction, increased nominal
rigidity causes the volatility of job destruction to increase. Consequently, a tension
arises in the ability of the model to simultaneously predict realistic ination and job
21The labour force was excessively volatile in the baseline model because employment was counter-
cyclical, moving together with unemployment.
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destruction dynamics.22 To see this, note that the stickier prices are, the greater the
extent to which job destruction spikes on impact in response to a positive technology
shock for the reasons pertaining to a short-run aggregate demand constraint described
in section 4 above. As for a monetary disturbance, note that higher  causes prices
to increase more gradually in response to a positive monetary shock. This generates
a more robust increase in aggregate demand which in turn necessitates a larger drop
in job destruction. Nominal rigidity thus exacerbates uctuations in job destruction in
response to both real and nominal shocks.
Other models in the literature, however, have been able to reasonably match both
ination and job destruction volatility. This could be due to a number of di¤erences
with the approach of Krause and Lubik (2007), which is followed in this chapter. For
instance, the model of Trigari (2009) which features variable hours can match ination
volatility without excess volatility in job destruction. By introducing variable hours
into the model, rms can adjust how much output they produce through an addi-
tional margin, easing the burden of adjustment on employment. The study by Walsh
(2005), however, suppresses hours variation and yet still manages to predict reasonably
accurate ination and job destruction behaviour. This points to the possibility that
the ination-job destruction volatility trade-o¤ that we nd in our model could be a
consequence of the manner in which we have specied monetary policy as a simple
growth rule as opposed to a Taylor rule, which both Walsh and Trigari assume. Mon-
etary policy modelled as a Taylor rule with a positive coe¢ cient on ination would
be more accommodating during a deationary productivity boom. This would relax
the short-run aggregate demand constraint caused by incomplete nominal adjustment,
thereby reducing pressure on job destruction to spike upwards on impact in response
to a productivity improvement. In Appendix II, we discuss the consequences of adopt-
ing a Taylor rule to characterise monetary policy, but it turns out that although the
ination-job destruction volatility trade-o¤ is improved, it is not entirely solved.
There is yet another possible explanation. We have followed Krause and Lubik
(2007) in modelling both pricing and employment decisions as taking place within a
single rm. This approach departs from most of the literature (e.g. Walsh 2005, Trigari
2009, Gali 2010) which assumes a producer-retailer setup consisting of two di¤erent
rm types in order to separate the pricing and hiring decisions for tractability under
Calvo contracts.23 As a result, in our model, the shadow value yt which represents the
22This trade-o¤ is not the consequence of endogenous participation and therefore is a feature of the
model by Krause and Lubik (2007). The authors, however, do not discuss it.
23Simultaneously forward-looking vacancy posting and price adjustment implies that the rms va-
cancy supply depends on its pricing decisions and vice versa. Calvo contracts introduce price dispersion,
and therefore by extension dispersion in rmsdesired rates of job creation. In the model of Krause and
Lubik (2007), tractability is maintained despite price setting rms also making hiring decisions because
quadratic price adjustment costs imply that all rms adjust their price slightly in each period, and so
e¤ectively charge the same price. Work by Kuester (2007) and Thomas (2008) has also incorporated
both pricing and employment decisions within a single rm, demonstrating that when modelled in this
manner matching frictions temper ination volatility. Both authors nd that variable hours are central
to their results, but abstract from endogenous job destruction and so do not consider joint ination
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contribution of an additional unit of output to the rms revenue, factors into the match
separation condition (16). The negative dependence of at on 
y
t amplies uctuations
in job destruction. To demonstrate that the models dynamics are consistent with this
intuition, consider a positive technology shock. Due to the binding of the short-term
aggregate demand constraint, we saw that job destruction increases on impact. Now,
a positive technology shock is deationary, causing yt to fall below steady state. From
(16) this fall in the shadow value of output causes at to rise still further, exacerbating
the movement in job destruction. Similar intuition applies for a monetary disturbance.
Monetary shocks are inationary, causing yt to rise above steady state and thereby
exacerbate the decline in at, and hence job destruction, witnessed previously in Figure
2. Most importantly, note that the stickier prices are, the larger the uctuations in
yt .
24 In a model in which pricing and output decisions are made in separate sectors,
this additional source of volatility would not arise.
Illustrating this intuition in the constant participation model for  = 100 and  = 1,
Figures 8 and 9 plot the impulse responses of real marginal cost, the separation thresh-
old, ination and job destruction to monetary and technology shocks, respectively.25
Clearly, then, increasing the parameter , while leaving all other parameters unchanged,
damps ination volatility. But it also increases the volatility of job destruction. Notice
also that when  = 1, job destruction drops in response to a positive technology shock,
conrming the intuition that slow price adjustment is what causes job destruction to
spike on impact. In principle, it could be possible to obtain a combination of the two
parameters  and a that allows the model to be jointly consistent with observed in-
ation and separation dynamics. However, simulating the model with  = 100 and a
as low as 0.0001 still results in a relative standard deviation of job destruction equal
to 11.54. On the other hand, relative ination volatility falls to 0.31.26 It becomes
increasingly di¢ cult to match realistic job destruction volatility as  increases.
In summary, we conclude that in addition to the failure to replicate a negatively
sloped Beveridge curve, models of this class which feature endogenous job destruction
decisions in an environment with sticky prices tend to present a trade-o¤ in terms of
the ability to jointly match ination and separation dynamics. Related work in the
literature incorporates mechanisms that can plausibly reduce this tendency which we
have abstracted from given that we base our approach on Krause and Lubik (2007) in
order to address a particular peculiarity that arises in their model, namely the contrac-
tionary response of vacancies to a shock to monetary growth. In order to concentrate
and match separation dynamics. Thomas (2008) shows how the solution concept of Woodford (2005)
can be applied to solve the model under Calvo contracts.
24This is consistent with the standard textbook result that, under complete price exibility, monop-
olistically competitive pricing behaviour ensures that real marginal cost is constant at the steady state
value. See, for example, Walsh (2003) chapter 5.
25 = 100 implies an equivalent average Calvo duration of approximately four quarters, in line with
the evidence in Taylor (1999).
26Krause and Lubik (2007) assume that  = 40. Their results indicate that relative ination volatility
is 0.42 and relative job destruction volatility is 11.02.
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the analysis on this specic aspect of the model, we do not further investigate the ten-
sion in accounting for joint ination and job destruction dynamics given that there is no
immediate reason to suspect that it would interfere with our conclusions regarding the
e¤ects of endogenous participation. Rectifying this additional shortcoming would take
us far aeld from our original objective and constitutes a complication that warrants
an independent investigation in its own right.
5.3 Eliminating Passive Search
We now discuss in more detail the ability of agents to transition directly from out-
of-the-labour force to employment. This represents a feature of our model which is
absent from some other business cycle studies of participation (Veracierto 2008, Tripier
2003 and Haefke and Reiter 2006). Passive search can be interpreted as "jobs bumping
into people". Others argue that this is unrealistic. Proponents of the "time aggrega-
tion bias" theory suggest that some minimal e¤ort is always required to successfully
enter employment. Survey data that is obtained at discrete intervals cannot there-
fore capture infra-monthly transitions, and so such instances appear misleadingly as
non-participation-employment ows. See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a dis-
cussion. The approach taken in this chapter is to allow for passive search, as in Pries
and Rogerson (2009) who abstract from aggregate uncertainty.
Nevertheless, given that other authors ignore this labour market ow, we now con-
sider the e¤ects of removing it. Eliminating the possibility of direct transition from
non-participation to employment by setting  = 0 makes the participation constraint
more sensitive to uctuations in tightness, as can be seen by referring to equation (27).
Without the option to search whilst not participating in the labour market, agents
must enter the labour force and endure at least one period of unemployment in order
to nd a job. We now consider a version of our model with  = 0 under the compari-
son utility calibration since it yields more realistic results than the baseline calibration.
In computing the impulse responses, we set  to zero keeping all other parameters
unadjusted.
Figures 10 and 11 report the impulses for monetary and technology shocks, respec-
tively. The signicant e¤ect of removing passive search is on the behaviour of unem-
ployment. In Figure 10 for a monetary shock, the negative response in ht when  = 0
is smaller compared with the response in Figure 6. This is due to non-participation
becoming less attractive when it bars the prospect of nding a job. Unemployment
contracts by less, but with little overall impact on the rest of the models dynamics.27
A larger di¤erence in dynamics obtains in response to a technology shock. In Figure
11 without passive search, ht remains positive throughout the duration of adjustment,
27Although unemployment contracts by less, vacancies contract by more. This indicates that the fall
in ht, despite being smaller than in the baseline comparison utility model, results in a larger reduction
in e¤ective aggregate search intensity since those that do exit the labour market search with zero
intensity.
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indicating a much stronger incentive to participate compared with the (baseline) com-
parison utility model in Figure 7. With  = 0, the peak drop in unemployment is less
than one percentage point below steady state, indicating that without passive search
unemployment becomes less countercyclical. The reluctance of unemployment to fall
below steady state reduces congestion, amplifying the increase in vacancies and job
creation above steady state. This nding indicates that unemployment must remain
relatively high in order for any appreciable e¤ect on labour market congestion, and
hence job creation, to occur.
Unemployment therefore becomes less countercyclical conditional on both monetary
and technology shocks. Simulating the model we nd that the correlation of unemploy-
ment with output becomes -0.15, substantially less than the baseline gure of -0.57
from Table 3. Unemployment also becomes less volatile with a relative standard devia-
tion of 3.47.28 Given greater unemployment stability, the volatility of the labour force
increases to 0.58. The relative volatility of job creation increases to 6.58 due to the
amplied responses to technology disturbances, but apart from this there are no other
noteworthy changes to the business cycle moments compared with Table 3.
We thus conclude that passive search is a quantitatively signicant component in
generating realistically volatile and countercyclical time series for unemployment. This
nding suggests that the di¢ culty faced by previous authors (Veracierto, 2008, Tripier,
2003) in generating countercyclical unemployment when participation is endogenous
may be partially attributable to their simplifying assumption that search and home
production are mutually exclusive undertakings.29 Furthermore, the impulse response
functions indicate that unemployment must be unrealistically stable, causing excessive
volatility in the labour force, in order for the congestion e¤ects that arise from labour
market inows to have a meaningful impact on vacancy creation.
5.4 Time-Inseparable Utility
As the preceding analysis has demonstrated, the introduction of endogenous uctua-
tions in the size of the labour force in a standard New Keynesian model with matching
frictions does not result in a positive amplication e¤ect on the response of vacancy
supply to monetary stimulus. In this section, we discuss how time-inseparable utility
can reverse the contractionary e¤ect of monetary growth on vacancy supply observed
for the baseline model. This result stems from the importance of aggregate demand
persistence in determining the response of job creation to monetary shocks. Time-
inseparability features in the related work of Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2009) although
these authors refrain from discussing its implications for job creation and the Beveridge
curve. The theoretical motivation is as follows.
28This holds even though we reduce h to a value of just 0.0001. When setting  = 0, we also set
A = 0:006, yielding output volatility of 1.62%.
29Ebell (2008) argues that the failure of these studies to generate countercyclical unemployment is due
to the calibration strategy. She demonstrates that by calibrating the elasticity of labour supply to match
the volatility of the labour force, rather than employment, unemployment becomes countercyclical.
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The baseline impulse response functions for monetary policy disturbances exhibited
weak persistence and no inertial behaviour, with the peak response of output occurring
on impact. After impact, the variables decline monotonically back towards their steady
state positions. This lack of persistence is inconsistent with the evidence documented by
Christiano et al. (2005) that aggregate quantities respond sluggishly to monetary policy
shocks, gradually adjusting over a protracted period and peaking several quarters after
impact. In recognition of the forward-looking nature of vacancy creation, the monotonic
decline of aggregate demand after impact may be contributing to weak incentives to
supply vacancies in response to monetary shocks. If adjustment were carried out to
a larger extent in the periods following a shock, the incentives to supply vacancies,
which involve a lag prior to becoming operable, could increase. If rms anticipated a
hump-shaped, gradual response in aggregate demand that keeps rising even after the
shock takes place, vacancy supply could respond di¤erently to the baseline ndings.
For ease of exposition, and since the general principles we discuss here do not
hinge on the participation decision, we illustrate the consequences of this modica-
tion in the constant participation model of Krause and Lubik (2007). Furthermore,
time-inseparable utility induces additional countercyclicality in the labour force (see
footnote 16 above). We wish to avoid this issue in order to emphasise the fundamental
implications of time-inseparability for job creation dynamics.
The time-inseparable utility function is given by
u (ct; ct 1) =
(ct   ct 1)1 
1  
where 0    1 is a parameter that indexes the strength of consumption habits. The
rst-order condition with respect to consumption is now given by
(ct   ct 1)    Et (ct+1   ct)  = t:
The consumption decision at time t is made in recognition of the implication that a
rise in current consumption necessitates a further increase in consumption next period
in order to maintain the same level of utility. Internal habit formation in consumption
makes households reluctant to make large adjustments in consumption in adjacent
periods. This in turn means that aggregate demand is slower to respond to shocks.
We set  = 0:8, as is assumed in Walsh (2005). The rest of the parameters remain
unchanged relative to the baseline so that the specic role of time-inseparability is
isolated. Figure 12 displays the impulse dynamics to a monetary shock. Panel (a) shows
the hump-shaped adjustment path that output takes when utility is time-inseparable.
The dynamic behaviour of aggregate demand is therefore fundamentally di¤erent to the
baseline model, in which the response was front-loaded, displaying weak persistence.
Relative to the baseline, the responses in output and employment are also signicantly
weaker due to the reluctance of the representative household to substantially increase
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demand. As panels (b) and (c) indicate, time-inseparable preferences over consumption
induce a qualitative change in inationary job creation dynamics. Both vacancy supply
and job creation now react positively to an expansion in the money supply. Since output
responds sluggishly to the monetary shock, with the peak e¤ect occurring after impact,
rms have a greater incentive to adjust to the shock through job creation, which is time
consuming, rather than job destruction, which is instantaneous. Increased persistence
in aggregate demand induces an expansion in vacancy supply even though the amplitude
of output is lower than in the baseline. This suggests that persistence in aggregate
demand may be quantitatively more important than amplitude in order for rms to
have su¢ cient incentives to create jobs. The negative response of job destruction is
much smaller compared to the baseline (see Figure 2) as rms now increase employment
also partly through job creation. In the second period after the shock job destruction
rises (slightly) above steady state, as vacancies that were matched in the previous
period commence production. We therefore conclude that, by altering the dynamics
of aggregate demand so that a larger proportion of adjustment occurs after the time
of the shock, internal habit formation in consumption is capable of overturning the
result of Krause and Lubik (2007) that monetary shocks have a contractionary e¤ect
on vacancy supply.
The responses to a productivity shock are shown in Figure 13. Comparing with the
baseline results in Figure 3, in contrast to the results for a monetary shock, sluggish
adjustment in aggregate demand is not observed to have a quantitatively meaningful
e¤ect on job creation conditional on a productivity shock. The response of vacancies
in the baseline was positive to begin with, and through time consuming matching this
allowed the baseline model to generate a persistent increase in output without the need
for internal consumption habits. Time inseparability slows the adjustment process still
further, and as can be seen from panel (c) of Figure 13, the surge in job destruction on
impact becomes amplied as a result of sluggish aggregate demand falling below the
productivity-driven increase in aggregate supply. Unemployment rises substantially
above steady state, forcing tightness to decline until the second period after the shock.
Selected business cycle statistics are reported in Table 4. Despite reducing a to
0.0001, job destruction is grossly overstated due to increased sensitivity to productivity
shocks. Notably, however, the model predicts a negative correlation between vacan-
cies and unemployment conditional on a monetary shock. Job ows also attain the
correct negative correlation. Overall, however, the surge in unemployment in response
to productivity shocks dominates and when driven by both real and monetary shocks
the model predicts a counterfactually upward sloped Beveridge curve. Ampication of
vacancy supply still remains problematic as the volatility of vacancies relative to output
is still far lower than observed in the data.
To summarise, we observe that internal consumption habits are capable of gener-
ating an expansion in vacancy supply conditional on monetary stimulus even though
the amplitude of the response in output is substantially lower than in the baseline.
108
This indicates that the persistence of aggregate demand following a monetary growth
shock may be a more important factor in providing incentives for job creation rather
than simply the extent to which consumption rises. However, the model with time-
inseparable preferences still drastically understates the relative volatility of vacancies
and also exacerbates the trade-o¤ in the ability of the model to simultaneously match
ination and job destruction dynamics.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined the extent to which endogenous labour force par-
ticipation matters for the propagation of business cycle shocks in a New Keyensian
model with unemployment. In particular, we have tried to address a weakness of this
class of models pertaining to the di¢ culty encountered in generating an increase in
job creation in response to expansionary monetary policy so as to be consistent with
a downward-sloping Beveridge curve. In response to speculation in the literature that
this shortcoming could be due to excessive labour market congestion that arises in the
absence of endogenous variation in the size of the labour force, we extended the New
Keynesian model with endogenous job destruction and unemployment to feature an
explicit participation decision. It was found that, even for a conventional logarithmic
specication of the utility function, the presence of a home good to be valued tended
to induce countercyclical behaviour in the labour force. In order to address this coun-
terfactual implication, we formalised the notion of labour force participation as a social
device for raising consumption during upswings by introducing a particular type of
aggregate consumption externality in the spirit of Gali (1994). We used this concept
to argue that social considerations may be a quantitatively relevant driver of cyclical
labour force participation decisions. We then argued that, for realistically volatile and
procyclical uctuations in the labour force, endogenous labour market participation
has a quantitatively insignicant role in amplifying cyclical job creation in response to
monetary shocks.
This result continued to hold even when we disallowed passive search, which gener-
ated unrealistically stable unemployment that was also much less countercyclical. This
strengthened the conclusion that congestion e¤ects due to uctuations in the availabil-
ity of job applicants are not the main driver of cyclical job creation. However, this also
illustrated the quantitative importance of passive search in generating countercyclical
unemployment, behaviour which proved di¢ cult to obtain in earlier studies of cyclical
participation dynamics. In conclusion, there does not appear to be evidence of a sig-
nicant relationship between participation dynamics and cyclical job creation. From a
modelling perspective, our results somewhat justify the abstraction from labour force
uctuations in most of the related literature on cyclical unemployment which does not
explicitly examine issues directly related to participation.
We then demonstrated that by shaping the dynamics of aggregate demand, internal
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habit formation in consumption can rationalise a positive role for monetary policy
in creating jobs. Specically, a hump-shaped response in output, in which output
continues to rise even after the initial period of impact, appears to bolster incentives
for rms that create jobs in a frictional labour market to expand the supply of vacancies
in response to a positive aggregate demand shock. Since it takes time to successfully
ll vacant jobs, output growth that is sustained for more than one period was shown
to signicantly encourage greater vacancy creation, allowing the model to generate a
negative vacancy-unemployment correlation conditional on monetary shocks.
A deeper analysis provides considerable support for this conclusion. In an appen-
dix to this chapter, we demonstrate that when monetary policy is characterised by a
Taylor rule rather than a monetary growth rule, hump-shaped consumption dynamics
can, under certain conditions, arise even in the absence of time-inseparability, thereby
generating a positive response in vacancies to expansionary monetary policy. On the
other hand, Cooley and Quadrini (1999) nd that vacancies expand slightly in response
to a positive nominal shock even when monetary policy follows a constant growth rule,
which at rst might appear to contradict the result of Krause and Lubik (2007). The
di¤erence in the two models is that Cooley and Quadrini (1999) rationalise money
through cash-in-advance constraints, whereas Krause and Lubik (2007) assume that
money enters into utility. However, cash-in-advance constraints naturally give rise to
hump-shaped output dynamics in response to shocks whereas money-in-utility does
not (Wang and Wen 2006). This demonstrates that various independent mechanisms
which give rise to sluggish output adjustment also engender a vacancy expansion in
response to monetary stimulus. Although time-inseparability is a common assumption
in the related literature, the connection between sluggish output adjustment, mone-
tary policy and job creation has, to our knowledge, not previously been uncovered. By
explicitly highlighting the relevance of aggregate demand dynamics for the ability of
monetary policy to stimulate job creation, we hope to o¤er additional insight into the
determinants of cyclical job creation and the extent to which monetary control can be
exercised in this regard.
One of the main simplifying assumptions made in this chapter was the independence
of the equilibrium wage from individual home productivity. Relaxing this assumption
would result in a continuum of separation rates for all employees whose option outside
of the current match would be to exit the labour force rather than look for a new job.
This may turn out to have potentially signicant consequences for the manner in which
shocks are absorbed by the economy, particularly along the job destruction margin.
The intrinsic link between separation decisions and ination dynamics that we have
also established leads one to speculate that, if relaxing this assumption signicantly
altered destruction behaviour, the dynamics of ination could also be a¤ected. We
leave this issue to future research.
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8 Appendix I: Derivation of Equilibrium Wage
In order to derive the equilibrium wage expression (26), begin with the Nash sharing
rule (25) which requires









Inserting the Bellman equations (20), (19) and (18) into the right hand side of the
above condition yields
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where we have integrated over Ni;t recognising the fact that all aggregate and future
variables are independent of the current idiosyncratic home production shock. Making
further use of the share rule (25) we obtain
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Substituting using the free entry condition on vacancies (23) to eliminate Ji;t+1,
and replacing the left hand side of the above expression with the asset value for an
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Rearranging the above expression yields the wage equation (26) from the text
wi;t = 
y

















9 Appendix II: Accommodative Monetary Policy
We previously argued that the completely unaccommodative monetary policy stance
implied by the constant money growth rule (28) causes rms to aggressively shed work-
ers in response to a positive technology shock. Nevertheless, we characterised monetary
policy as following such a rule in order to remain consistent with Krause and Lubik
(2007), the study upon which the current chapter is based. In this appendix, we con-
sider a di¤erent policy rule which assumes that the monetary authority expands the
money supply in response to positive supply shocks in order to o¤set deation. For ease
of exposition, this policy modication is implemented holding participation constant.
Following Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2009), assume that the monetary authority









ln t = 'r ln t 1 + "
r
t




. The parameter  > 1 determines the weight that the monetary
authority attaches to ination in determining the policy target. Given (32), the money
supply adjusts endogenously in order to satisfy the money demand equation (4). In
this manner, monetary policy is accommodative. We calibrate the policy parameter
 according to empirical estimates which exceed unity in order to guarantee a unique
rational expectations equilibrium, in accordance with the well known Taylor principle.
Following Walsh (2005), we set  = 1:1. Rudebusch (2002) estimates the coe¢ cient
'r to be approximately 0.9, which makes the policy shock process highly serially corre-
lated. Using these parameter values and keeping the rest of the calibration the same as
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in the baseline, Figure 14 plots the impulse dynamics to a positive technology shock.
Panel (d) shows that the nominal money supply expands in order to accommodate
the positive supply shock, thus enabling job destruction to fall. Vacancies and unem-
ployment move in opposite directions and employment no longer falls below the steady
state. Compared with the baseline (see Figure 3) vacancies expand by less as rms
now place more emphasis on adjustment via the separation margin. Output peaks at a
higher level under a Taylor rule compared with a constant growth rule, although slightly
weaker vacancy creation detracts somewhat from persistence. We do note, however,
that the introduction of time-inseparable preferences (not shown for brevity) prevents
job destruction from falling even when monetary policy is determined by a Taylor rule,
resulting in a signicant increase in unemployment on impact that is comparable to
panel (b) of Figure 3.
We now turn to the possibility that the manner in which monetary policy is specied
- either by a Taylor rule or a constant money growth rule - determines the extent
to which job creation is stimulated by inationary policy. To understand how the
monetary transmission mechanism under a Taylor rules compares to a constant money
growth rule, note that the log-linearised version of the consumption Euler condition (3)
can be expressed as
 (Etbct+1   bct) =  Etbt+1 + 1
1  dbmt=bptbct| {z }brt
(33)
where the money demand equation (4) has been used to replace rt. The above ex-
pression simply states that the growth path of consumption (the left side) is positively
related to the real interest rate (the right side). Our previous discussion on time-
inseparability suggested that the growth path of consumption, which is the only com-
ponent of aggregate demand in this model, plays an important role in determining the
dynamics of job creation. Equation (33) relates the growth path of consumption to
the real interest rate. It is theoretically possible to obtain a hump-shaped adjustment
path for consumption in response to a policy shock as long as the increase in brt is
substantial enough to induce an increase in the real interest rate. For this to be the
case, the increase in consumption must be large relative to the increase in real money
balances, so that the marginal rate of substitution between money and consumption
- the term dbmt=bptbct in (33) - is high, and expected ination must rise only modestly.
However, baseline results indicated that the real interest rate falls in response to a
monetary growth shock, causing consumption growth to decline over the adjustment
path.30 Hump-shaped dynamics do not occur and therefore vacancy supply contracts.
30The decline in the real interest rate is displayed in Figure 15, discussed subsequently. This holds
even if  is increased to 360, corresponding to the degree of price stickiness assumed in Walsh (2005).
Although ination rises by less, real balances rise by more in response to a monetary shock since prices
are slower to rise. From (33) this puts downward pressure on the real interest rate.
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Next, consider how a Taylor rule can produce di¤erent interest rate dynamics,
and therefore potentially result in a di¤erent adjustment path for aggregate demand.
Substituting the policy rule into the Euler condition and log-linearising gives
 (Etbct+1   bct) =  Etbt+1 +bt + bt| {z }brt .
Consumption growth is now positively related to the central banks response to
current ination as well as the policy shock. Consider an exogenous policy shock as
represented by a decrease in bt. This corresponds to a reduction in brt which, all else
equal, necessitates an expansion in the money supply, which is inationary. If the
central bank is aggressive enough in ghting ination, and if current ination is high
enough, then it is possible for the real interest rate to increase in equilibrium as the
central bank o¤sets the initial shock to bt. As the central bank seeks to raise interest
rates in the presence of above average ination, it encourages the postponement of
consumption to future periods, shifting the adjustment of aggregate demand away
from the period of impact. This logic is therefore the same as for time-inseparability,
but instead of obtaining from the structure of household preferences, it arises due to
the policy behaviour of the monetary authority. The endogenous response of the policy
target to ination becomes a determining factor of the growth path of consumption.
Figure 15 displays the impulses to a negative 1% policy shock to the Taylor rule
keeping all parameters the same as in the baseline calibration. The clear di¤erence to
the baseline dynamics in Figure 2 is that output responds sluggishly under the Taylor
rule. Panel (d) contrasts the rise in the real interest rate that occurs under a Taylor
rule with the decline under a constant money growth rule. Consistent with our previous
discussion on the importance of aggregate demand adjustment for cyclical job creation,
the supply of vacancies expands above steady state. Although contrasting starkly to
the baseline model, the rise in vacancies is nevertheless too weak to generate a boom
in job creation.
This result therefore demonstrates that when monetary policy is endogenously de-
termined at least in part by prevailing inationary conditions, it is possible for vacancies
to increase in response to an expansionary policy shock. This conclusion, however, crit-
ically depends on the extent to which ination rises in response to the policy shock.
For instance, in order for a given policy shock to generate a large response in ination,
t needs to display considerable persistence given the forward-looking manner in which
prices are set subject to adjustment costs. Lowering 'r to 0.5, as shown in Figure 16
produces results that are much more similar to the baseline results in Figure 2, with
vacancies visibly contracting in response to the shock. Compared to when 'r = 0:9,
the response of ination is notably smaller and as a result the central bank does not
endeavour to raise the policy target as aggressively. Panel (d) thus shows that the real
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interest rate falls, ruling out hump-shaped output dynamics in panel (a).31
It is now possible to examine whether the model with a Taylor rule can success-
fully replicate a downward-sloping Beveridge curve in simulations with both real and
nominal shocks. Leaving the calibration for all parameters apart from the specication
of monetary policy the same as in the baseline, we nd that the relative volatility of
job destruction is too low, as could have been anticipated from the impulse response
analysis. Given our previous discussion on the e¤ects of nominal rigidity on separation
dynamics in the main text, we raise  to 100. Although this prevents job destruction
from falling by as much conditional on productivity shocks, hence lowering its relative
volatility, job destruction falls by more in response to a monetary shock. The overall
e¤ect is to increase the relative volatility of job destruction. For A = 0:008, we nd
that output volatility is 1.59%, relative job destruction volatility is 7.65, relative in-
ation volatility is 0.55 and the vacancy-unemployment correlation is -0.10. Job ows
still exhibit a positive correlation of 0.44. On the whole, however, the model ts the
data better with a Taylor rule than a constant money growth rule due to the accommo-
dation of technology disturbances. In particular, ination volatility is now somewhat
lower compared to the baseline value of 0.67 (Table 2), signifying an improvement in
the ination-destruction volatility trade-o¤ discussed in the main text.
31We nd that the real interest rate always falls in response to accelerated growth in the money
supply in the baseline model regardless of 'g.
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Table 1: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Value Parameter Value
 0.99 e 0.59
 0.5 u 0.04 (0.114)
 1  20
# 0.66 b (b1; b2) 0.37 (0.36,0.86)
 1.47  0.1 (0.04)
 11 'A 0.95
 0.104 'g 0.41
x 0.07 A 0.014 (0.01)
 0.2 g 0.0086
q () 0.7 a 0.2 (0.075)
pU () 0.6 h 0.15
M 0.66 v 0.1
Note: Constant participation values in parentheses where di¤erent.
Table 2: Business Cycle Properties of U.S. Economy and Baseline Model
U.S. Data Cons. Participation Endog. Participation
Money Shock - 0.0086 0.0086 0 0.0086 0.0086 0
Productivity Shock - 0.01 0 0.01 0.014 0 0.014
Standard Deviations
Output 1.59% 1.58% 0.66% 1.44% 1.58% 0.38% 1.51%
Ination 0.20 0.67 1.19 0.50 0.90 2.64 0.66
Real Wage 0.49 0.72 1.02 0.64 1.11 2.49 0.96
Labour Force 0.34 - - - 0.55 0.38 0.56
Employment 0.83 0.61 1.12 0.43 0.46 1.36 0.34
Unemployment 6.77 3.16 5.80 2.20 6.88 14.01 6.15
Vacancies 8.59 2.59 3.37 2.39 2.40 5.12 2.13
Tightness 13.86 2.46 2.48 2.46 3.09 1.15 3.17
Job Creation 4.30 5.05 7.77 4.23 3.86 10.07 3.11
Job Destruction 7.83 7.76 16.57 3.90 8.01 22.17 6.17
Correlations
Unemp.,Vacancies -0.65 0.65 0.99 0.43 -0.16 0.98 -0.56
Job Creation, Destr. -0.42 0.77 0.83 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87
Lab. Force, Tightness 0.84 - - - -0.97 0.20 -0.99
Lab. Force, Output 0.55 - - - -0.87 0.96 -0.95
Ination, Output 0.12 0.15 0.97 -0.27 -0.08 0.90 -0.35
Unemp., Output -0.88 -0.59 -0.99 -0.45 -0.93 -0.98 -0.96
Emp., Output 0.83 0.59 0.99 0.45 -0.16 0.98 -0.50
Vacancies, Output 0.45 0.22 -0.98 0.61 0.52 -0.92 0.77
Note: Standard deviations are expressed relative to output. All time series are HP ltered,
smoothing parameter 1600. Job ows data are available at the personal webpage of John
Haltiwanger and described in Davis et al. (2006). Vacancies data are compiled by the
Conference Board and made available at the OECD statistics portal. All other data are
obtained from the BLS and BEA websites. Ination is dened as the percentage change in the
GDP deator.
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Table 3: Business Cycle Properties of the Comparison Utility Model
U.S. Data Model
Money Shock - 0.0086 0.0086 0
Productivity Shock - 0.0075 0 0.0075
Standard Deviations
Output 1.59% 1.59% 0.58% 1.48%
Ination 0.20 0.76 2.00 0.19
Real Wage 0.49 0.77 1.82 0.41
Labour Force 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.35
Employment 0.83 0.72 1.36 0.55
Unemployment 6.77 6.44 14.38 3.96
Vacancies 8.59 2.83 5.53 2.10
Tightness 13.86 2.19 0.58 2.34
Job Creation 4.30 5.23 10.82 3.63
Job Destruction 7.83 8.10 21.83 0.97
Correlations
Unemp.,Vacancies -0.65 0.76 0.99 0.43
Job Creation, Destr. -0.42 0.61 0.87 -0.67
Lab. Force, Tightness 0.84 0.90 -0.01 0.98
Lab. Force, Output 0.55 0.99 0.99 0.99
Ination, Output 0.12 0.24 0.85 -0.28
Unemp., Output -0.88 -0.57 -0.97 -0.52
Emp., Output 0.83 0.87 0.98 0.93
Vacancies, Output 0.45 0.10 -0.95 0.54
Note: Standard deviations are expressed relative to output.
Table 4: Business Cycle Properties of the Time-Inseparable Utility Model
U.S. Data Model
Money Shock - 0.0086 0.0086 0
Productivity Shock - 0.0185 0 0.0185
Standard Deviations
Output 1.59% 1.60% 0.14% 1.59%
Ination 0.20 0.91 4.77 0.82
Unemployment 6.77 6.41 5.18 6.42
Vacancies 8.59 3.65 7.94 3.61
Job Creation 4.30 8.60 11.29 8.60
Job Destruction 7.83 13.59 6.81 13.58
Correlations
Vacancies, Unemp. -0.65 0.77 -0.47 0.79
Job Creation, Job Destr. -0.42 0.66 -0.34 0.67
Note: Constant participation model. Standard deviations are expressed relative to output.
In these simulations  = 20 and a = 0:0001.
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Positive 1% Monetary Growth Shock in the
Baseline Constant Participation Model





































































Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Positive 1% Aggregate Productivity Shock in the
Baseline Constant Participation Model






































































Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a Positive 1% Monetary Growth Shock in the
Baseline Endogenous Participation Model




































































Figure 5: Impulse Responses to a Positive 1% Aggregate Productivity Shock in the
Baseline Endogenous Participation Model





































































Figure 6: Impulse Responses to a Positive 1% Monetary Growth Shock in the
Endogenous Participation Model with Comparison Utility





































































Note: Refer to section 5.2 for details regarding the comparison utility calibration.
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Figure 7: Impulse Responses to a Positive 1% Aggregate Productivity Shock in the
Endogenous Participation Model with Comparison Utility








































































Note: Refer to section 5.2 for details regarding the comparison utility calibration.
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Figure 8: Impulses to a Monetary Shock: Varying the Degree of Price Stickiness





























































Note: The baseline, low rigidity and high rigidity calibrations set  to 20,1 and 100,
respectively. Impulses are computed keeping all other parameters unchanged relative to the
baseline.
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Figure 9: Impulses to an Aggregate Productivity Shock: Varying the Degree of Price
Stickiness




























































Note: The baseline, low rigidity and high rigidity calibrations set  to 20,1 and 100,
respectively. Impulses are computed keeping all other parameters unchanged relative to the
baseline.
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Figure 10: Impulse Responses to a Positive 1% Monetary Growth Shock Without
Passive Search





































































Note: Impulses for  = 0 keeping all other parameters the same as in the baseline calibration.
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Figure 11: Impulse Responses to a Positive 1% Aggregate Productivity Shock
Without Passive Search






































































Note: Impulses for  = 0 keeping all other parameters the same as in the baseline calibration.
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Figure 12: Impulse Responses to a Positive 1% Monetary Growth Shock with
Time-Inseparable Utility






































































Note: Impulses computed with habit parameter  = 0:8 keeping all other parameters the
same as in the baseline constant participation model.
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Figure 13: Impulse Responses to a Positive 1% Aggregate Productivity Shock with
Time-Inseparable Utility


































































Note: Impulses computed with habit parameter  = 0:8 keeping all other parameters the
same as in the baseline constant participation model.
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Figure 14: Impulse Responses to a Positive 1% Aggregate Productivity Shock when
Monetary Policy follows a Taylor Rule


































































Note: See the appendix for details regarding the calibration of the Taylor rule. Impulses are
for the constant participation model.
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Figure 15: Impulses Responses to a Negative 1% Policy Shock to the Taylor Rule































































Job Destruction Constant Growth Rule
Taylor Rule
Real Interest Rate
Note: A policy shock is a negative 1% shock to rt in the Taylor rule. See the appendix for
details regarding the calibration of the Taylor rule. Impulses are for the constant participation
model.
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Figure 16: Impulse Responses to a Negative 1% Policy Shock to the Taylor Rule with
Low Persistence

































































Note: A policy shock is a negative 1% shock to rt in the Taylor rule. "Low persistence"




Equilibrium Matching and Age
Discrimination Policy
Abstract
Federal legislation prohibiting the discrimination of workers on the basis of age has
been in place in the United States since the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. Yet empirical studies which aim to estimate the employment e¤ects of such legis-
lation have yielded inconclusive results. In this chapter we approach the issue from a
di¤erent perspective by deriving quantitative predictions of equilibrium unemployment
theory to investigate how age anti-discrimination legislation impacts macroeconomic
performance. The main conclusion is that an equilibrium matching model of the life
cycle predicts a moderately positive e¤ect on the employment rate of workers very
close to retirement, but the overall impact of age discrimination policy on the life cy-
cle pattern of employment is quantitatively small. This occurs because in a frictional
matching equilibrium, the incentive to discriminate is o¤set by labour market conges-
tion, preventing the demand for older workers from falling excessively even when it is
possible to discriminate on the basis of age. Welfare issues are also addressed. It is
demonstrated that while age discrimination policy results in an age-dependent ine¢ -
ciency in the participation decision of agents, the size of the externality is quantitatively
negligible.
1 Introduction
Low employment rates among older workers have generated longstanding interest in
the potential presence of age discrimination in the labour market. As Neumark (2009)
notes, the issue of employment among older workers is likely to become increasingly
relevant as the workforce ages and the prevention of rising dependency ratios becomes
an ever more pressing policy objective. Federal legislation in the United States pro-
hibiting discrimination against workers on the basis of age dates back to 1967, the year
in which the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was passed by Congress.
The success of such a policy can be judged by its ability to raise employment amongst
older workers, but the quantitative e¤ect that the legislation has had on actual employ-
ment and hiring rates is still an issue of ongoing research. Given conicting empirical
evidence, in this chapter we aim to contribute to the understanding of the employment
e¤ects of such legislation from a di¤erent angle by developing equilibrium unemploy-
ment models that can be implemented quantitatively to yield predictions about the
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likely e¤ects of institutional changes such as the introduction of age anti-discrimination
legislation. It should be claried at the outset that we do not attempt to measure
the e¤ects of the particular episode of legislative reform that is the ADEA, and so
our results are not directly comparable to the econometric literature that pursues this
goal (discussed below). Nevertheless, our approach does have the virtue of assessing
the e¢ cacy of age discrimination policy as a tool for macroeconomic management in a
fully specied general equilibrium model with optimising agents, thereby allowing for
a deeper theoretical analysis of the issues involved.
In order to build a framework within which a quantitative evaluation of age dis-
crimination policy is possible, a life cycle equilibrium unemployment model is developed
which controls for age discrimination through the functional form of the matching tech-
nology. We therefore restrict attention to age discrimination in the hiring decision as
opposed to other terms and conditions of the employment relationship, such as dis-
missal or compensation. Two extremes are then considered. One is that rms can
perfectly discriminate on the sole basis of age by means of an age-specic matching
technology that pairs job seekers of a particular age with vacancies available only to
their age cohort. The other is that anti-discrimination law renders age-specic match-
ing technologically infeasible so that employers must accept the applicants with whom
they are randomly matched regardless of age. The model without age discrimination
can also be referred to as "random-age matching". In order to isolate the e¤ect of a
nite horizon on labour market dynamics, productivity di¤erences and other sources
of heterogeneity among di¤erent age cohorts are abstracted from. This allows for dis-
crimination purely on the basis of age, since the only source of heterogeneity amongst
agents is distance to retirement.
It is found that the e¤ect of a nite horizon on behaviour in general is quantitatively
weak apart from when the terminal period is very near, so that the dynamics of the
models with and without age discrimination are not substantially di¤erent overall.
Calibrating the models to post-war U.S. data and assuming an exogenous retirement
age of 65, anti-discrimination legislation is found to increase the employment rate of
workers aged 60 to 64 by 1.1 percentage points and workers in the 62-64 age bracket
by 3.1 percentage points. The quantitative di¤erence in net aggregate output (i.e.
total output net of vacancy creation costs) produced in the two economies is negligible.
The model suggests that the e¢ ciency gain, in terms of net output, that would result
from allowing rms to direct recruitment e¤orts with respect to age is on the order
of 0.02%. Our results therefore indicate that legislation prohibiting discrimination
against older workers in the hiring process does not substantially a¤ect macroeconomic
performance. Despite comparing two extremes in order to elicit the maximum e¤ect of
the institutional change, equilibrium unemployment theory does not appear to provide a
strong rationale based on equilibrium outcomes for pursuing age discrimination policy.1
1Neither, however, does it imply that the e¢ ciency loss resulting from the restriction on rm re-
cruitment behaviour is large.
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Intuitively, as the pool of job searchers grows due to falling employment rates, rms
have the opportunity to capitalise on quicker vacancy transition rates. Congestion
e¤ects therefore oppose the negative e¤ect of a nite horizon on the employment rate
of older members of the labour force. In equilibrium, for plausible calibrations, it turns
out that these opposing forces largely cancel out, such that the incentive to discriminate
on the basis of age is low even when it is technologically possible. As such, there is an
in-built mechanism in standard matching theory that guards against equilibria with a
high degree of age-discrimination: as the demand for older workers becomes too low,
a vacancy targeted at an older worker is more quickly matched because competition
from other rms in the hiring process is more slack, making recruiting older workers
relatively less costly. Consequently, hiring rates experience a substantial drop only
when the terminal period is very near, so that even in the age-specic matching model
age discrimination is not severe in the sense that demand for older workers remains
relatively high.
The impact on social welfare that the specic form of the matching technology has
is also considered. It is demonstrated that an age-dependent ine¢ ciency arises in the
labour force participation decision of agents in the random-age matching model. When
only a single matching technology is available to connect job seekers with vacancies,
older workers for whom only a relatively short productive time horizon remains do not
internalise the negative e¤ect that their participation decision has on the age distrib-
ution of the aggregate pool of searchers. Similarly, young workers whose participation
in the labour market would raise the expected gain to rms from issuing a vacancy
do not recognise this and so tend to exhibit excessive reluctance to participate relative
to the social optimum. This life cycle externality lowers the asset value of a vacancy
and in equilibrium market tightness is too low in the decentralised economy relative to
the social optimum. In the age-specic matching model this externality does not arise,
and as long as standard ine¢ ciencies are controlled for in the Nash bargaining process
that determines wages, i.e. the Hosios condition is satised, the decentralised solution
coincides with the social optimum. It is further demonstrated that imposing the Hosios
condition results in an oscillatory unemployment path such that market tightness does
not consistently decline over the life cycle at the optimal allocation as it does in the
decentralised equilibrium. This implies that average hiring rates can actually increase
for older workers. However, it is found that the departures of the decentralised solution
to the socially optimal allocation are quantitatively small regardless of the form of the
matching technology.
Our ndings on the sub-optimality of decentralised participation behaviour in the
presence of a single aggregate matching technology provide an extension of the results
of Cheron et al. (2008), who rst documented the intergenerational externality in the
separation decision. Decentralised ring decisions do not internalise the impact caused
on the age distribution of the unemployed and therefore the asset value of vacancies.
Cheron et al. (2008) concluded that endogenously determined separation rates tend to
140
be ine¢ ciently high (low) for old (young) workers, thereby justifying the subsidisation
of employment for older workers. It is worth noting that the ine¢ ciencies caused by
a single matching technology in the context of nitely-lived agents in the Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides equilibrium unemployment model are distinct from the type of
potential ine¢ ciency of age anti-discrimination legislation considered by the literature
on long-term incentive contracts in the style of Lazear (1979). Lazears theory posits
that mandatory retirement is a mechanism by which rms can enforce the termination
of implicit delayed payments contracts that serve to disincentivise workers from shirking
and instead exert more e¤ort in order to retain their jobs. However, given a deferred
benet scheme, workers will not voluntarily retire at the optimal date because the
wage will exceed their reservation value. The elimination of forced retirement with the
introduction of the ADEA may thus prevent the formation of Lazear contracts and
reduce labour market e¢ ciency.2
Our focus on age discrimination only in the hiring process is made both for the sake
of simplicity and also to be consistent with the fact that the original intention of the
ADEA was primarily to reduce age discrimination in the hiring process, as reected
by the proceedings of the 1967 House Hearings on the subject, extensively discussed
in Issacharo¤ and Harris (1997).3 The Act was largely passed in response to the per-
ception that up until the 1950s and 1960s there existed manifest age barriers against
older job applicants seeking employment, and the belief of Congress that these barriers
stemmed from employersmisjudgement regarding the e¤ects of aging on the capacity
to work. Section 621(a) of the Act, which contains the Congressional Statement of
Findings and Purpose, stipulates that "the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of
potential for job performance has become a common practice". In the model of this
chapter, discrimination is then dened as a preference for hiring a worker of a younger
age that cannot be explained by productivity di¤erentials or other di¤erences in the
costs of hiring the worker. Given our focus on hiring discrimination, we abstract from
endogenous job separation, which simplies the analysis.
That the arbitrary age barriers of the 1950s and 1960s have largely ceased to exist
is fairly clear from casual observation of modern recruitment practices.4 As Neumark
(2009) documents, the majority of age discrimination cases led with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Commission are due to discharges and layo¤s rather than hiring.
2Neumark and Watson (1999) provide the counter-argument that by reducing the likelihood of
rms reneging on their long-term commitments to older workers, it is possible for age discrimination
legislation to encourage employees to enter into Lazear contracts, thereby enhancing labour market
e¢ ciency.
3See Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on H.R. 365L, H.R. 3768, and H.R.4221 Before
the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 90th Cong. 7 (1967). For
example, a statement by Peter J. Pestillo, Labor Counsel, U.S. Chamber of Commerce reads; "The
underlying goal of the proposed legislation is a laudable one: that of opening up greater job opportu-
nities to older people." See footnote 8 of Issacharo¤ and Harris (1997) for several more corroborating
statements.
4"In 1967 half of all private job openings were barred to applicants over fty-ve, and a quarter
to those over forty-ve." - Issacharo¤ and Harris (1997) drawing on a statement made by W. Willard
Wittz, Secretary of Labor, during the 1967 House Hearings.
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But as Neumark argues, this should not be misconstrued as evidence that discrimi-
nation in hiring has been relatively subdued, because the scarcity of hiring cases may
instead be a consequence of the structure of the legal system rather than an indicator
of the severity or prevalence of discriminatory behaviour. For instance, damages in
layo¤ cases tend to be larger because an actual job has been lost, whereas any losses
incurred by a job applicant due to alleged discrimination can only be putative. Ev-
idence supporting the presence of age discrimination at the hiring stage in the U.S.
labour market is documented by correspondence studies which nd that older work-
ers with otherwise similar credentials are signicantly less likely to receive favourable
responses from potential employers (Bendick, Jackson and Romero 1996 and Lahey
2008). Furthermore, unemployment duration is still higher among the elderly than for
younger workers, which is consistent with, although not necessarily indicative of, a bias
against hiring older workers (Neumark 2009). Given the di¢ culty involved in empir-
ically testing for the presence of discrimination, our analysis contributes to the issue
by attempting to quantify the incentives for discrimination that arise in an equilibrium
model of unemployment.
Our method of quantifying the employment e¤ects of anti-discrimination legislation
di¤ers fundamentally to other recent work that uses an approach based on econometric
analysis. Recent attempts to measure the e¤ects of age discrimination laws have gener-
ally involved di¤erence-in-di¤erences econometric techniques to study the impact of the
ADEA on labour market outcomes and have found ambiguous results. Neumark and
Stock (1999) estimate employment equations using census data for the sample period
1940-1980 for white males and exploit state variation in age discrimination laws prior
to the introduction of the federal law in order to identify the impact of the ADEA.
Their ndings indicate that the ADEA substantially increased the employment rate of
workers aged 60 and over by about 6 to 7 percentage points. The e¤ect on protected
workers under the age of 60 is weaker, about 1 to 2 percentage points.5 Adams (2004)
extended the analysis to quantify the e¤ect of the ADEA on hiring but nds only sta-
tistically insignicant results that, if anything, predict a negative e¤ect on hiring rates
of covered workers.6 Lahey (2007) used a di¤erent identication strategy based on the
assertion that employees in states that have their own age discrimination laws receive
better protection than those in states that do not have state level laws in place and
are only covered by the federal legislation. This is due to an "unusual provision in the
federal law" which a¤ords workers covered by state level legislation a longer period of
time to le age discrimination claims in their own states (at what are called (state) Fair
Employment Practices o¢ ces) compared to workers who must submit their claims to
5Originally the ADEA covered workers from the ages of 40 to 65. The 1986 amendment to the
ADEA eliminated the upper age bound and with it mandatory retirement.
6He uses data from the Current Population Survey for the years 1964 to 1967. New hires in his study
are dened as workers who are employed in the current year but were not employed in the previous
year.
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the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at the federal level.7 In stark contrast
to Adams (2004) and Neumark and Stock (1999), she nds that anti-discrimination leg-
islation is associated with a reduction in the number of weeks worked, which she uses
to proxy employment. As in Adams (2004), Lahey (2007) also nds that protection
against age discrimination induces a negative e¤ect on hiring of covered workers and a
positive (but statistically insignicant) e¤ect on the hiring rate of workers of ages not
in the range of protection. The proposed explanation is that rms are more reluctant
to higher workers in the protection age bracket because anti-discrimination law deters
the termination of their employment. That it is more di¢ cult to prove a hiring case
than an unfair dismissal is consistent with this hypothesis.
This chapter is closely related to a number of studies which have recently examined
nite horizon equilibrium matching models of unemployment. Cheron et al. (2007)
develop an age-specic matching model of the labour market with endogenous separa-
tion and consider an equilibrium in which employment risk is continually rising with
age due to decreased incentives to retain workers close to retirement. Much of the
structure of the model that is developed in the current chapter draws heavily on the
model by Cheron et al. (2007) and a later study of theirs, Cheron et al. (2008), which
constructs a model in which age-specic matching is not possible. There are two main
di¤erences with our analysis. The rst concerns the objective of the studies. Cheron
et al. (2007, 2008) do not derive the quantitative implications of age discrimination for
employment dynamics, which is our primary focus in this chapter, but focus instead
on the optimal life cycle paths of ring taxes and hiring subsidies. The second is a
technical di¤erence in that we introduce an explicit labour force participation decision
into the models of Cheron et al. (2007, 2008). The motivation for this is provided by
Figure 1, which depicts the behaviour of the U.S. labour market. The data indicate
that participation and employment rates follow similar hump-shaped patterns over the
life cycle. The gap between the two is inversely related to age such that unemployment
monotonically decreases over the life cycle. The immediate conclusion that is drawn
from Figure 1 is that a labour market participation choice is necessary in order to
explain the joint life cycle dynamics of employment and unemployment since the two
exhibit qualitatively di¤erent age proles. Without an endogenously determined par-
ticipation decision, unemployment would be the reection of employment and would
therefore exhibit a U-shaped life cycle prole. This would be grossly at odds with the
monotonic decline in job search activity that is depicted by the data. In our context,
it is potentially important to correctly capture search behaviour over the life cycle
since our results depend on the interaction between a nite horizon and labour market
congestion, whereby the latter depends on the measure of job searchers. Ignoring par-
ticipation may then overstate the search intensity of older workers, keeping employment
7Lahey (2007) also suggests that "state Fair Employment Practices o¢ ces may be able to process
claims more quickly", further reducing the burden of claiming compensation. As Neumark (2008) notes,
however, she provides no evidence in support of this claim.
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rates articially high by reducing labour market congestion.8
Related studies by Bettendorf and Broer (2003), Hahn (2009) and more recently
Choi et al (2011) construct nite horizon matching models with endogenous participa-
tion, but do not consider age discrimination. For the purposes of our analysis, including
a participation decision allows us to assess the impact that age discrimination policy
has not only on employment but also unemployment. In particular, we can nd out
whether unemployment among the elderly can be expected to increase upon the re-
moval of anti-discrimination legislation due to depressed job creation for older workers.
It turns out that the behaviour of unemployment is not sensitive to age discrimination
policy, and a monotonically declining unemployment path over the life cycle is observed
for both specications.
Figure 1: The Life Cycle in the U.S. Labour Market
























Notes: Average values for the period 1948:1-2010:4. Raw data are interpolated to in-between
years using a cubic spline. Series are expressed as a ratio to the civilian non-institutional
population. Data source: Bureau of Labor Statistics at www.bls.gov.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the equilibrium
matching models. Section 3 discusses constrained e¢ ciency. In Section 4 the calibra-
tion procedure, solution algorithm and quantitative results are presented. Section 5
concludes.
8Although in Chapter II we argued that the labour force participation decision did not matter for
job creation at the cyclical frequency, this does not imply that the same is true in the stationary state
of an overlapping generations model.
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2 Model
In this section, a life cycle model of unemployment dynamics is constructed in which
labour market participation is endogenous. Two versions of the model are presented. In
the rst, age discrimination with respect to hiring decisions is possible. In the second,
it is not possible for hiring to be age-directed. Apart from this distinction the two
models are the same. The matching technology is what determines the possibility of
discriminating by age. When age-directed search is allowed for, there is assumed to be
an age-dependent matching technology that randomly matches job seekers of a given
age cohort with the supply of age-specic vacancies available only to that cohort. In
contrast, the assumption of a single matching technology that pools the search e¤ort
of all job seekers of all ages with a single measure of aggregate vacancies rules out
age-based hiring decisions. We consider these two cases in turn, beginning with the
rst case in which age discrimination is technologically feasible. In the decentralised
solution to the age-specic matching model we only consider an equilibrium in which
labour market tightness is decreasing in age, consistent with the notion of discrimination
against older workers as well as the observed dynamics in Figure 1. We will then
subsequently demonstrate that it is not necessarily optimal for market tightness to
decline monotonically over the life cycle.
2.1 Age-Specic Matching
Time is discrete. Only the working life of agents is considered and economic activity
during retirement is abstracted from. There are no savings and individuals consume
their income in each period. Agents are risk neutral. The age of an individual agent
is denoted  . Each agent has a working life of T periods, which is exogenously given.
After the end of period T , referred to as the terminal period, the working life of the
agent expires and the agent exits the labour market. The terminal period is known with
certainty to all agents and rms. Each retiring cohort is replaced by a new youngest
generation in each period so that only stationary demographics are considered. All age
cohorts are assumed to be of the same size, which for simplicity is a unit measure with a
continuum of agents. Aggregate uncertainty is abstracted from so that only stationary
state overlapping-generations equilibria are considered.
The matching process is based on the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model ex-
tended to incorporate age heterogeneity. Denote by v the measure of vacancies avail-
able to a member of the age  cohort. Without loss of generality, each rm only posts
(at most) a single vacancy. The measure of age  searchers is s . Job seekers can
only be matched with vacancies that are specic to their age. Given that we allow for
passive search, or search e¤ort by agents who are currently out of the labour force, s
is an e¤ective measure of job search derived from the joint e¤orts of the unemployed
and non-participants. An age-dependent matching technology then pairs job seekers
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with available vacancies in each cohort:
M = m (v ; s ) :
M is assumed to be increasing in both arguments and homogenous of degree one.





The probability with which a vacancy is matched with a searching agent is then
q ( ) =
m (v ; s )
v
= m (1;  )
where the representation of q solely in terms of  follows from the homogeneity re-
striction on m. The probability with which a searching agent encounters a vacancy
depends on the type of searcher, since unemployed agents and non-participants search
at di¤erent levels of intensity. We assume the same structure as in the previous chap-
ter. In particular, the search intensity of unemployed agents is normalised to unity.
Non-participants search with a weaker intensity given by 0    1. Search intensities
are assumed not to vary over the life cycle. Random matching then implies that the
probability that an unemployed agent encounters a match is
p ( ) =






= q ( ) :
Similarly, the probability with which a non-participant searching with intensity 
transitions to employment is p ( ).
Match separation is assumed to be constant over the life cycle. At the beginning of
each period, the measure of matches which will produce output during the production
phase of the period is given by n . Jobs terminate at the xed rate  at the end of
each period. Life cycle employment dynamics therefore evolve according to the law of
motion
n+1 = (1  )n +M (1)
subject to a suitable initial condition n1  0. A one period lag is assumed between
matching and production. As detailed subsequently, our calibration strategy assumes
quarterly time periods, implying that the matching-production delay in terms of calen-
dar time is the same as in most business cycle analyses that feature matching frictions.
The labour market participation decision is the natural life cycle extension to the
model of the previous chapter. The decision whether or not to participate is made at
the beginning of each period of life, based on the realisation of an idiosyncratic home
productivity shock denoted as hi; for the ith individual of any particular age. Home
productivity shocks are re-drawn by all agents who are not employed at the beginning of
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every period of life. That is, we retain the assumption of the previous chapter that the
home productivity of employed agents is completely suppressed.9 Idiosyncratic shocks
are drawn from a general, age-invariant distribution F with positive support bounded
from above by h. There will exist an age-dependent participation constraint such that
all non-employed agents for whom hi; is less than an endogenously determined lower
bound h will enter the labour market at the beginning of age  . The measure of
unemployed agents aged  is then
u = (1  n )F (h ) (2)
and the measure of non-participants is
l = (1  n ) (1  F (h )) :
It therefore follows that the measure of age  searchers in e¢ ciency units is given
by
s = u + l :
2.1.1 Recursive Form
We now express the labour market in recursive form so as to be able to derive equi-
librium decisions for participation, job creation and the determination of wages. The
recursive structure of the labour market is very similar to the stochastic equilibrium
considered in the previous chapter with endogenous participation. For brevity, there-
fore, we do not repeat explanations that are straightforward re-interpretations of last
chapters model. We begin with the Bellman equations which characterise the asset
values of jobs and agents. Consider rst the Bellman equation for a non-participant of
age  ,


























which must hold for all  2 [1; T   1]. Ni; , W and U are the age-dependent value
functions of non-participation, employment and unemployment, respectively, and  is a
discount factor. The idiosyncratic home productivity shock renders the value function
Ni; individual specic. Because we abstract from idiosyncratic match productivity and
endogenous job destruction, the value of employment is common across all matches of
a particular cohort. The value of unemployment is also constant for all members of a
specic age as unemployment compensation is not assumed to be individual-specic.
9Recall that the reason for this is to avoid a wage distribution with respect to home productivity.
This assumption can therefore also be thought of as a bargaining rigidity.
147
With probability 1 p ( ) the non-participant of age  will not be employed at  +1,
in which case home productivity is re-drawn at age  +1 and the participation decision
is made.
The Bellman equations for employment and unemployment are, respectively,





































which must hold for all  2 [1; T   1]. The wage paid to the worker in (4), w , is age-
dependent. Jobs are exogenously destroyed with probability . Conditional on match
termination at the end of age  , the agent re-draws a value for home productivity at
age  + 1 and conditional on the realisation decides whether or not to remain in the
labour force. Unemployment benets, b, do not vary according to age. The only source
of age heterogeneity in the asset value of unemployment is the continuation value of
search.
The Bellman equations for the rms value of an occupied job, J , and a vacancy,
V , are given respectively by







V =  + q ( )J+1 + (1  q ( ))max

V+1 (7)
for  2 [1; T   1]. Match productivity, a, is constant across all matches and does not
vary with age. Should the match terminate, the rm then optimally chooses which age
to post a vacancy for. Vacancy posting entails a ow cost   which is age-independent.
It is assumed that match productivity is high enough such that a w  0 for all  in
order to ensure that the value of J is always non-negative.
Equilibrium job creation is determined by a free entry condition on vacancy posting
that requires
V = 0 8 2 [1; T   1] :
Inserting the above equilibrium condition into (7) implies

q ( )
= J+1 8 2 [1; T   1] : (8)
The anticipated cost of creating a vacancy for the age  cohort is equalised to the
expected discounted value of a job after the lapse of one period. At the end of each
period, all age T matches are terminated with probability one. In conjunction with the
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one period lag in job creation, this implies the terminal condition
vT = T = 0:
Market tightness in the terminal period is equal to zero because rms do not post
any vacancies for the age T cohort. The terminal conditions for Bellman equations




JT = a  wT :
Note that uT is not necessarily equal to zero, since b may exceed the value of home
production for some draws of hi;T .
2.1.2 Wage Determination and Participation










[J   V ]1 
where the positive fraction  is the bargaining power of the worker and 1    is the
bargaining power of the rm. Bargaining strengths do not depend on age. The rst-
order condition for wages is
W  
 








which must hold for all ages  2 [1; T ]. Replacing the value functions in the above
condition with equations (3)-(6) and solving for the wage gives


















The equilibrium wage has a analogous interpretation to the expression derived in
the previous chapter with time subscripts replaced by age.
Labour market participation is formally dened through the age-dependent indif-
ference condition
U = N (h ) 8 2 [1; T ] :
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Given the Nash sharing rule (9), an explicit solution for the participation threshold
is obtained as
h = b+ (1  )

1   (11)
which is analogous to the participation decision of the previous chapter. The key
implication of (11) in the current setting is that the life cycle dynamics of h will trace
the path of  . The terminal conditions for (10) and (11) are therefore





2.1.3 Equilibrium Life Cycle Dynamics
A life cycle equilibrium with age-specic matching is dened as a path for market
tightness fg=T=1 that jointly satises the job creation condition (8), the Nash wage
solution (10) and the participation constraint (11). How will the life cycle path of
market tightness behave? Combining the job creation condition (8) with the Bellman
equation for an occupied job (6) yields a rst-order di¤erence equation in tightness

q ( )
= J+1 = 






The following proposition establishes the property of monotonicity in the age-
specic matching model with endogenous participation.





  @w@  0 for all  , an endoge-
nous participation equilibrium exists in which +1   and h+1  h 8 2 [1; T ].
Proof. The terminal value of a job is
JT = (1  )
"

















with hT 1 = b+ (1  )










= F (h )  0:
We therefore have JT 1  JT and from (8) given that q0 ( )  0 for all   0 it
follows that T 2  T 1. In general, the equilibrium path for market tightness will
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depend on sign of the derivative @J=@ . Assuming that @J=@ is positive for all
ages, the same logic can be iteratively applied to obtain   +1 for all  . Market
tightness then monotonically declines over the life cycle, reaching a terminal value of
zero at age T . It follows straightforwardly from (11) that the participation constraint
then declines over the life cycle. On the other hand, if @JT 1=@T 1  0, it follows
that for T 1  T = 0 it is possible for JT 1 < JT to be true. Applying the same logic
as before, it follows that T 2  T 1 and the equilibrium is no longer monotonic but
oscillatory.
In general, following Cheron et al. (2007), we restrict attention to equilibrium paths
fg=T=1 in which market tightness is monotonically declining in age. It is then imme-
diate from the participation constraint (11) that there will be an increased tendency
to exit the labour force as the terminal period approaches. As will be demonstrated
quantitatively subsequently, this allows the model to generate realistic employment
and unemployment dynamics over the life cycle as in Figure 1. Such a restriction also
serves to make the theoretical analysis far simpler and, as our quantitative exercises
demonstrate, is consistent with the parameterisations that are considered.
Let us obtain some intuition for the mechanisms at work behind a declining path
for tightness. Market tightness inuences the asset value J in two ways; through the
continuation value of the match and through the Nash bargained wage. As the terminal
period approaches, beyond which the asset value of a job is zero, the continuation value
of the match declines. All else equal, this leads rms to create fewer vacancies for older
cohorts. This is termed the "horizon e¤ect" (Cheron et al. 2007) and it has a negative
inuence on the value of the match to the rm. However, as market tightness falls
with age, we know from the proof of Proposition 1 that the Nash bargained wage also
falls since it depends positively on tightness, thereby o¤setting the horizon e¤ect. The
assumption in Proposition 1 guarantees that the horizon e¤ect dominates the wage
e¤ect. This raises the following potentially important issue. One may argue that
our claim in the Introduction that the incentives for age discrimination are weak is a
misinterpretation of the positive e¤ect of declining wages on employment. In section
4.2.1 below, we return to this issue and illustrate that reducing the dependence of
the wage on market tightness does not alter our main conclusions. Furthermore, as
Corollary 1 demonstrates, endogenous participation weakens the dependence of the
wage on tightness.
The intuition for why a monotonically declining path for market tightness is consis-
tent with the hump-shaped employment pattern shown in Figure 1 is straightforward
and can be anticipated in advance of the quantitative simulations reported subsequently.
In a monotonic equilibrium, market tightness is at its strongest for young cohorts. The
incentive to participate is also strong, but despite this employment is initially low due
to time consuming matching. Employment then gradually increases with age due to a
"queueing e¤ect" as the hiring rate exceeds the (constant) separation rate. Eventually,
after prime age, market tightness weakens and there is less of an incentive to remain ac-
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tive in the labour force. Participation also begins to weaken as market tightness falls.
Hiring now becomes weaker than the combined e¤ects of job separation and labour
force exit, causing employment and unemployment to decline towards the end of life.
Corollary 1 Endogenous participation expands the parameter space consistent with the
monotonicity property in the age-specic matching model.
Proof. In the constant participation model for which F (h ) = 1 for all  , it is straight-
forward to see that @w=@ =  > 0 if ;  > 0. The latter derivative is subject to
change in an endogenous participation equilibrium. Applying Leibnizs rule for di¤er-
entiation under an integral with variable limits, we have
@w
@




















(1  F (h ))
=  (F (h ) + (1  F (h )))
which is also positive under plausible parameter assumptions. Moreover, note that
F (h ) + (1  F (h ))  1
if 0    1. This result in turn implies that the assumption in Proposition 1 is a
weaker restriction in the endogenous participation model, since a positive @J=@ will
obtain for a larger parameter space given the smaller value for @w=@ relative to the
case with constant participation.
Intuitively, wages are less dependent on market tightness in the endogenous partic-
ipation model because the outside option of the worker depends not only on the value
of unemployment, which depends positively on market tightness through p ( ), but
also on the value of non-participation which depends only weakly on current market
tightness if  6= 0 and not at all if  = 0. As a result, we have demonstrated that if
a constant participation equilibrium exists in which the age prole of market tightness
is declining, then for the same parameter set a monotonic equilibrium exists under
endogenous participation. In other words, the introduction of endogenous participa-
tion does not require more stringent restrictions on the parameter space, but, on the
contrary, reduces the likelihood of non-monotonic equilibria arising for a given set of
parameters. It is also noted, as in Cheron et al. (2007), that the issue of monotonic-
ity does not arise if wages are independent of market tightness as, for instance, in a
wage posting equilibrium with  = 0. In this case, @w=@ is zero regardless of the




Consider now an alterative model that species a single matching function common to
all searching agents in the labour force, such that it is no longer technologically possible
for rms to age-direct their recruitment e¤orts. For simplicity, we assume workers of
all ages are covered by the anti-discrimination legislation.10 The aggregate measure of
vacancies, v, can potentially be matched with an individual of any age from the searcher







(u + l ) :





The matching function transfers agents from the unemployment pool to employment
at the rate p () = q (), and from the pool of non-participants at the rate p (). In
the previous model, the type of equilibrium considered featured a drop-o¤ in tightness
towards the end of life, causing employment to decline. This mechanism is absent from
the current model, in which agents of all ages face the same probability of nding a job
conditional on search e¤ort. Accordingly, any relative drop-o¤ in employment for older
cohorts must stem from the weaker search e¤orts of the non-employed. An aggregate
decrease in the e¤ective measure of searchers is attained through a weakened tendency
to participate in the labour market as the terminal period approaches.
The only changes to the recursive structure of the labour market in Bellman equa-
tions (3)-(6) is that the transition rates p () and q () are no longer age-dependent.
We therefore do not reproduce these equations for the sake of brevity. The Bellman
equation for a vacancy now becomes





J+1 + (1  q ())V
reecting the fact that a rm posting a vacancy does not know ex ante the age of the
worker the vacancy will eventually be matched with. With probability ss , the vacancy
is matched with a worker of age  , thus yielding an asset value to the rm of J+1 when
the worker becomes productive after the lapse of one period. The terminal condition









requiring that the anticipated cost of creating a vacancy is equated to the expected
10This assumption turns out to be innocuous since dynamics for younger workers turn out to be
quantitatively very similar in the two specications.
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asset value of a job weighted according to the age distribution of the pool of searchers.
Wages are determined through the same process as before. Replacing the asset
values in the rst-order condition (9) and applying the above equilibrium condition for
vacancy supply gives a wage equation of the form























is the value of an age  + 1 job relative to the expected value of a job weighted by the
age distribution of the searcher pool.
Conditional on Nash bargaining, the participation decision is derived in a manner
analogous to the previous model to obtain
h = b+ (1  )

1   +1: (15)
The participation decision at age  is positively related to the relative value of J+1.
The age prole of labour market participation therefore depends on the behaviour of
  . Given that all jobs are destroyed in period T + 1 with certainty, we have the
terminal condition
 T+1 = 0.
This implies that wT and hT are the same as in the model with age discrimination.
We now make the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assuming that (1  ) q()  
@w
@ +1
 0 for all  , an endogenous par-
ticipation equilibrium exists in which  +1    and h+1  h 8 2 [1; T ].
Proof. The proof follows that for Proposition 1 in the age-specic labour market. The
terminal value of a job is
















Given that  T+1 = 0, we have hT 1 = b + (1  )

1   T  hT = b. For any
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= F (h )  0:
We therefore have JT 1  JT and  T 1   T . Recognising that q() +1 = J+1,






For arbitrary  , the derivative of w with respect to  +1 is given by
@w
@ +1
= F (h )  + (1  F (h ))















then JT 2  JT 1. Repeating this logic recursively backwards implies that J  J+1
if (1  ) q()  
@w
@ +1
 0 for all  . As a consequence it then holds that  +1    and
h+1  h 8 2 [1; T ].
Corollary 2 Endogenous participation expands the parameter space consistent with the
monotonicity property in the random age matching model.
Proof. Holding participation constant, di¤erentiation of the wage equation yields
@w
@ +1
=   F (h )  + (1  F (h ))
for 0  F (h ) ;   1. It therefore follows that the parameter restriction implied by
the assumption (1  ) q()  
@w
@ +1
 0 is less likely to bind when participation is
endogenous.
The intuition for Corollary 2 is the same as for Corollary 1. In particular, the wage
is less sensitive to labour market conditions when the option to participate is available.
This weakens the e¤ect that   has on wages over the life cycle, implying that the
dynamics of the asset value J are determined largely through the horizon e¤ect. As a
result, even though the negotiated wage falls as the terminal period draws closer, the
horizon e¤ect dominates such that the asset value J ! 0 as  ! T:
3 Constrained E¢ ciency
The models constructed in the previous section exhibit congestion externalities caused
by matching frictions, manifested by the dependence of the transition probabilities on
labour market tightness. Market tightness, in turn, depends on the wage which is
determined by a bargaining condition. As noted in Pissarides (2000), the conditions
under which wages are determined are unlikely to internalise the congestion externalities
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associated with labour market search. The reason is that wages are determined after a
rm and a worker meet, but search externalities a¤ect agents who are still searching.
Agents engaged in the negotiation process do not take into account the e¤ect of their
actions on market tightness and, therefore, agents currently involved in search.
The present section therefore investigates the conditions under which the decen-
tralised equilibria developed above maximise social output. In particular, we examine
the implications of the structure of the labour market for social e¢ ciency, illustrat-
ing the consequences that age-specic matching functions have on the e¢ ciency of the
participation decision. The formal problem is set up as follows. A planner chooses
an allocation for vacancy supply, employment and the participation constraint that
maximises total economic output net of vacancy costs. In an overlapping generations
steady state equilibrium the discount factor is set to unity. The corresponding discount
factor in the decentralised equilibrium is therefore also set to unity to facilitate com-
parison. The social planner is not concerned with distributional issues, allowing the
wage determination process to be bypassed since wage payments only determine the
manner in which the match surplus is divided between the employee and the employer.
The two physical environments of age-specic and random matching are analysed
















n+1 = (1  )n + q

v
(1  n )F (h ) + (1  n ) (1  F (h ))

v
and an initial condition n1  0. The same terminal conditions as in the decentralised
economy also apply. An asterisk denotes the social optimum. The rst-order conditions
for the social optimum are
@v : 0 =  + 

q0 ( ) 


































@h : 0 = b  h   q0 ( ) ( )
2 (1  )
where  is the multiplier on the age  employment constraint. Dene  ( ) =
 q0 ( ) ( ) =q ( ), the negative of the elasticity of q ( ) with respect to market
tightness. Consider rst the e¢ ciency of the participation decision. Eliminating the
multiplier from the rst-order condition for h and noting that q
0 ( )  + q ( ) =
q ( ) (1   ( )), we obtain
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h = b+ (1  )
 ( )
1   ( )
 :
Comparing the above equation to the corresponding decentralised version (11), the
requirement for decentralised labour market participation to be socially e¢ cient is that
 =  ( ). If the matching technology assumes the log-linear specication M =
v s
1 
 , then  ( ) = . Given that both  and  are positive fractions, the e¢ cient
participation decision is implementable. For a more general matching function it may
turn out that the elasticity  ( ) is age-dependent, such that the bargaining power of
the worker would then have to vary according to age in order for the socially e¢ cient
participation rate to be attained. Assuming bargaining strengths that vary with age,
the Nash sharing rule becomes
W  
(









It is straightforward from the indi¤erence condition U = N (h ) that the partici-
pation threshold is now determined by




Given the one period delay between matching and wage payments, age  agents base
participation decisions on their relative bargaining strengths at  + 1. It follows that
setting +1 =  (

 ) is su¢ cient to ensure e¢ ciency of the decentralised equilibrium.
However, note that even then the e¢ cient solution is only actually implementable under
the Hosios condition if 0   ( )  1 for all  .
In the decentralised economy, wages are determined at the level of the rm so that
unemployed agents are excluded from the process of negotiation. This renders equi-
librium ine¢ cient from a social perspective because of a divergence in the interests of
the employed and unemployed that arises due to externalities in the trading process.
Employed workers want higher wages, but this discourages the supply of new vacan-
cies which a¤ects the job nding probabilities of the unemployed. The result that
 ( ) =  is required for e¢ ciency is standard in the literature and referred to as the
Hosios condition in recognition of Hosios (1990). The intuition is that when  ( ) is
high, the negative impact of the presence of an additional vacancy on the transition
rate q for all rms is large. The social planner would then grant workers a high bargain-
ing power in order to o¤set the incentive to supply excessive (from the social point of
view) vacancies. That the Hosios condition applies not just to vacancy creation (as will
be demonstrated below) but also to the participation decision is a consequence of the
decision to participate being determined conditional on Nash bargaining. Just as the
Nash solution for the wage inuences vacancy supply, it also inuences the participation
choice by determining the returns from job search. Therefore the same e¢ ciency con-
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dition governs the optimal solution for both. Put di¤erently, the participation choice
as we have modelled it introduces no additional labour market externalities.
Optimal vacancy creation is obtained by eliminating the multiplier in the rst-order
condition for n+1, resulting in





























The decentralised Nash wage under age-dependent bargaining strengths is given by




























Because the above expression is somewhat non-standard in the literature, we pro-
vide the workings in an appendix at the end of this chapter. The term which enters
negatively in the third line of the above expression disappears if bargaining strengths
are constant. When the ratio of the workers bargaining power to the rms is low
relative to its future value, the current wage rate will, holding all else constant, be
lower than in the future. Inserting (17) into (12) and rearranging gives

q ( 1)
= (1   )

























Decentralised equilibrium vacancy supply can be made to coincide with the social
optimum under the condition that +1 =  (

 ). The e¢ cient solution is therefore
attainable as long as  ( ) is a positive fraction. It is clear that the need for bargaining
weights to vary with age in order to maintain e¢ ciency only arises in this model because
market tightness is itself age-dependent.
Next, consider the alternative physical environment in which age-specic matching

















The di¤erence in the planners set of control variables is that a sequence for vacancies
is no longer specied, but a single value.11 Note also that the costs of vacancy creation
are divided equally among the cohorts of searchers which can be matched. Optimisation
is subject to the constraints
n+1 = (1  )n + p
 
vPT
=1 ((1  n )F (h ) + (1  n ) (1  F (h )))
!
s
and suitable initial and terminal conditions for employment and market tightness. The
rst-order conditions are





























+ (1  F (h ))

  
@h : 0 = b  h   (1  ) + p () (1  )
where  is the multiplier on the employment constraint. Consider rst the e¢ ciency









We can therefore express the rst-order condition for the participation threshold as












From the relation between p () and q (), it holds that p0 () =p () = (1   ()) .
Using this denition in (18),





 (    1)

: (19)
Expression (19) gives the socially optimal participation constraint. To gain some
11Market tightness rather than vacancies is specied as the control variable of the planner purely for
ease of exposition.
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understanding for the variable   , note that the interpretation of the multiplier  is
the net social value of having an additional agent in employment at age  + 1. The
decentralised equilibrium equivalent to  is the joint surplus of a match with an age
+1 worker. Recall that the rms share of the surplus in the decentralised equilibrium
under Nash bargaining is 1 , such that J = (1  )S , where S is the joint surplus
of a match with an age  agent. It follows that the decentralised participation constraint
can therefore be expressed in terms of joint match surpluses as










Comparison of the above expression with the social optimum (19) reveals that even
if the Hosios condition  =  () were to hold, participation would still not be e¢ cient
in the decentralised equilibrium. Participation rates would nevertheless di¤er by the
term (1  ) (    1), which is independent of the relative bargaining strengths of
workers and rms. This result is due to an intergenerational externality that arises
because of the absence of age specic matching functions. The size of the externality
is multiplied by the factor v=s, which gives the average cost of aggregate vacancy
supply per searcher.
Not all searchers are worth the same in terms of their potential contribution to
output because of di¤erences in their remaining time horizons, but in the decentralised
equilibrium searchers do not recognise the impact of their participation decision on
the age composition of the aggregate searching pool s. The sign of the externality is
age-dependent. Younger workers for whom   > 1 set h too low relative to the social
optimum. Their entry into the labour force would raise the average return on vacancies,
an e¤ect not internalised by decentralised behaviour that treats aggregate quantities
parametrically. In contrast, the participation rate of older workers for whom   < 1
tends to be excessively high relative to the social optimum because searchers who are
close to the terminal period depress the expected return on vacancies. As a result, the
age distribution of searchers is distorted in the decentralised economy, even under the
Hosios condition. This result may therefore be interpreted as justication for allowing
age discrimination in the hiring process.
What is the e¤ect of ine¢ cient participation on the job creation decision? Observing
that p0 () = (1   ()) q (), the planners rst-order condition for market tightness
can be expressed as

q ()
















from (13). Assuming the Hosios condition holds, in order for market tightness to be











Even if  =  (), ine¢ cient participation decisions create two separate distortions
in the equilibrium supply of vacancies. First, ine¢ cient participation decisions distort
vacancy supply by altering the age distribution of the searcher pool, captured in the





s which determine the average age of the
worker in a newly matched job. As noted previously, the age distribution of the pool of
searchers in the decentralised equilibrium will tend to be skewed towards an ine¢ ciently
high average. Typically then, vacancies turn out to be matched with a worker whose
remaining time horizon in the labour force is sub-optimally short. Given monotonically
declining S with age, this e¤ect on the age composition of searchers tends to cause
market tightness in the decentralised equilibrium to be lower than the social optimum.
This tends to cause equilibrium market tightness to be too low in the decentralised
equilibrium relative to the social optimum.
The second distortion on the supply of vacancies occurs through the inuence of
the participation decision on the asset value S+1 relative to the optimum  . This is
because the joint surplus of the match depends on the wage, which in turn depends
on the participation constraint. Rearranging the planners rst-order condition for
employment gives




























The decentralised counterpart to the above expression can be obtained by expressing
the Bellman equation for a job in terms of the joint surplus as
(1  )S = a  w + (1  ) (1  )S+1
and substituting for the wage using (14) to obtain












Before proceeding, note that if h = h

 for all  , then from (20) and (21) S+1 = 
and the decentralised economy would produce an e¢ cient outcome for market tight-
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ness. Therefore, assuming the Hosios condition holds, any departures from the socially
e¢ cient level of market tightness occur only indirectly through the sub-optimality of
the participation decision. That is to say, because the vacancy supply decision is not
age-dependent, there is no intergenerational externality that distorts the job creation
decision.
To gain some intuition for how departures from the socially e¢ cient path h inu-
ence market tightness via the Nash bargained wage, consider a simplied situation in
which  = 0 for analytical tractability. Di¤erentiation then yields
@S
@h
=  F (h )  0:
Because the wage is positively related to h , the value of the match to the rm
will tend to be higher than is socially optimal for relatively young workers for whom
h  h . Conversely, for relatively old workers for whom it holds that h  h , the value
of a match to the rm is lower than is socially optimal. Recall our previous argument
that on average a decentralised vacancy tends to be matched with an agent with too
short a remaining time horizon in the labour force. Even if this were the only e¤ect of
ine¢ cient participation, vacancy supply would be too low. But it is not the only e¤ect
if wages are Nash bargained. In the latter case, ine¢ ciently high participation rates
amongst old workers - which make it more likely for a vacancy to be matched with a
relatively old worker - further reduce the value of employing older workers because of
ine¢ ciently high negotiated wage payments resulting from the positive dependence of
w on h . The two separate e¤ects of ine¢ cient participation decisions - on
s
s and on
S+1 - therefore both work in the same direction and reinforce one another in depressing
market tightness relative to the socially e¢ cient outcome. We will be able to quantify
the departure of  from  in the next section.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we carry out two objectives. First, we quantitatively assess the impli-
cations of age-specic matching for life cycle dynamics in the decentralised equilibria
with and without age discrimination using numerical simulations under plausible pa-
rameterisations. The second is to quantify the departure of the decentralised solutions
from their respective socially optimal allocations. Before proceeding, we rst describe
the calibration and computational method.
4.1 Calibration and Computation
Because the models considered represent two extreme views of reality, the issue arises
of which is the more appropriate benchmark. As will become clear shortly, this turns
out to be inconsequential as our calibration targets are met by both models for the
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assumed parameterisation. Both models are therefore simulated with the same bench-
mark calibration, which is summarised in Table 1. In order for matching frictions to
be meaningful, a time period equal to one quarter is adopted. The discount factor is
then set to  = 0:99. We assume a working life span from the age of 16 to 64, requiring
that T = 196 quarters and all agents retire at the start of age 65. Match productivity
is normalised to unity, a = 1. As in the previous chapter, the baseline value for passive
search intensity,  = 0:2, is taken from Pries and Rogerson (2009). Following Shimer
(2005) we target a replacement ratio of about 40% for the U.S. economy. We thus set
b = 0:39. Symmetric bargaining is assumed as a benchmark case so that  = 0:5, unless
the Hosios condition is imposed in which case  is set equal to the elasticity of q with
respect to tightness. The quarterly separation rate is set to  = 0:05 in accordance
with the data compiled by Shimer (2007).12
In the life cycle setting that we consider, if we were to assume a Cobb-Douglas
technology for m, then as  ! 0 as  ! T , the vacancy transition probability q ( )!
1. Clearly this violates the requirement that q be bounded between zero and one.13
It therefore becomes necessary to depart from the standard Cobb-Douglas form for m.













if it is not. We restrict   0. Note that as ! 0,M ! 0. The benet of adopting such
a specication over the more conventional Cobb-Douglas technology is that the above
function ensures that the transition rates p and q are bounded between 0 and 1 for
positive  . M is homogenous of degree one and increasing in both input arguments.
The transition probabilities can be expressed solely in terms of market tightness as
























and q () =
12For additional details, please see Shimer (2007) and his webpage
http://sites.google.com/site/robertshimer/research/ows. The data from June 1967 and Decem-
ber 1975 were tabulated by Joe Ritter and made available by Hoyt Bleakley.







 ( ) = 1  p
where p = p
0 ( ) =p ( ) is the elasticity of p ( ). For the assumed functional form





 1 for   0
thus ensuring that the optimal allocation is implementable. An analogous expression
holds if the age subscript is dropped.
We follow Cheron et al. (2008) in choosing the models free parameters in order
to match the labour market characteristics of prime-age workers, which we take to be
 = 100 quarters in our models. Specically, we calibrate the models such that the
employment and unemployment ratios at age  = 100, which corresponds to 41 years
of age, are reasonably replicated. In the data, n100 = 0.74 and u100 = 0:0325, which
correspond to the 35-44 age bracket. Recall that, as alluded to in the Introduction,
the horizon e¤ect is weak during the middle stages of the life cycle. Therefore, given
that we target realistic stocks for prime-age workers, both the age-specic and random-
age matching models meet the calibration targets under the same parameterisation,
eliminating the need to establish a benchmark model.
The free parameters are , the support of F and . We normalise the lower bound
h to b so that hT = 0, ensuring that nobody participates in the terminal period with-
out the prospect of nding a job. This is done for simplicity as well as to maintain
consistency with the denition of unemployment as job search. This implies a slight
divergence with the empirical data in Figure 1 in which unemployment at the start
of age 65 is above zero. However, one must recall that in our model all labour force
activity ceases at the start of age 65, whereas this is clearly not the case for the real
U.S. data which is used to compute the life cycle dynamics in the gure. This subtlety
is not important for any of our main results.14
We then have three remaining parameters - , h and  - with which to meet our
two empirical calibration targets. Of the three parameters,  is the one for which the
most information for calibration purposes can be obtained from the related literature
since the other two are much less widely used. However, as discussed below, calibrated
values for  still tend to vary widely. Nevertheless, we choose to normalise  and use the
two remaining parameters to match n100 and u100.15 The upper bound h governs how
14For a later exercise in which we compare decentralised and e¢ cient outcomes, the lower bound on
F is calibrated to a value that is below b, yielding a terminal unemployment ratio that is close to 2%
as in the data.
15Most of the literature on equilibrium matching assumes a Cobb-Douglas form for m and parame-
terises the function according to the empirical estimates of Blanchard and Diamond (1989). In the
absence of empirical estimates for the less common matching function assumed in this chapter, other
authors such as Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and den Haan et al. (2000) use  to pin down selected
rst moments of the data. This does not therefore provide much of a basis for comparison with our
framework. In the absence of related empirical work, it would be even more di¢ cult to pin down the
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reluctant agents are to enter the labour force (and therefore the unemployment pool)
while the matching function parameter  determines the rapidity with which agents
exit the unemployment pool, thus controlling the level of employment for a given pool
of searchers.
In the absence of empirical estimates of the ow cost of vacancy creation, the para-
meter  tends to vary in the literature apparently without a consensus on what would
be an appropriate calibration method, much less a specic value for . For instance,
Shimer (2005) sets  to roughly 20% of labour productivity in order to normalise steady
state market tightness to unity in his model. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) decom-
pose  into costs of idle capital in vacant jobs and the opportunity cost of labour devoted
to the recruitment e¤ort. Using the steady state restrictions of their model, they argue
that the capital and labour costs of posting vacancies are roughly equivalent to 47%
and 11%, respectively, of average labour productivity. In an RBC-matching model,
Andolfatto (1996) simply assumes that the costs of vacancy creation are 1% of steady
state output on the grounds that "in all likelihood... these costs are relatively small".
He nds that this requires  = 0:11 assuming a quarterly time period. Cheron et al.
(2008) also set  = 0:78 to target vacancy recruitment costs of 1% relative to average
annual output, implying   0:20 at the quarterly frequency. Cheron (2007) assume
a smaller (quarterly equivalent) value of about 0.11 in order to pin down the average
employment rate of 55-59 year old male workers. A di¤erent strategy still was demon-
strated in the previous chapter, which followed Krause and Lubik (2007) in determining
the appropriate value of  residually from the steady state job creation condition once
the other parameters had been chosen. This yielded a value of  that was closer to
zero. After considering a range of values for  from 0.01 to 0.2, we found that the
particular value that we normalise  to does not have an important inuence on our
main results. The reason for this is that commensurate adjustments in the remaining
two free parameters o¤set changes in . We therefore report the results for  set to
0.1, which roughly lies at the mid-range of values adopted in the related literature.16
The remaining two parameters are then given by  = 0:74 and h = 1:45.
Given the assumed calibration, life cycle paths for employment, unemployment and
participation are then computed for both models. The computational strategy is to
work recursively backwards given the terminal conditions. For the age-specic matching
model, given that T = 0, market tightness can be solved by iterating backwards on
upper bound on F . Although, in principle, we could have normalised any one of the free parameters
and used the remaining two to match the calibration targets, given that  is common to practically all
other related quantitative matching models we choose to normalise it based on the information that
this provides.
16 It turns out that total costs of vacancy creation relative to match production in this case turn out
















Once a path for market tightness has been computed, the participation threshold
follows straightforwardly from equation (11). Life cycle employment is then determined
from the law of motion (1) and unemployment from the denition in (2).
From equation (13), equilibrium tightness in the random-age model depends on the
entire path of job values J , and so cannot be solved for in the recursive manner used
for age-specic matching. We therefore start with an initial guess for tightness, i, and
compute a rst estimate of life cycle dynamics for the asset values J i and the path of
searchers si . Given the initial solution, we can then compute the right hand side of















This procedure is iterated until convergence in order to solve for equilibrium .17
Given equilibrium tightness, the employment and unemployment paths are computed




Figure 2 shows the life cycle equilibrium paths of the age-specic and random-age
matching models, illustrating the following points. First, the models are jointly con-
sistent with the qualitative hump-shaped patterns of employment and participation as
well as a monotonically declining unemployment path. Quantitatively, however, the
life cycle paths are not as pronounced as in the data. This point has also been recog-
nised by Choi et al. (2011), who have demonstrated that a model with endogenous job
destruction also predicts a relatively at life cycle prole for employment, indicating
that separation dynamics are also only weakly inuenced by the presence of a nite
horizon. The baseline results in Figure 2 therefore indicate that the horizon e¤ect is not
very strong in the model, in the sense that the decline in labour market participation
towards the end of the life cycle occurs with greater abruptness and at a later stage in
the model than in the data (see Figure 1).
Second, age-specic matching has a discernible e¤ect on the decline in employment,
but only as the terminal period draws very near. The di¤erence in unemployment paths
17For iteration i, convergence is dened as i+1   i  0:01.
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is small, so that overall the dynamics of the two specications are very much alike. Pan-
els (b) and (d) show the dynamics of market tightness and the participation constraint
in the age-specic and random-age models, respectively. Clearly, in the random-age
model there is no decline in market tightness for older workers. Instead, the partici-
pation constraint falls due to a decrease in the relative value of a job. The dynamics
of the participation constraint are very similar in both specications. Preventing age
discrimination results in a slightly lower equilibrium level of market tightness of 1.55
compared with 1.62 (for prime-age workers) in the age-specic matching model.
Table 2 summarises the employment and unemployment rates for di¤erent age co-
horts. Despite middle-aged employment being about 0.3 percentage points lower with-
out age discrimination, employment for the 55-64 cohort is about half a percentage
point higher than when age discrimination is allowed. The employment protection ef-
fect of the legislation becomes stronger for workers even closer to the retirement age.
Employment among 60-64 year olds is over a percentage point higher and for 62-64
year olds it is more than 3 percentage points higher. Prohibiting age discrimination
results in only a small reduction in unemployment among older workers.
In addition to a weak horizon e¤ect, the increase in employment during the initial
stage of the life cycle occurs relatively quickly in the model, suggesting that matching
frictions do not present much of an impediment to young agents gaining employment
(this can also be inferred from Table 2). That is to say, the "queueing e¤ect" described
by Cheron et al. (2007) is also quantitatively quite small. Taken in combination, we
therefore nd that weak horizon and queueing e¤ects cause the model to fail to replicate
realistically sloped, hump-shaped dynamics in the middle stages of the life cycle even
when rms are free to hire workers on the basis of age. These ndings support the
notion that the incentives for rms to discriminate strongly against older workers in
the hiring process purely on the basis of age is weak. Equilibrium unemployment theory
predicated on the view that matching frictions matter thus has an in-built mechanism
which tends to smooth out employment rates over the life cycle, indicating that the
pronounced hump-shaped dynamics portrayed in Figure 1 are mainly due to life cycle
factors other than a pure horizon e¤ect on the asset value of employment.
Before proceeding to compute the welfare e¤ects of age discrimination policy, we
rst examine the extent to which changes to the baseline calibration give rise to more
pronounced di¤erences between the life cycle dynamics of the two models. In what
follows, we make changes to the models parameters in isolation, keeping the remainder
of the calibration unchanged. As mentioned previously in section 2.1.3, the tendency
for the Nash bargained wage to fall over the life cycle in line with market tightness
weakens the incentive for rms to decrease job creation for older workers. In order
to examine the quantitative importance of the wage channel in determining life cycle
employment dynamics, consider an economy in which the workers bargaining weight
is close to zero, at  = 0:05.18 Keeping all other parameters as in the baseline cal-
18We do not reduce  all the way to zero in order to preserve a non-zero level of unemployment.
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ibration, Figure 3 shows the impact that this has on the models results. Lowering
 raises the rms share of the joint surplus and disincentivises participation. These
two e¤ects force vacancies up and unemployment down, causing market tightness to
increase substantially. Despite weaker participation, the net e¤ect on employment is
positive as shown in panels (a) and (c). The dynamic e¤ect of this parameter change
is less noticeable. From panel (b), the decline in market tightness commences at an
earlier age in the age-specic matching model compared to the baseline, suggesting that
the insensitivity of the wage to tightness when  is close to zero induces rm to start
to reduce job creation relatively early. However, the impact on life cycle employment
is quantitatively weak. In particular, employment still does not decrease substantially
towards the end of the life cycle. In the random-age matching model, there is hardly a
perceptible decrease in employment as T approaches since the variation in h is small.
Therefore, although equilibrium employment still does not display large variation with
respect to age even under age-specic matching, the divergence of the two models
equilibrium paths becomes somewhat more notable, indicating that age discrimination
policy is likely to be more e¤ective when  is low.
Lowering the matching function parameter  has a similar e¤ect on the impact of
age discrimination policy on employment dynamics. Lowering  raises the expected
duration of vacancies and causes rms to discount the future more heavily. If age
discrimination is possible, vacancy creation will reect a more pronounced horizon
e¤ect. Figure 4 illustrates this for  = 0:4. Abstracting from the level e¤ects of
lowering , reducing the e¢ ciency of the matching function results in a more notable
decline in employment in the second half of life in panel (a) for age-specic matching,
whereas the decline remains relatively at in panel (b) for the random-age model. This
indicates that the e¤ect of  on the path of employment operates through its impact
on job creation rather than participation dynamics. Therefore, the model suggests that
age discrimination policy will be more e¤ective when matching e¢ ciency is low.
In Figure 5 we show the e¤ects of raising  to 0.3, three times the baseline value.
Making vacancy creation more costly lowers market tightness and also makes the decline
in employment towards the end of the life cycle somewhat more pronounced in the age-
specic matching model (panel a). The strength of the horizon e¤ect is positively
related to : as the costs of vacancy supply fall, there is less reason to curtail the
supply of vacancies available to older workers. As a result, we nd that the role for age
discrimination policy is larger when the costs of job creation are high.
Next, consider an alternative measure for , lowering it from its benchmark value of
0.2 to 0.05. In recognition of the fact that by changing  we are e¤ectively changing the
aggregate search intensity of the economy, we can determine how the macroeconomic
implications of age discrimination policy depend on the extent to which agents search
for a job by participating in the labour market. Figure 6 reports the results. From
the participation constraints (11) and (15), lowering  causes h to rise by raising the
return on active job search relative to non-participation. This causes unemployment
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to generally rise in panels (a) and (c) compared with the baseline. In equilibrium we
also nd that market tightness rises in panels (b) and (d) due to increased vacancy
supply in response to higher unemployment. With lower passive search intensity, the
decline in unemployment towards the end of life has a larger negative impact on em-
ployment because, once out of the labour market, agents search for a job with only
very weak intensity. This causes employment to terminate at a lower value relative to
the baseline, and the di¤erence is particularly notable for random-age matching. In
panel (c), we can see that the terminal decline in employment is of comparable magni-
tude to the age-specic model in panel (a). This result indicates that in the baseline
model without age discrimination, transitions from non-participation to employment
were a quantitatively signicant factor in maintaining high employment rates among
the elderly. The model therefore suggests that the e¤ectiveness of age discrimination
policy hinges to some extent on large ows from non-participation to employment. This
is not entirely surprising, since low unemployment among older workers implies that
active job search is relatively low. With a constant rate of job destruction over the life
cycle, high employment rates for older workers cannot be sustained unless the intensity
of passive search is reasonably high. Once again, however, life cycle dynamics remain
much less pronounced than in the data, such that even in the age-specic matching
model the decline in employment past middle age is quantitatively small.
The last parameter experiment we consider is a "shock" to the separation rate.
By inuencing the continuation value of matches, the average length of a job, or its
"durability", may determine the extent to which job creation tapers o¤at the end of the
life cycle. To the extent that higher separation rates reduce the likelihood of continuing
the match into the future, the incentive to age discriminate is weakened since future
periods are discounted more heavily. In order to investigate this hypothesis, we raise 
to 0.1 without changing any of the other baseline parameter values, thereby simulating
an exogenous shock to match durability. Figure 7 plots the impact that this has on the
age-specic and random-age matching models. The results indicate that, expectedly,
a higher separation rate is associated with lower employment at every stage of the
life cycle. Notably, despite the reduction in employment, unemployment does not rise
substantially even though we held matching e¢ ciency constant. Hence, participation
rates decline by roughly the same factor as employment. The qualitative shape of
employment and unemployment dynamics remains the same relative to the baseline,
with terminal employment declining more sharply under age-specic matching. The
e¢ cacy of age discrimination policy therefore is not found to be very sensitive to the
destruction rate.
4.2.2 Welfare Analysis
Our rst objective in evaluating the welfare e¤ects of age discrimination policy is to
quantify the distortion caused by the presence of the intergenerational externality in
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the participation decision of the random-age matching model. The bargaining weight of
the worker is now replaced by the elasticity of the matching function with respect to va-
cancies. Furthermore, the intergenerational externality in the participation constraint
(19) reduces the terminal value of hT below b, so it becomes necessary to adjust the
lower bound on F accordingly in order to ensure that h always remains positive. We
assume that it is reduced to h = b  , where  = 0:1. This calibration implies that un-
employment terminates at approximately 2%, which is close to what is observed in the
data. Note that we make the same adjustment to the support of F in the decentralised
solution when comparing it to the social optimum. In order for the decentralised equi-
librium to achieve our calibration targets for employment and unemployment as stated
in the previous section, we re-adjust  to 1 and h to 1.6.19 All other parameters remain
the same as in the baseline.
Figure 8 compares the e¢ cient outcome to the private outcome with symmetric
bargaining ( = 0:5). It turns out that market tightness is slightly higher at the social
optimum, with  = 1:01 as opposed to  = 0:93. Given , it also turns out that,
coincidentally,  () = 0:50, which matches the assumption of symmetric bargaining
in the decentralised equilibrium. This is convenient for our analysis since it implies
that any departure of the decentralised equilibrium from the planners solution in Fig-
ure 8 is due to the intergenerational externality rather than bargaining ine¢ ciencies.
The di¤erences in the life cycle paths of employment and unemployment bear out the
previously derived theoretical result that the decentralised h is too low for young
workers and too high for older workers. Figure 9 plots h and h , illustrating that
the social planners correction for the intergenerational externality in equation (19)
raises participation for the young and decreases it for the old. As can be seen from
Figure 8, unemployment at  = 1 is too low in the decentralised equilibrium, which,
in conjunction with ine¢ ciently low market tightness, then leads to lower employment
over most of the life cycle. Correcting for the intergenerational externality exerts an
opposite force on the unemployment path of the old as the terminal period approaches.
Although the decline in unemployment begins at just before age 60 in both models, the
social planner desires a steeper fall in unemployment towards the end of working life.
Quantitatively, average unemployment for the 60-65 cohort is about half a percentage
point lower in the e¢ cient solution (2.94% versus 2.39% ) and terminal unemployment
is about 1.6 percentage points lower (2.06% versus 0.4%) As h declines at a faster
pace for older workers relative to the private outcome, the employment rate also falls
more quickly as T approaches. Thus, although employment is higher throughout the
majority of the life cycle at the planners solution, the terminal value is smaller than in
the decentralised equilibrium. Overall, however, e¢ cient dynamics are quantitatively
similar to the decentralised outcome for most of the life cycle.
It is desirable to obtain a more precise quantitative measure of the divergence be-
19The rationale for increasing these parameters is to o¤set the increase in unemployment due to the
decrease in the lower bound of F which lowers average home productivity.
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tween the decentralised equilibrium and the social optimum. Given equilibrium paths
for employment, unemployment and participation we can compute the value of output
net of vacancy creation costs for each economy. In this manner, an indicator of the wel-
fare e¤ect of the intergenerational externality is obtained. We nd that, characterised
in terms of net output, the di¤erence between the e¢ cient and private equilibria is
negligible. Specically, the social planner attains a level of net output equal to 191.66
whereas the gure for the decentralised economy is 191.63. Despite perceptibly di¤erent
dynamics in Figure 8, therefore, the e¢ ciency loss from the failure of the free market
to account for the life cycle externalities of participation choices is very small indeed.
Next, we compare dynamics in the e¢ cient and decentralised versions of the age-
specic matching model. In order to facilitate comparison with the previous results,
we adopt the same parameterisation, setting h = b   0:1, h = 1:6 and  = 1. Figure
10 plots the results. Whereas in the random-age matching model it was found that the
decentralised economy exhibited too little labour force activity, we now nd that labour
force participation, employment and unemployment are all lower at the social optimum
with age specic matching - except at the very end of the life cycle. Observing the
behaviour of the e¢ cient unemployment path, it can be seen that unemployment rises
towards the end of the life cycle, thereby indicating that market tightness increases
with age for at least some portion of the life cycle. Consequently, the social optimum
is oscillatory and the monotonicity property does not continue to hold. The reason for
this is due to the interaction between market tightness and the elasticity  ( ), which
is now age-dependent and therefore varies over the life cycle.
Let us analyse the mechanism by which age-dependent bargaining weights are prone
to yielding oscillatory dynamics in more detail. To aid with the explanation, Figure
11 plots  and  ( ) for the planners solution and the private equilibrium for ages
60 to 65. As the two left panels illustrate, market tightness displays a monotonic
decline as T approaches in the decentralised economy, in accordance with the intuition
underlying our monotonicity property established previously in Proposition 1. The
participation threshold h (not shown) traces the path of market tightness and also
declines smoothly as T approaches. The workers (symmetric) bargaining weight is
xed over the life cycle. In the social planners economy, by contrast, market tightness
becomes unstable as the terminal period approaches, thereby introducing oscillatory
terminal participation dynamics as well. The e¢ cient counterpart to the workers
bargaining weight is displayed in panel (d) of Figure 11. Given that 0 ( )  0,  ( )
traces the path of market tightness.
To see the economics behind the endogenous relationship between  and  (

 )
and how this gives rise to oscillatory dynamics in the socially optimal equilibrium,
start from the period before the last, T   1, in equation (16). At T   1, the right hand
side of that expression is the same for both the decentralised economy as well as the
social optimum since market tightness at T in both economies is zero. Then, the T 1
which solves the left hand side for 
(1 (T 1))q(T 1)
happens to be larger than the
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T 1 which solves the decentralised counterpart (1 )q(T 1) . This is because for low




is small. It turns out that (as Figure 11 indicates) T 1 = 0:68,
which is larger than the decentralised value of T 1 = 0:19. Since 0 ( )  0, this high




, which from (16) has a negative e¤ect on T 1 that is
akin to an increase in the workers bargaining weight in the decentralised outcome. In
e¤ect, the Hosios condition with age-dependent market tightness reinforces the negative
relationship between the wage and market tightness. High anticipated market tightness
at age  + 1 then has a negative e¤ect on the supply of vacancies at age  . This is
exactly what causes market tightness at the e¢ cient solution to fall sharply at T   2
in Figure 11. Relatively low T 2 then induces a high value at 

T 3, and so on until
convergence at just above 0.4.
It is particularly notable that the e¢ cient level of market tightness stabilises at
a lower level during the middle of the life cycle than is observed for the decentralised
outcome despite the e¢ cient bargaining strength, at a value of approximately 0.3, lying
below the assumed case of symmetric bargaining. This further reinforces the intuition
that rendering worker bargaining strength dependent on the level of market tightness
serves to reduce equilibrium market tightness through the adverse e¤ect on vacancy
supply. Lower values of  in the decentralised equilibrium exacerbate the di¤erence
in the average value of market tightness between the two economies. Figure 12 plots
the dynamics of the participation threshold and market tightness from setting  = 0:3.
The matching parameter  is reset to 0.7 in order to maintain realistic prime-age
employment but the rest of the calibration is unchanged relative to the model in Figure
11.20 Average market tightness increases in the decentralised equilibrium due to weaker
bargaining strength, whereas it decreases at the social optimum. The lower value for
 exacerbates the oscillations in market tightness, which eventually converge at about
0.3. Net e¢ cient production is 192.40 while the decentralised economy produces 190.38,
still representing a very small di¤erence.
Despite qualitatively di¤erent behaviour towards the end of the life cycle, we nd
that the e¢ ciency gain in terms of net production is once again negligible at the social
optimum. Output net of the costs of vacancy creation is equal to 192.50 at the e¢ -
cient allocation and 191.66 for the private outcome. Comparing net output with the
random-age matching model, the di¤erences are also minimal, with the social planners
allocation producing slightly more when age-specic matching is possible (192.50 versus
191.66). The di¤erence in net production in the two decentralised economies is also
very small, suggesting that anti-age discrimination legislation does not have a large
impact on the amount of output the economy actually produces.
To summarise, we nd that the failure to implement the Hosios condition results in
negligible e¢ ciency losses in the age-specic matching equilibrium with age dependent
elasticity  ( ). In our life cycle setting, we also nd that age-dependent bargaining
20For brevity, a counterpart to Figure 10 displaying full life cycle dynamics of participation, employ-
ment and unemployment is omitted due to similarity.
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weights cause equilibrium monotonicity to break down, instead giving rise to more
complicated oscillatory dynamics towards the end of the life cycle. This is because, in
order for the decentralised economy to be socially e¢ cient, the bargaining strength of
the worker must be rendered dependent on market tightness, which is age-dependent
in this specication. In this context, it is not optimal for unemployment to follow a
monotonically declining equilibrium path over the life cycle. Despite this di¤erence
in the behaviour of unemployment, only a quantitatively small departure of the de-
centralised solution to the socially optimal allocation is found in terms of net output
produced. We also nd that the size of the e¢ ciency loss associated with age discrimi-
nation policy is quantitatively negligible due to the presence of only a weak e¤ect of a
nite horizon on behaviour in general.
5 Conclusion
This chapter has applied equilibrium unemployment theory to quantitatively evaluate
the implications of age discrimination policy for the performance of the labour market.
Our results suggest that such policy has a moderately positive e¤ect on the employment
rate of older workers close to retirement, but is unlikely to have further repercussions
which are of considerable magnitude on workers who are of a younger age but still
nevertheless protected by anti-discrimination laws such as the ADEA. This is because
the negative e¤ect on employment of a shorter remaining time horizon is o¤set by
congestion e¤ects that are generated by matching frictions which prevent equilibrium
job creation from dropping very low for older workers even when age discrimination
is possible. We have also argued that although preventing rms from hiring on the
basis of age introduces an age-dependent externality in the labour force participation
decision of agents, the resultant e¢ ciency loss is quantitatively negligible.
It is emphasised that this chapters analysis has concerned the macroeconomic im-
plications of age discrimination policy as separate and distinct from the issue of fairness
which naturally arises in this context. Although we have argued that the economic im-
pact of age discrimination policy on employment is likely to be quite small, this does
not of course imply that such policy does not have signicant merit with respect to its
assurance of the basic tenet of equal opportunity for all.
6 References
Adams, Scott J. (2004), Age Discrimination Legislation and the Employment of Older
Workers, Labour Economics, vol. 11, pp. 219-41.
Andolfatto, David (1996), "Business Cycles and Labor Market Search", American Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 86(1), pp. 112-32.
Bendick, Marc, Jr., Charles W. Jackson, and J. Horacio Romero (1996), Employment
173
Discrimination Against Older Workers: An Experimental Study of Hiring Practices,
Journal of Aging & Social Policy, vol. 8(4), pp. 25-46.
Bettendorf, Leon J. H. and D. Peter Broer (2003), "Lifetime Labor Supply in a Search
Model of Unemployment", Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2003-032/2.
Cheron, Arnaud, Jean-Olivier Hairault and Francois Langot (2007), "Job Creation
and Job Destruction over the Life Cycle: The Older Workers in the Spotlight", IZA
Discussion Paper Series, No. 2597.
Cheron, Arnaud, Jean-Olivier Hairault and Francois Langot (2008), "Life Cycle Equi-
librium Unemployment", IZA Discussion Paper Series, No. 3396.
Choi, Sekyu, Alexandre Janiak and Benjamin Villena-Roldan (2011), "Unemployment,
Participation and Worker Flows Over the Life Cycle", Unpublished.
Davis, Steven, John Haltiwanger, and Scott Schuh (1996), Job Creation and Destruc-
tion, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
den Haan, Wouter, Gary Ramey and Joel Watson (2000) "Job Destruction and the
Propagation of Shocks", American Economic Review, vol. 90, pp. 482-98.
Hagedorn, Marcus and Iourrii Manovskii (2008), "The Cyclical Behaviour of Equilib-
rium Unemployment and Vacancies Revisited", European Central Bank Working Paper
Series No. 853.
Hahn, Volker (2009), "Search, Unemployment and Age", Journal of Economic Dynam-
ics and Control, vol 33, pp. 1361-78.
Hall, Robert (1995), Lost Jobs, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 22173.
Hosios, Arthur (1990), "On the E¢ ciency of Matching and Related Models of Search
and Unemployment", Review of Economic Studies, vol. 57, 279-98.
Issacharo¤, Samuel and Erica Worth Harris (1997), "Is Age Discrimination Really Age
Discrimination? The ADEAs Unnatural Solution", New York University Law Review,
vol 72(4), pp. 780-840.
Krause, Michael U. and Thomas A Lubik (2007), "The (Ir)relevance of Real Wage
Rigidity in the New Keynesian Model with Search Frictions", Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol 54, pp. 706-727.
Lahey, Joanna (2007), "State Age Protection Laws and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act", Bush School Working Paper # 600, The Bush School of Government
and Public Service, Texas A&M University.
174
Lahey, Joanna (2008), Age, Women, and Hiring: An Experimental Study, Journal
of Human Resources, vol. 43, 30-56.
Lazear, Edward P. (1979), "Why is there Mandatory Retirement?", Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 87(6), pp. 1261-84.
Neumark, David (2009), "The Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Chal-
lenge of Population Aging", Research on Aging, vol 31(1), pp. 41-68.
Neumark, David andWendy Stock (1999), "Age Discrimination Laws and Labor Market
E¢ ciency", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 107(5), pp. 1081-125.
Pissarides, Christopher (2000), Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Second Edition,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Pries, Michael and Richard Rogerson (2009), "Search Frictions and Labor Market Par-
ticipation", European Economic Review, vol. 53, pp. 568-87.
Shimer, Robert (2005), "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and
Vacancies: Evidence and Theory", American Economic Review, 95, pp. 25-49.
Shimer, Robert (2007), "Reassessing the Ins and Outs of Unemployment", NBERWork-
ing Paper, No. W13421, NBER.
Walsh, Carl (2005), "Labor Market Search, Sticky Prices and Interest Rate Policies",
Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 8, pp. 829-49.
7 Appendix: Wage Derivation
A derivation is presented for the Nash wage solution when bargaining powers are age-
dependent. The Nash sharing rule modied for age-dependent bargaining powers is
W  
(









for all  . Substituting the respective Bellman equations into the above Nash sharing
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Solving the above expression for w yields the wage equation with age-dependent
bargaining weights (17) from the text:





























Table 1: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Value Parameter Value
 0.99  0.10
 0.5  0.05
 0.74  0.20
b;h 0.39 h 1.45
Table 2: Life Cycle Dynamics
Model U.S. Data
Cohort Age Specic Random Age
n (%) u (%) n (%) u (%) n (%) u (%)
16-24 63.79 4.41 63.33 4.44 54.79 7.25
25-34 74.37 3.12 74.01 3.15 71.31 4.15
35-44 74.37 3.12 74.01 3.14 74.23 3.25
45-54 74.37 3.12 74.01 3.14 72.87 2.85
55-64 72.88 2.66 73.25 2.55 56.76 2.20
60-64 71.43 2.20 72.57 2.03 - -
62-64 68.30 1.27 71.43 1.14 - -
Figure 2: Life Cycle Dynamics under the Baseline Calibration










































































Participation Threshold (right scale)
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Figure 3: Life Cycle Dynamics with Low Worker Bargaining Power










































































Participation Threshold (right scale)
Note: Life cycle paths are computed for  = 0:05 keeping the rest of the calibration as in the
baseline.
178
Figure 4: Life Cycle Dynamics with Low Matching E¢ ciency















































































Note: Life cycle paths are computed for  = 0:4 keeping the rest of the calibration as in the
baseline.
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Figure 5: Life Cycle Dynamics with High Costs of Vacancy Creation














































































Participation Threshold (right scale)
Note: Life cycle paths are computed for  = 0:3 keeping the rest of the calibration as in the
baseline.
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Figure 6: Life Cycle Dynamics with Low Passive Search Intensity






































































Participation Threshold (right scale)
Note: Life cycle paths are computed for  = 0:05 keeping the rest of the calibration as in the
baseline.
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Figure 7: Life Cycle Dynamics with Low Match Durability






































































Participation Threshold (right scale)
Note: Life cycle paths are computed for  = 0:1 keeping the rest of the calibration as in the
baseline.
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Figure 8: Comparing the Social Optimum with the Decentralised Equilibrium under
Random-Age Matching


























Note: Life cycle paths are computed for h = b  0:1, h = 1:6 and  = 1 keeping the rest of the
calibration as in the baseline.
Figure 9: The Social Planners Correction to the Participation Threshold



























Note: Life cycle paths are computed for h = b  0:1, h = 1:6 and  = 1 keeping the rest of the
calibration as in the baseline.
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Figure 10: Comparing the Social Optimum with the Decentralised Equilibrium under
Age-Specic Matching

























Note: Life cycle paths are computed for h = b  0:1, h = 1:6 and  = 1 keeping the rest of the
calibration as in the baseline.
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Figure 11: Terminal Dynamics in the Age-Specic Matching Model


































Worker Bargaining WeightWorker Bargaining Weight
Tightness
Tightness
Note: Life cycle paths are computed for h = b  0:1, h = 1:6 and  = 1 keeping the rest of the
calibration as in the baseline.
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Figure 12: Terminal Dynamics in the Age-Specic Matching Model with Low Worker
Bargaining Power



































Worker Bargaining Weight Worker Bargaining Weight
Tightness Tightness
Note: Life cycle paths are computed for h = b  0:1, h = 1:6,  = 1 and  = 0:3 keeping the
rest of the calibration as in the baseline.
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